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Game theory is the study of mathematical models of conflict and coopera-
tion between intelligent rational decision makers (Myerson (1991)). The book
"Theory of Games and Economics Behavior" written by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947) is considered as the starting point of game theory litera-
ture. In this book, von Neumann and Morgenstern distinguish between two
main approaches in game theory. The possibility of signing a binding contract
among the players is the main distinction between these two approaches. A
cooperative game corresponds to a game where commitments are fully bind-
ing and enforceable while for non-cooperative games the commitments have
no binding force, see, e.g., Harsanyi (1966). When it is assumed that all play-
ers choose to cooperate, the fundamental question in cooperative game theory
deals with the problem of how much payoff every player should receive. A
solution concept assigns a set of suitable payoff vectors to each cooperative
game.
Cooperative games with transferable utilities, or simply TU-games, refers
to the case where the revenues created by a coalition of players through co-
operation can be freely distributed to the members of the coalition. Formally,
a TU-game consists of a set of players and a characteristic function which as-
signs to each coalition of players its worth being the highest revenue that the
coalition can earn without cooperating with the rest of the players. As a gen-
eral solution concept for TU-games, Gillies (1959) introduces the core which
is the set of payoff vectors that are efficient and stable. A payoff vector is ef-
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ficient if it distributes the worth of the grand coalition of all players and in
order to be stable each coalition of players should receive at least its worth as
the total joint payoff.
The best known single-valued solution concept for TU-games is the Shap-
ley value. For the Shapley value, all permutations on the player set are con-
sidered and the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding
to those permutations is calculated. At such a payoff vector, a player receives
what he contributes in worth to the set of his predecessors in the permutation.
The Shapley value is characterized by efficiency, additivity, the null-player
property, and symmetry, see Shapley (1953). In the literature there are vari-
ous other characterizations of the Shapley value. Together with efficiency and
symmetry Young (1985) uses strong monotonicity and in van den Brink (2002)
a fairness axiom is used together with efficiency and the null player property.
The classical assumption for TU-games states that every coalition is able to
form and earn the worth created by cooperation. However, in many practical
situations the collection of coalitions that can be formed is restricted by some
social, economical, hierarchical, or technical structure. In the literature there
are several different modifications of TU-games in order to cover the cases
where cooperation among the players is restricted.
Aumann and Dréze (1974) and Owen (1977) consider cooperative games
with coalition structure which is called a priori unions in Owen (1977). The
coalition structure in these models is an exogenously given partition of the
set of all players. Aumann and Dréze (1974) assumes that cooperation is not
restricted within each member of the partition, but on the other hand, for
the players that belong to different elements of the partition it is impossible
to cooperate. For such situations, Aumann and Dréze (1974) studies well-
known solution concepts including the Shapley value. According to Owen
(1977), the players that are in the same a priori union are more likely to co-
operate compared to the players of different a priori unions. For games with
a priori unions, Owen (1977) introduces Owen’s value and provides a char-
acterization for it. Different than the Shapley value which is the average of
the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all permutations, Owen’s
value considers those permutations in which the players in each element of
the partition appear successively. Instead of a partition of the set of players,
there are various papers that consider other specific set systems. For exam-
ple, Algaba et al. (2001) considers union stable cooperation structures, Bilbao
and Edelman (2000a) considers convex geometries, Bilbao et al. (2001) consid-
ers matroids, Algaba et al. (2003) considers antimatroids, Bilbao and Ordónez
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(2009a) considers augmenting systems, Ui et al. (2011a) considers complete
coalition structures, and Koshevoy and Talman (2014) considers building sets.
For more models of games with restricted cooperation represented by other
combinatorial structures we refer to Bilbao (2000).
Another way to include restricted cooperation into TU-games is by assum-
ing a permission structure. A permission structure is modeled by means of
a directed graph and players need the permission of their superiors in the
directed graph in order to cooperate. There are two main approaches for
TU-games with permission structure. Gilles et al. (1992), Derks and Gilles
(1995) and van den Brink and Gilles (1996) consider situations where each
player needs the permission of all his superiors to cooperate (conjunctive ap-
proach). On the other hand, in Gilles and Owen (1999), and van den Brink
(1997) another assumption is employed which states that the permission of
one direct superior is sufficient to cooperate (disjunctive approach). In the two
approaches, by taking both the underlying game and the permission structure
into account, a new TU-game is defined and the Shapley value of this game is
taken as solution.
Faigle and Kern (1992) considers TU-games with precedence constraints
which are modeled by some partially ordered set of players. In case of prece-
dence constraints, only the coalitions that respect the precedence structure on
the set of players are able to form. Faigle and Kern (1992) defines the Shapley
value for TU-games with precedence constraints and provides a characteriza-
tion.
Yet, another way to represent restricted cooperation in a TU-game is to as-
sume that cooperation depends on a communication structure which is gen-
erally represented by an undirected graph on the set of players. The study of
TU-games with communication structure represented by undirected graphs
is initiated by Myerson (1977), see also Owen (1986) and Borm et al. (1994).
In an undirected graph on the set of players, an edge between two players is
interpreted as the players’ ability to communicate bilaterally with each other.
Given a communication structure represented by an undirected graph, Myer-
son (1977) assumes that only connected sets of players in the graph are able
to form a coalition. For games with such communication structure, Myer-
son (1977) introduces a value, called the Myerson value, which is the Shap-
ley value of the so called Myerson restricted game. The Myerson value is
characterized by component efficiency and fairness. Borm et al. (1992) also
considers cooperative games with communication structure and studies the
position value as a solution concept for such games, see Meessen (1988). A
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characterization of the position value for TU-games with cycle-free communi-
cation structure is provided by Borm et al. (1992). In case of an arbitrary undi-
rected graph representing the communication structure, a characterization of
the position value is provided by Slikker (2005). Together with introducing
the position value, Borm et al. (1992) also provides a new axiomatic charac-
terization of the Myerson value by using component efficiency, additivity, the
superfluous arc property, and the communication ability property. As a more
general structure, Myerson (1980) introduces conference structures as a way
to model communication in TU-games. In contrast to graphs, in a conference
structure a communication link can also be formed among the members of a
coalition with more than two players. In van den Nouweland et al. (1992),
the communication structure in TU-games is modeled with hypergraphs and
characterizations of the Myerson value and the position value are provided.
For games with communication structure which are represented by a cycle-
free undirected graph, Herings et al. (2008) introduces as solution concept the
average tree solution and Herings et al. (2010) defines the average tree so-
lution for games with communication structure represented by an arbitrary
undirected graph. For TU-games with cycle-free communication structure,
the average tree solution is the average of the marginal contribution vectors
corresponding to all spanning trees of the graph. For this class of games, Her-
ings et al. (2008) characterizes the average tree solution with component ef-
ficiency and component fairness. Other characterizations of the average tree
solution for TU-games with cycle-free communication structure are provided
by Mishra and Talman (2010) and van den Brink (2009). In Mishra and Talman
(2010) efficiency, linearity, strong symmetry, the dummy property, and inde-
pendence in unanimity games are used for a characterization. On the other
hand, van den Brink (2009) uses component efficiency, collusion neutrality,
additivity, the communication ability property, the equal gain/loss property,
and component independence.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this monograph deal with TU-games with restricted
cooperation. Chapter 2 considers TU-games with communication structure.
The communication structure in that chapter, which restricts cooperation among
the players, is represented by a cycle-free graph on the set of players. A
new characterization of the average tree solution for TU-games with cycle-free
communication structure is provided. The axioms used for this characteriza-
tion are in the same spirit of the ones that are used to characterize the Shapley
value for TU-games. For this characterization, we use efficiency, linearity, the
restricted null player property, strong symmetry, and restricted marginality.
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Chapter 3 considers TU-games with dominance structure. Different than
a communication structure, the dominance structure is represented by a di-
rected graph on the set of players and similar to a communication structure it
restricts the cooperation among the players. For TU-games with dominance
structure, we introduce two solution concepts, the average covering tree so-
lution and the dominance value. The average covering tree solution is the
average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all covering
trees of the digraph and the dominance value is the average of the marginal
contribution vectors corresponding to all consistent permutations. Given a
TU-game with dominance structure, each node in the directed graph may be
considered as a task that needs to be completed and different assumptions
about the ordering of the tasks results in different solution concepts. For the
average covering tree solution it is assumed that at each time several tasks
can be completed as long as they belong to independent groups of tasks and
the subordination of tasks in the digraph is not violated. On the other hand,
for the dominance value it is assumed that at each time only one task can be
completed as long as the subordination of tasks in the digraph is not violated.
In case the dominance structure is represented by a cycle-free directed graph,
the Shapley value introduced in Faigle and Kern (1992) and the dominance
value coincide. Both the average covering tree solution and the dominance
value are efficient, linear and independent of inessential arcs. Moreover, the
average covering tree solution satisfies the superfluous player property and
hierarchical efficiency, while the dominance value satisfies the restricted null
player property and the restricted equal treatment property. Additionally, for
each of these solution concepts we provide a convexity type of condition that
guaranties the core stability of the solution and we provide characterizations
on the class of TU-games with special types of dominance structures.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the fact that in some real life cases, graphs
and specific combinatorial structures are not the appropriate tools to repre-
sent restricted cooperation. In that chapter, a set system is taken to represent
the restricted cooperation in a TU-game. We assume that the grand coali-
tion is a member of the set system or can be partitioned into coalitions such
that each feasible coalition is a subset of a partition member. For TU-games
with coalitional structures, where the restricted cooperation is represented by
a set system on the set of players, we introduce the average coalitional tree
solution. As the Shapley value for TU-games with arbitrary coalitional struc-
ture, Aguilera et al. (2010) considers the average of the marginal contribution
vectors corresponding to all maximal chains of the set system. However, the
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average coalitional tree solution is defined as the average of the marginal con-
tribution vectors corresponding to all maximal nested sets of the set system.
A nested set of a set system is a more general concept than a chain. We study
the properties that are satisfied by the average coalitional tree solution and
consider the special cases where the coalitional structure is a building set and
forms a partition of the set of players.
The remaining two chapters of this monograph belong to the area of so-
cial choice theory which deals with collective decision making by aggregating
individual preferences to obtain a social preference.
In a voting situation, if voters are asked to compare all candidates pair-
wise, the result of this procedure will be a tournament if the number of voters
is odd. Formally, a tournament is a complete and asymmetric binary relation
on a set of alternatives and it can also be considered as a complete asymmetric
directed graph. Given a tournament, a Condorcet winner is the alternative
that has an arc in the directed graph to every other alternative. For a tour-
nament, a Condorcet winner may not exist and if a solution picks the Con-
dorcet winner whenever it exists, then this solution is said to be Condorcet
consistent. In the literature, several different methods, called tournament so-
lutions, are proposed to choose the winner of a tournament. Zermelo (1929)
employs a probabilistic approach and as a self consistent choice rule, Grivko
and Levchenkov (1994) proposes the Markovian solution, and Slikker et al.
(2012) employs an iterative approach to rank the alternatives in a tournament.
Additionally, Fishburn (1977) and Miller (1980) proposes the uncovered set,
and Dutta (1988) introduces the minimal covering set. For a tournament, the
Copeland solution consists of the alternatives that have an arc to a maximum
number of alternatives, see Copeland (1951). Chapter 5 provides a new char-
acterization of the Copeland solution that is defined for tournaments. It is
shown that the Copeland winner is not only a score maximizer but also is
minimizing the number of steps required to reach every other alternative.
Chapter 6 deals with preference aggregation in case the social preferences
are sophisticated. Arrow (1951) defines a social welfare function as a rule that
assigns a social preference to each possible profile of individual preferences
on the set of alternatives. A preference on a set of alternatives is a complete,
reflexive, and transitive binary relation. The celebrated impossibility result
in Arrow (1951) shows that the dictatorial social welfare function, that cares
about only the preference of a single individual, is the only social welfare func-
tion that satisfies a set of desirable properties, including Pareto optimality and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. A sophisticated preference, which
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is more general than a standard preference, adds ambiguity into the prefer-
ences. A sophisticated social welfare function is defined as a mapping from
the profiles of individual standard preferences to the set of sophisticated pref-
erences. In this chapter, we characterize sophisticated social welfare functions,
that are Pareto optimal and independent of irrelevant alternatives, in terms of
oligarchies that are induced by some power distribution in the society. This
class is quite large which contains both dictatoriality and equal power distri-
bution as two the extreme cases. When the range of the sophisticated social
welfare function is restricted to the set of standard preferences, it can be shown
that the induced oligarchy contains only one individual. Hence, the results in
this chapter generalize the impossibility theorem of Arrow (1951).

CHAPTER 2




In this chapter, we consider TU-games with communication structure which is
represented by an undirected graph on the set of players, see Myerson (1977).
For TU-games with communication structure, only the players that form a
connected set in the undirected graph are able to cooperate. To illustrate this
point, consider a situation where several cities are located along a river. Sup-
pose that using the river is vital for trade because it is the only way to transport
goods between the cities. Therefore, in order to cooperate and trade with each
other, any subset of these cities must form a connected set along the river. In
this setting, cities can be considered as the set of players and the river corre-
sponds to the set of bilateral communication links connecting players to each
other. Once a subset of cities is able to trade, there will emerge a revenue
which is the worth corresponding to that coalition of cities. Given that all
cities are connected by the river, a solution for such a situation deals with the
problem of distributing the total revenue resulting from the cooperation of all
cities.
For TU-games, where every subset of players is able to cooperate, the Shap-
ley value is the most well known solution concept. The Shapley value is de-
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fined as the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all
permutations on the set of players, see Shapley (1953). The original character-
ization of the Shapley value, as in Shapley (1953), uses efficiency, additivity,
the null-player property, and symmetry. In the literature, there exist several
other characterizations of the Shapley value where Young (1985) uses strong
monotonicity together with efficiency and symmetry. As a way to include
restricted cooperation, Myerson (1977) considers TU-games with communica-
tion structure which is represented by an arbitrary undirected graph on the
set of players. In a TU-game with communication structure, Myerson (1977)
assumes only connected sets of players in the undirected graph are able to co-
operate. For TU-games with communication structure, the Myerson value is
the Shapley value of the so-called Myerson restricted game. On the class of
TU-games with communication structure, Myerson (1977) provides a charac-
terization of the Myerson value by using component efficiency and fairness.
As a solution concept, Herings et al. (2008) introduces the average tree so-
lution for TU-games with communication structure which is represented by
a cycle-free graph. Herings et al. (2010) studies the average tree solution for
TU-games with communication structure represented by an arbitrary undi-
rected graph. Given a TU-game with cycle-free communication structure, for
the average tree solution all spanning trees of the undirected graph are con-
sidered and the average of the corresponding marginal contribution vectors
is calculated. The marginal contribution vector corresponding to a tree is first
defined by Demange (2004) as the hierarchical outcome. For a cycle-free undi-
rected graph, a spanning tree is a cycle-free directed graph where each arc
between any pair of nodes corresponds to an edge between the same pair of
nodes in the undirected graph. For this class of games, Herings et al. (2008)
characterizes the average tree solution with component efficiency and com-
ponent fairness. Other characterizations of the average tree solution for TU-
games with cycle-free communication structure are provided by Mishra and
Talman (2010) and van den Brink (2009). In Mishra and Talman (2010) effi-
ciency, linearity, strong symmetry, the dummy property, and independence
in unanimity games are used for this characterization, while van den Brink
(2009) uses component efficiency, collusion neutrality, additivity, the commu-
nication ability property, the equal gain/loss property, and component inde-
pendence as axioms. Additionally, for TU-games with communication struc-
ture which is represented by a cycle on the set of players, Selçuk et al. (2013)
provides a characterization of the average tree solution. For this characteri-
zation, together with efficiency, linearity, and the restricted dummy property
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some modified symmetry axioms are used.
In this chapter, we provide a new characterization of the average tree solu-
tion for TU-games with cycle-free communication structure by using axioms
that are in the same spirit of the ones that characterize the Shapley value as in
Shapley (1953) and Young (1985). For this characterization, we use efficiency,
linearity, the restricted null player property, strong symmetry, and restricted
marginality. Among those axioms, efficiency and linearity are well-known in
the literature and are also satisfied by the Myerson value. Given a TU-game
with cycle-free communication structure, if a player’s marginal contributions
to any collection of his satellites, which are the components arising when
this player is erased from the communication structure, are zero, then the re-
stricted null player property requires this player to receive zero payoff. The
restricted null player property is not satisfied by the Myerson value and may
be considered as a strong form of the null player property used by Shapley
(1953). Strong symmetry is also satisfied by the Myerson value and it requires
equal payoff for all players if any proper subset of the grand coalition has zero
worth, see Mishra and Talman (2010). On the class of TU-games with con-
nected cycle-free communication structure, strong symmetry coincides with
the weak communication ability property introduced by van den Brink et al.
(2011). Restricted marginality requires a player to receive the same payoff in
two different TU-games with the same cycle-free communication structure, if
this player’s marginal contributions to some specific coalitions are the same
in both games. This property is not satisfied by the Myerson value.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the preliminaries.
Section 3 introduces the Shapley value, the Myerson value and the average
tree solution. Section 4 provides the new characterization of the average tree
solution.
2.2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is represented by a pair
(N, v), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of n players with n ≥ 2, and
v : 2N → R is a characteristic function defined on the power set of N, satisfying
v(∅) = 0. A subset S ∈ 2N is a coalition and the associated real number v(S)
stands for the worth of coalition S, being the total joint revenue that is achiev-
able by S without cooperating with the rest of the players and can be freely
distributed among the players in S. We denote the set of TU-games with fixed
player set N by GN. Shapley (1953) introduces the class of unanimity games
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which forms a linear basis for GN. For a coalition S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, the unanimity
game uS ∈ GN is defined by
uS(Q) =
{
1 if Q ⊇ S,
0 otherwise,
for all Q ∈ 2N.
A payoff vector x ∈ Rn is an n-dimensional vector at which xi is the pay-
off available for player i ∈ N. A single-valued solution on GN is a function
ξ : GN → Rn that assigns to every TU-game (N, v) ∈ GN a payoff vector
ξ(N, v) ∈ Rn.
A graph on N is a pair (N, L), consisting of a set of nodes N and a collection
of unordered pairs of nodes L ⊆ LcN, where LcN = { {i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} is
the complete (undirected) graph without loops on N and an unordered pair
{i, j} ∈ L is called an edge. For S ∈ 2N, (S, L|S) stands for the subgraph of
(N, L) on S, where L|S = {{i, j} ∈ L | i, j ∈ S}. In a graph (N, L), a sequence
of different nodes (i1, . . . , ik), k ≥ 2, is a path between node i1 and node ik if
{ih, ih+1} ∈ L for h = 1, . . . , k− 1. A path (i1, . . . , ik), k ≥ 3, is a cycle in (N, L)
if {ik, i1} ∈ L. A graph (N, L) is cycle-free if it does not contain any cycle. Two
nodes i, j ∈ N are connected in (N, L) if there exists a path in (N, L) between
these nodes. In a graph (N, L), a subset S of N is connected if for any two
distinct nodes of S there exists a path between these nodes in the subgraph
(S, L|S). For a graph (N, L), a subset S of N is a component of (N, L) if S is
maximally connected, i.e., S is connected and for any j ∈ N \ S the set S ∪ {j}
is not connected. The collection of all connected subsets of S in the graph
(N, L) is denoted by CL(S) and the collection of all components of (S, L|S)
is denoted by ĈL(S). For i ∈ N, ĈLi denotes the component of (N, L) that
contains player i, i.e., S ∈ ĈL(N) and i ∈ S implies ĈLi = S.
The combination of a TU-game and an (undirected) graph results in a TU-
game with communication structure which is denoted by a triple (N, v, L) where
N is the set of players, (N, v) is a TU-game, and (N, L) is a graph on N. We
denote the set of TU-games with communication structure and fixed player
set N by GcsN . The set of TU-games with cycle-free communication structure
and fixed player set N is denoted by Gc fN . The set of TU-games with connected
cycle-free communication structure and fixed player set N is denoted by Gcc fN .
Note that Gcc fN ⊆ G
c f
N ⊆ GcsN . A single valued solution on a subset G ⊆ GcsN is a
function ξ : G → Rn such that ξ(N, v, L) ∈ Rn is the payoff vector assigned to
the TU-game with communication structure (N, v, L) ∈ G.
A directed graph or digraph is a pair (N, D) with D being a collection of or-
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dered pairs of different nodes, i.e., D ⊆ DcN, where DcN = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N, i 6=
j} is the complete directed graph without loops on N and an ordered pair
(i, j) ∈ D is called an arc from i to j. For a digraph (N, D), a sequence of dif-
ferent nodes (i1, . . . , ik), k ≥ 2, is a path in (N, D) between node i1 and node ik
if {(ih, ih+1), (ih+1, ih)} ∩ D 6= ∅ for h = 1, . . . , k− 1. A sequence of different
nodes (i1, . . . , ik), k ≥ 2, is a directed path in (N, D) from i1 to ik if (ih, ih+1) ∈ D
for h = 1, . . . , k− 1. If there exists a directed path in (N, D) from node i ∈ N
to node j ∈ N, then j is a successor of i and i is a predecessor of j in (N, D). If
(i, j) ∈ D, then node j is an immediate successor of node i and player i is an
immediate predecessor of j in (N, D). For i ∈ N, SD(i) is the set of successors of
node i in (N, D) and S̄D(i) = SD(i) ∪ {i}. A path (i1, . . . , ik), k ≥ 3, in (N, D)
is a cycle if {(ik, i1), (i1, ik)} ∩ D 6= ∅, and a directed path (i1, . . . , ik), k ≥ 2,
in (N, D) is a directed cycle if (ik, i1) ∈ D. A digraph (N, D) is cycle-free if it
contains no directed cycles, i.e., no node is a successor of itself. A digraph
(N, D) is strongly cycle-free if it is cycle-free and contains no cycles. A directed
graph (N, T) is a tree if it has a unique node without any predecessors, called
the root of the tree, and for every other node in N there is a unique directed
path in (N, T) from the root to that node. A tree (N, T) is a spanning tree of an
undirected graph (N, L) if every arc of T induces an edge of L, i.e., (i, j) ∈ T
implies {i, j} ∈ L. A tree (N, T) is a line tree if each node, different than the
root, has exactly one immediate predecessor.
2.3 The Shapley value, the Myerson value, and the
average tree solution: Existing characterizations
Shapley (1953) introduces one of the most well-known single-valued solution
concepts, the Shapley value, for TU-games. The Shapley value is the aver-
age of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all permutations on
the set of players. For a permutation π : N → N, π(i) denotes the (unique)
position of player i ∈ N in π, Pπ(i) = {j ∈ N | π(j) < π(i)} is the set of
predecessors of i in π, and P̄π(i) = Pπ(i) ∪ {i}. For a TU-game (N, v) ∈ GN,
the marginal contribution vector corresponding to permutation π on N is given
by the payoff vector mπ(N, v)∈Rn, defined by
mπi (N, v)=v(P̄π(i))−v(Pπ(i)) for all i∈N.
Let ΠN stand for the collection of all permutations on N. Note that |ΠN| = n!.
Definition 2.3.1 The Shapley value of a TU-game (N, v) ∈ GN is given by the
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In the literature the Shapley value is characterized in many different ways. For
the characterization, Shapley (1953) uses efficiency, additivity, the null player
property and symmetry.
Definition 2.3.2 A solution ξ : GN → Rn satisfies efficiency if for any (N, v) ∈
GN it holds that ∑i∈N ξi(N, v) = v(N).
For a solution in order to satisfy efficiency it should distribute the worth of the
grand coalition to the players.
Definition 2.3.3 A solution ξ : GN → Rn satisfies additivity if for any (N, v),
(N, w) ∈ GN it holds that ξ(N, v + w) = ξ(N, v) + ξ(N, w).
According to the additivity axiom, given any two TU-games with the same
set of players, if an additive solution assigns a payoff vector to each of these
two TU-games, then the sum of these two payoff vectors should be assigned to
the TU-game, for which the worth of every coalition is obtained by summing
up the worths of that coalition in both TU-games.
A player i ∈ N is called a null player in TU-game (N, v) ∈ GN if v(S∪ {i})−
v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N \ {i}.
Definition 2.3.4 A solution ξ : GN → Rn satisfies the null player property if for
any (N, v) ∈ GN and null player i ∈ N in (N, v) it holds that ξi(N, v) = 0.
According to the null player property, players who have zero contribution
to every coalition should receive zero payoff.
Given a TU-game (N, v) ∈ GN, two players i, j ∈ N are called symmetric in
(N, v) if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
Definition 2.3.5 A solution ξ : GN → Rn satisfies symmetry if for any (N, v) ∈
GN and symmetric players i, j ∈ N in (N, v) it holds that ξi(N, v) = ξ j(N, v).
According to the symmetry axiom, two players who have the same con-
tribution to every coalition not containing both of them, should receive the
same payoff. Symmetry is often referred to as the equal treatment property,
see Peleg and Südhölter (2007).
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Theorem 2.3.6 (Shapley, 1953) The Shapley value is the unique solution on GN
that satisfies efficiency, additivity, the null player property, and symmetry.
Young (1985) provides another characterization of the Shapley value by us-
ing strong monotonicity together with efficiency and symmetry.
Definition 2.3.7 A solution ξ : GN → Rn satisfies strong monotonicity if ξi(N, v)
≥ ξi(N, w) holds for any (N, v), (N, w) ∈ GN and i ∈ N such that
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≥ w(S ∪ {i})− w(S)
for all S ⊆ N \ {i}.
Theorem 2.3.8 (Young, 1985) The Shapley value is the unique solution on GN that
satisfies efficiency, symmetry, and strong monotonicity.
Remark 2.3.9 In fact the characterization of Young (1985) is valid under a
weaker condition which is obtained by replacing the inequalities in the def-
inition of strong monotonicity with equalities. Strong monotonicity is often
referred to as marginality.
In van den Brink (2002), a fairness axiom is used together with efficiency
and the null player property to get an alternative characterization of the Shap-
ley value.
Definition 2.3.10 A solution ξ : GN → Rn satisfies fairness if for any (N, v),
(N, w) ∈ GN and i, j ∈ N that are symmetric in (N, w) it holds that
ξi(N, v + w)− ξi(N, v) = ξ j(N, v + w)− ξ j(N, v).
Theorem 2.3.11 (van den Brink, 2002) The Shapley value is the unique solution
on GN that satisfies efficiency, the null player property, and fairness.
For TU-games it is assumed that any subset of players is able to cooperate
and earn the worth of this coalition. Following Myerson (1977), for TU-games
with communication structure the collection of feasible coalitions is restricted
by an undirected graph on the set of players. It is assumed that only connected
sets of players are able to form a coalition. The Myerson value of a TU-game
with communication structure is the Shapley value of the so-called Myerson
restricted game.
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For a TU-game with communication structure (N, v, L) ∈ GcsN , Myerson
(1977) defines the corresponding Myerson restricted game vL by
vL(S) = ∑
Q∈ĈL(S)
v(Q), S ∈ 2N.
Given a TU-game with communication structure, in the Myerson restricted
game, the worth of any set of players is the sum of the worths of the compo-
nents of the subgraph on this set of players.
Definition 2.3.12 On the class of TU-games with communication structure,
the Myerson value assigns to any (N, v, L) ∈ GcsN the payoff vector µ(N, v, L)
given by
µ(N, v, L) = Sh(N, vL).
Two axioms that fully characterize the Myerson value are component effi-
ciency and fairness.
Definition 2.3.13 On a subclass G ⊆ GcsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies
component efficiency if for any (N, v, L) ∈ G it holds that
∑
i∈Q
ξi(N, v, L) = v(Q) for all Q ∈ ĈL(N).
A solution on a subclass of TU-games with communication structure sat-
isfies component efficiency if it distributes to each component of the graph
exactly its worth.
Definition 2.3.14 On a subclass G ⊆ GcsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies
fairness if for any (N, v, L) ∈ G and {i, j} ∈ L it holds that
ξi(N, v, L)− ξi(N, v, L \ {i, j}) = ξ j(N, v, L)− ξ j(N, v, L \ {i, j}).
The fairness axiom requires that if an edge is deleted from the undirected
graph, then this yields the same payoff change for the players who are in-
volved in this edge.
Theorem 2.3.15 (Myerson, 1977) The Myerson value is the unique solution on GcsN
that satisfies component efficiency and fairness.
There are several alternative characterizations of the Myerson value for TU-
games with communication structure as well as for some subclasses. Borm
et al. (1992) characterizes the Myerson value for TU-games with cycle-free
communication structure. Together with component efficiency and additivity,
Borm et al. (1992) uses the superfluous link property and the communication
ability property.
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Definition 2.3.16 On a subclass G ⊆ GcsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies
additivity if for any (N, v, L), (N, w, L) ∈ G, it holds that ξ(N, v + w, L) =
ξ(N, v, L) + ξ(N, w, L).
Given a TU-game with communication structure (N, v, L) ∈ GcsN , an edge
{i, j} ∈ L is called superfluous if it holds that rv(A) = rv(A \ {i, j}) for all
A ⊆ L, where rv(A) is defined as
rv(A) = vA(N) = ∑
Q∈ĈA(N)
v(Q), A ⊆ L.
Definition 2.3.17 On a subclass G ⊆ GcsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies the
superfluous link property if for any (N, v, L) ∈ G and superfluous edge {i, j} ∈ L
it holds that
ξ(N, v, L) = ξ(N, v, L \ {i, j}).
For a communication structure (N, L), let D(N, L) = {i ∈ N | {i, j} ∈
L for some j ∈ N}. A TU-game with communication structure (N, v, L) ∈
Gc fN is called point anonymous if vL(S) = vL(T) for all S, T ⊆ N with |S ∩
D(N, L)| = |T ∩ D(N, L)|. For a TU-game with communication structure, in
order to be point anonymous each coalition’s worth in the Myerson restricted
game only depends on the number of players in the coalition that have links
with other players.
Definition 2.3.18 On a subclass G ⊆ GcsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies the
communication ability property if for any point anonymous (N, v, L) ∈ G it holds
that ξi(N, v, L) = ξ j(N, v, L) for all i, j ∈ D(N, L) and ξi(N, v, L) = 0 for all
i ∈ N \ D(N, L).
Theorem 2.3.19 (Borm et al., 1992) The Myerson value is the unique solution on
Gc fN that satisfies component efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property, and
the communication ability property.
On the class of TU-games with cycle-free communication structure, van den
Brink et al. (2011) provides a characterization of the Myerson value by replac-
ing the communication ability property of Borm et al. (1992) with a weaker
property.
A TU-game with communication structure (N, v, L) ∈ GcsN is called point
unanimous if vL(S) = vL(N)uD(N,L)(S) for all S ⊆ N.
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Definition 2.3.20 On a subclass G ⊆ GcsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies the
weak communication ability property if for any point unanimous (N, v, L) ∈ G it
holds that ξi(N, v, L) = ξ j(N, v, L) for all i, j ∈ D(N, L) and ξi(N, v, L) = 0 for
all i ∈ N \ D(N, L).
Theorem 2.3.21 (van den Brink et al., 2011) The Myerson value is the unique
solution on Gc fN that satisfies component efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link
property, and the weak communication ability property.
The average tree solution is introduced in Herings et al. (2008) on the class
of TU-games with cycle-free communication structure and generalized to the
class of TU-games with arbitrary communication structure in Herings et al.
(2010). Given a TU-game with cycle-free communication structure, for each
component of the communication structure, all spanning trees on that com-
ponent and all marginal contribution vectors corresponding to these span-
ning trees are considered. To each player, the average tree solution assigns
the average of his marginal contributions in all spanning trees defined on the
component containing this player. Formally, given a TU-game with cycle-free
communication structure (N, v, L) ∈ Gc fN , each i ∈ N induces a unique span-
ning tree (ĈLi , T(i)) with the node i being the root in the following way. For
any j ∈ ĈLi \ {i}, take the unique path in (N, L) from i to j, then change the
edges on this path to arcs in such a way that the first node in any ordered pair
is the node that comes first on the path from i to j. Given a TU-game with cy-
cle free communication structure (N, v, L) ∈ Gc fN and Q ∈ ĈL(N), since each
i ∈ Q induces a unique spanning tree (Q, T(i)), the number of spanning trees
on Q is equal to |Q|. For a TU-game with cycle-free communication struc-
ture (N, v, L) ∈ Gc fN and i ∈ N, the marginal contribution of player j ∈ ĈLi
corresponding to the spanning tree (ĈLi , T(i)) is defined as
mT(i)j (N, v) = v(S̄T(i)(j))− ∑
h∈N:(j,h)∈T(i)
v(S̄T(i)(h)).
Definition 2.3.22 On the class of TU-games with cycle-free communication
structure, the average tree solution (AT) assigns to any (N, v, L) ∈ Gc fN the payoff
vector AT(N, v, L) given by





mT(j)i (N, v), i ∈ N.
The average tree solution is originally defined for TU-games with cycle-
free communication structure. Since the spanning trees and corresponding
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marginal contribution vectors are defined componentwise, one may also de-
fine the solution for TU-games with connected cycle-free communication struc-
ture and if the communication structure is not connected, then for each com-
ponent the average tree solution can be defined separately.
Definition 2.3.23 On the class of TU-games with connected cycle-free com-
munication structure, the average tree solution (AT) assigns to any (N, v, L) ∈
Gcc fN the payoff vector AT(N, v, L) given by




Example 2.3.24 Consider a TU-game with connected cycle-free communica-
tion structure (N, v, L) ∈ Gcc fN where N = {1, . . . , 7} and L = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}, {3,
4}, {4, 5}, {4, 6}, {6, 7}} and let v(S) = |S|2 for all S ∈ 2N. The graphical rep-
resentation of (N, L) is given in Figure 2.1.







There are seven spanning trees, (N, T(1)), . . . , (N, T(7)), for (N, L) as de-




































(N, T(7))(N, T(6))(N, T(5))(N, T(4))(N, T(3))(N, T(2))(N, T(1))
Figure 2.2: The spanning trees of (N, L) in Example 2.3.24.
To each of these spanning trees a marginal contribution vector corresponds
with mT(1)(N, v) = (13, 1, 19, 11, 1, 3, 1), mT(2)(N, v) = (1, 13, 19, 11, 1, 3, 1),
mT(3)(N, v) = (1, 1, 31, 11, 1, 3, 1), mT(4)(N, v) = (1, 1, 7, 35, 1, 3, 1), mT(5)( N,
v) = ( 1, 1, 7, 23, 13, 3, 1), mT(6)(N, v) = (1, 1, 7, 15, 1, 23, 1), mT(7)(N, v) =
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(1, 1, 7, 15, 1, 11, 13). Since the average tree solution is the average of these
marginal contribution vectors, we have AT(N, v, L) = (19/7, 19/7, 125/7,
121/7, 19/7, 49/7, 19/7).
For the class of TU-games with cycle-free communication structure, Her-
ings et al. (2008) characterizes the average tree solution with component effi-
ciency and component fairness axioms. Note that in a cycle-free graph, if an
edge is deleted from the graph, then there emerge two more components (re-
placing one component) additional to already existing ones. For a cycle free
graph (N, L) and {i, j} ∈ L, let Ki and K j be the components of (N, L \ {{i, j}})
containing i and j, respectively.
Definition 2.3.25 A solution ξ : Gc fN → Rn satisfies component fairness if for








|K j| ∑h∈K j
(
ξh(N, v, L)− ξh(N, v, L \ {{i, j}})
)
.
Different than the fairness axiom used to characterize the Myerson value,
component fairness requires that deletion of an edge causes the same average
payoff change for both components resulting from this deletion.
Theorem 2.3.26 (Herings et al., 2008) The average tree solution is the unique so-
lution on Gc fN that satisfies component efficiency and component fairness.
In van den Brink (2009) another characterization for the average tree solu-
tion for TU-games with cycle-free communication structure is provided. This
characterization is based on component efficiency, additivity, collusion neu-
trality, the communication ability property, component independence, and the
equal gain/loss property.
For a TU-game (N, v) ∈ GN, when players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, collude, then
instead of (N, v), the TU-game (N, vij) ∈ GN is considered where
vij(S) =
{
v(S \ {i, j}) if {i, j} * S,
v(S) if {i, j} ⊆ S.
Definition 2.3.27 On a subclass G ⊆ GcsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies collu-
sion neutrality if for any (N, v, L) ∈ G and {i, j} ∈ L it holds that ξi(N, vij, L) +
ξ j(N, vij, L) = ξi(N, v, L) + ξ j(N, v, L).
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Given a TU-game with communication structure (N, v, L) ∈ GcsN , a player
i ∈ N is called superfluous if this player is a null player in the Myerson re-
stricted game, i.e., vL(S)− vL(S \ {i}) = 0 for all S ⊆ N, S 3 i.
Definition 2.3.28 On a subclass G ⊆ GcsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies the
superfluous player property if for any (N, v, L) ∈ G and superfluous player i ∈ N
it holds that ξi(N, v, L) = 0.
Definition 2.3.29 On a subclass G ⊆ GcsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies the
equal gain/loss property if for any (N, v, L) ∈ G and {i, j} ∈ L it holds that
ξh(N, vij, L)− ξh(N, v, L) = ξg(N, vij, L)− ξg(N, v, L) for all h, g ∈ N \ {i, j}.
Definition 2.3.30 On a subclass G ⊆ GcsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies
component independence if for any (N, v, L), (N, w, L′) ∈ G and Q ∈ ĈL(N) ∩
ĈL
′
(N) satisfying (Q, L|Q) = (Q, L′|Q) and v(S) = w(S) for all S ⊆ Q, it holds
that ξi(N, v, L) = ξi(N, w, L′) for all i ∈ Q.
Theorem 2.3.31 (van den Brink, 2009) The average tree solution is the unique so-
lution on Gc fN that satisfies component efficiency, additivity, collusion neutrality, the
communication ability property, the superfluous player property, the equal gain/loss
property, and component independence.
Mishra and Talman (2010) provides a different characterization of the aver-
age tree solution for the class of TU-games with connected cycle-free commu-
nication structure. Together with efficiency and linearity, Mishra and Talman
(2010) imposes strong symmetry, the dummy property, and independence in
unanimity games.
Definition 2.3.32 On a subclass G ⊆ GcsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies
efficiency if for any (N, v, L) ∈ G it holds that ∑i∈N ξi(N, v, L) = v(N).
Efficiency means that exactly the worth of the grand coalition is distributed
among the players. If the undirected graph in a TU-game with communication
structure is connected then component efficiency and efficiency are equivalent
to each other.
Definition 2.3.33 On a subclass G ⊆ GcsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies
linearity if for any (N, v, L), (N, w, L) ∈ G and a, b ∈ R it holds that ξ(N, av +
bw, L) = aξ(N, v, L) + bξ(N, w, L).
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According to linearity, if there are two TU-games with the same commu-
nication structure, then applying the solution to each of them and adding up
multiples of the two resulting payoff vectors gives the same outcome when
the solution is applied to the TU-game which is the sum of the same multiples
of the two TU-games with the same communication structure. For TU-games
with communication structure linearity is stronger then additivity.
Definition 2.3.34 A solution ξ : Gcc fN → Rn satisfies strong symmetry if for
any (N, v, L) ∈ Gcc fN with v(S) = 0 for all S ∈ CL(N), S 6= N, it holds that
ξi(N, v, L) = ξ j(N, v, L) for all i, j ∈ N.
According to strong symmetry, in a TU-game with connected cycle-free
communication structure, if all proper connected subsets of the grand coali-
tion have zero worth, then all players should receive the same payoff. For TU-
games with connected cycle-free communication structure, the weak commu-
nication ability property of van den Brink et al. (2011) is equivalent to strong
symmetry.
A player i ∈ N is called dummy player in a TU-game with connected com-
munication structure (N, v, L) ∈ GcsN if v(S) − ∑Q∈ĈL(S\{i}) v(Q) = 0 for all
S ∈ CL(N) and S 3 i.
Definition 2.3.35 On a subclass G ⊆ GcsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies the
dummy property if for any (N, v, L) ∈ G and dummy player i ∈ N it holds that
ξi(N, v, L) = 0.
According to the dummy property, for a TU-game with communication struc-
ture, a player with zero marginal contribution in any connected set should
receive zero payoff.
Definition 2.3.36 A solution ξ : Gcc fN → Rn satisfies independence in unanimity
games if for any (N, v, L) ∈ Gcc fN and Q, Q ∪ {j} ∈ CL(N) with j ∈ N \ Q, it
holds that ξi(N, uQ, L) = ξi(N, uQ∪{j}, L) for all i ∈ Q with {i, j} /∈ L.
Theorem 2.3.37 (Mishra and Talman, 2010) The average tree solution is the unique
solution on Gcc fN that satisfies efficiency, linearity, strong symmetry, the dummy prop-
erty, and independence in unanimity games.
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2.4 A new axiomatic characterization of the average
tree solution
In this section, we axiomatize the average tree solution on the class of TU-
games with connected cycle-free communication structure based on axioms
that are in the same spirit of the ones used to characterize the Shapley value.
On the class of TU-games, according to the Shapley value a player receives
zero payoff if this player has no contribution when joining to coalitions that
do not contain him. For the average tree solution, since only spanning trees
and corresponding marginal contribution vectors are considered, not all of
the marginal contributions of a player are taken into account. In a connected
cycle-free graph (N, L), for any i ∈ N an element S ∈ ĈL(N \ {i}) is called
a satellite of player i. A satellite of a player is a component of the subgraph
on the set of remaining players. Each satellite of a player is connected to this
player and the complement of any satellite of a player is a connected set.
A player i ∈ N is called a restricted null player in a TU-game with connected
cycle-free communication structure (N, v, L) ∈ Gcc fN if this player never con-




S ∪ {i})− ∑
S∈Q
v(S) = 0
for all Q ⊆ ĈL(N \ {i}).
Definition 2.4.1 A solution ξ : Gcc fN → Rn satisfies the restricted null player
property if for any (N, v, L) ∈ Gcc fN and restricted null player i ∈ N in (N, v, L),
it holds that ξi(N, v, L) = 0.
A solution on TU-games with connected cycle-free communication struc-
ture satisfies the restricted null player property if restricted null players re-
ceive zero payoff. The restricted null player property is stronger than the
dummy property of Mishra and Talman (2010). From linearity and the re-
stricted null player property we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4.2 Let a solution ξ : Gcc fN → Rn satisfy linearity and the restricted
null player property. Then for any (N, v, L), (N, v′, L) ∈ Gcc fN it holds that ξ(N, v, L)
= ξ(N, v′, L) whenever v(S) = v′(S) for all S ∈ CL(N).
Proof Take any (N, v, L), (N, v′, L) ∈ Gcc fN such that v(S) = v′(S) for all S ∈
CL(N). Consider the TU-game with connected cycle-free communication struc-
ture (N, v− v′, L). In (N, v− v′, L) every player is a restricted null player be-
cause (v − v′)(S) = 0 for all S ∈ CL(N) and therefore receives zero payoff,
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that is, ξi(N, v− v′, L) = 0 for all i ∈ N. By linearity, this implies ξ(N, v, L) =
ξ(N, v′, L).
Linearity and the restricted null player property of a solution on Gcc fN to-
gether imply that the solution is completely determined by the worths of the
connected sets.
The symmetry axiom for the characterization of the Shapley value states
that if two players are symmetric in a TU-game, i.e., they have the same
marginal contribution to any set of players which does not contain them, then
the two players must receive the same payoff. On the class of TU-games
with cycle-free communication structure, where connectedness of players is
accounted for the set of feasible coalitions, none of the players need to be sym-
metric with someone else in terms of this definition, since the set of coalitions
a player can join to is typically not the same as that of other players. Therefore,
we consider a different kind of symmetry axiom to replace it which is strong
symmetry as in Definition 2.3.33. According to strong symmetry of a solution
on Gcc fN , if the worth of any connected proper subset of the grand coalition is
zero, then there should be no payoff difference between the players.
The other axiom we use for the characterization of the average tree solution
is restricted marginality which puts restrictions on the payoff of a single player
in two different TU-games with the same connected cycle-free communication
structure.
Definition 2.4.3 A solution ξ : Gcc fN → Rn satisfies restricted marginality if for




v(K) = w(Q)− ∑
K∈ĈL(Q\{i})
w(K)
for Q = N and Q ∈ 2N satisfying N \Q ∈ ĈL(N \ {i}).
According to restricted marginality, a player should receive the same payoff
in two TU-games with the same connected cycle-free communication struc-
ture if this player has the same marginal contribution in both games when
joining to all of his satellites and to all but one of his satellites.
Now we show that efficiency, linearity, restricted null player property, strong
symmetry, and restricted marginality characterize the average tree solution on
the class of TU-game with connected cycle-free communication structure. The
proof uses a number of lemmata.
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It is well known that every TU-game (N, v) can be written as a unique lin-
ear combination of unanimity games, i.e., v = ∑S∈2N\{∅} αSuS, where αS ∈ R
is the so-called Harsanyi dividend of coalition S ∈ 2N \ {∅} in the TU-game
(N, v), see Harsanyi (1959). Due to linearity, given a TU-game with connected
cycle-free communication structure, in order to show that there is a unique
solution that satisfies linearity, efficiency, the restricted null player property,
strong symmetry, and restricted marginality, it is sufficient to show that for
every unanimity game with this connected cycle-free communication struc-
ture, there is a unique solution satisfying the other four axioms.
Lemma 2.4.4 Given any connected cycle-free graph (N, L), if a solution ξ : Gcc fN →
Rn satisfies efficiency and strong symmetry, then ξi(N, uN, L) = 1/n for all i ∈ N.
Proof It holds that uN(N) = 1 and uN(S) = 0 for all S ∈ 2N, S 6= N. By
strong symmetry, this implies that ξi(N, uN, L) = ξ j(N, uN, L) for all i, j ∈ N.
Since ξ is efficient, we have ∑i∈N ξi(N, uN, L) = 1. So, ξi(N, uN, L) = 1/n for
all i ∈ N.
In a graph (N, L), for each S ∈ CL(N), a node i ∈ S is called an extreme
node of S if there exists a node outside S to which i is connected. For each
S ∈ CL(N), let EL(S) be the set of extreme nodes of S in (N, L), i.e., EL(S) =
{i ∈ S | {i, j} ∈ L for some j ∈ N \ S}.
Lemma 2.4.5 Given any connected cycle-free graph (N, L), if a solution ξ : Gcc fN →
Rn satisfies efficiency, the restricted null player property, strong symmetry, and re-
stricted marginality, then
ξi(N, uS, L) =

0 if i ∈ N \ S,
1/n if i ∈ S \ EL(S),
1− |S|−1n if i ∈ EL(S),
for all S ∈ CL(N) such that |EL(S)| = 1.
Proof Let EL(S) = {j} for some S ∈ CL(N) and j ∈ N. All players i ∈
N \ S are restricted null players in (N, uS, L), and therefore from the restricted
null player property it follows that ξi(N, uS, L) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S. Re-
garding any i ∈ S \ {j}, we have uS(N) − ∑K∈ĈL(N\{i}) uS(K) = uN(N) −
∑K∈ĈL(N\{i}) uN(K) and uS(Q)−∑K∈ĈL(Q\{i}) uS(K) = uN(Q)−∑K∈ĈL(Q\{i})
uN(K) for any Q ∈ 2N such that N \ Q ∈ ĈL(N \ {i}). From restricted
marginality and Lemma 2.4.4, we obtain that ξi(N, uS, L) = ξi(N, uN, L) =
1/n for all i ∈ S \ {j}. Finally, by efficiency we have ξ j(N, uS, L) = 1− (|S| −
1)/n.
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For a connected set with more than one extreme player and a unanimity
game defined on that set, the reasoning in the proof of Lemma 2.4.5 is directly
applicable to the players who are not members of that coalition and to the
members of the coalition who are not extreme players of the coalition. The
former players receive zero payoffs because of the restricted null player prop-
erty, and because of restricted marginality the latter ones receive the same
payoff they receive in the unanimity game defined on N. So, the problem is to
see how those axioms assign payoffs to the extreme players of the coalition.
Lemma 2.4.6 Given any connected cycle-free graph (N, L) and S ∈ CL(N), for
every j ∈ EL(S) there exists S′ ∈ CL(N) such that S′ ⊇ S and EL(S′) = {j}.
Proof Take any j ∈ EL(S) and define S′ = N \M where M = {i ∈ N | i ∈ Q
for some Q ∈ ĈL(N \ {j}) with Q ∩ S = ∅}. Since M ∩ S = ∅, we have
S′ ⊇ S. Also, it follows that S′ ∈ CL(N) because it is obtained by subtracting
a number of satellites of j from the grand coalition. By construction and since
(N, L) is a cycle-free graph it holds that EL(S′) = {j}.
Note that Lemma 2.4.6 may not hold when the graph is not cycle-free.
Given a connected cycle-free graph (N, L), S ∈ CL(N) and i ∈ EL(S), let SLi
be the (unique) smallest (with respect to set inclusion) connected set in (N, L)
such that S ⊆ SLi and EL(SLi ) = {i}. Note that SLi = S if EL(S) = {i}.
Lemma 2.4.7 Given any connected cycle-free graph (N, L), if a solution ξ : Gcc fN →
Rn satisfies efficiency, the restricted null player property, strong symmetry, and re-
stricted marginality, then
ξi(N, uS, L) =

0 if i ∈ N \ S,




n if i ∈ EL(S),
for all S ∈ CL(N).
Proof Take any S ∈ CL(N). All players i ∈ N \ S are restricted null players
in (N, uS, L), and therefore from the restricted null player property it follows
that ξi(N, uS, L) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S. For any i ∈ S \ EL(S), we have uS(N)−
∑K∈ĈL(N\{i}) uS(K) = uN(N)−∑K∈ĈL(N\{i}) uN(K) and uS(Q)−∑K∈ĈL(Q\{i})
uS(K) = uN(Q) − ∑K∈ĈL(Q\{i}) uN(K) for any Q ∈ 2
N such that N \ Q ∈
ĈL(N \ {i}). Hence, by Lemma 2.4.4 and restricted marginality we have ξi(N,
uS, L) = 1/n for all i ∈ S \ EL(S). Now take any i ∈ EL(S) and consider
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(N, uS, L) and (N, uSLi , L). Note that uS(N)−∑K∈ĈL(N\{i}) uS(K) = uSLi (N)−
∑K∈ĈL(N\{i}) uSLi (K) and uS(Q)−∑K∈ĈL(Q\{i}) uS(K) = uSLi (Q)−∑K∈ĈL(Q\{i})
uSLi (K) for any Q ∈ 2
N such that N \Q ∈ ĈL(N \ {i}). By restricted marginal-
ity, this implies ξi(N, uS, L) = ξi(N, uSLi , L) for all i ∈ E
L(S). Since EL(SLi ) =
{i}, by Lemma 2.4.5 we have ξi(N, uS, L) = ξi(N, uSLi , L) = 1− (|S
L
i | − 1)/n,
which completes the proof.
Lemma 2.4.8 Given any connected cycle-free graph (N, L) and S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, if a
solution ξ : Gcc fN → Rn satisfies efficiency, the restricted null player property, strong
symmetry, and restricted marginality, then ξ(N, uS, L) is uniquely determined.
Proof If S ∈ CL(N), then Lemma 2.4.7 implies that ξ(N, uS, L) is uniquely
determined. Suppose S /∈ CL(N) and let Sc ∈ CL(N) be the smallest (in
terms of set inclusion) connected set containing S. Since the graph (N, L)
is cycle-free, Sc is uniquely determined. Consider (N, uS, L) and (N, uSc , L).
Since uS(Q) = uSc(Q) for all Q ∈ CL(N), from Proposition 2.4.2, it follows
that ξ(N, uS, L) = ξ(N, uSc , L). Since Sc ∈ CL(N), Lemma 2.4.7 implies the
uniqueness of the payoff vector ξ(N, uSc , L), which implies the uniqueness of
the payoff vector ξ(N, uS, L).
Theorem 2.4.9 The average tree solution is the unique solution on Gcc fN that sat-
isfies efficiency, linearity, the restricted null player property, strong symmetry, and
restricted marginality.
Proof First, we show that the average tree solution for any TU-game with
connected cycle-free communication structure (N, v, L) ∈ GLN satisfies all ax-
ioms. Efficiency follows because the marginal vector mT(i)(N, v) is efficient
for any i ∈ N by construction. Since mT(i)(N, v) is linear in the worths of the
connected sets for every i ∈ N and the same holds for the average of those vec-
tors, the average tree solution satisfies linearity. If player j ∈ N is a restricted
null player, then mT(i)j (N, v) = 0 for all i ∈ N and therefore the average of his
marginal contributions is also zero. If (N, v, L) is such that v(S) = 0 for all
S ⊂ N, then for any i ∈ N the marginal vector mT(i)(N, v) allocates v(N) to
the player i and zero to the rest of the players. Therefore the average of these
vectors assigns v(N)/n to each player and therefore strong symmetry holds.
To show the average tree solution satisfies restricted marginality, consider
two TU-games with the same cycle-free communication structure (N, v, L)
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and (N, w, L). For some j ∈ N, let v(N) − ∑K∈ĈL(N\{j}) v(K) = w(N) −
∑K∈ĈL(N\{j}) w(K) and v(Q)−∑K∈ĈL(Q\{j}) v(K) = w(Q)−∑K∈ĈL(Q\{j}) w(K)
for all Q ∈ 2N satisfying N \Q ∈ ĈL(N \ {j}. Then it holds that mT(i)j (N, v) =
mT(i)j (N, w) for all i ∈ N, and therefore player j receives the same payoff at the
average tree solution in both games.
Second, we show that there exists a unique solution that satisfies all five
axioms. Since a TU-game can be uniquely expressed as a linear combination
of unanimity games, by linearity it is sufficient to show that for a solution ξ
: Gcc fN → Rn satisfying the other axioms ξ(N, uS, L) is a unique payoff vector
for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. Uniqueness of ξ(N, uS, L) for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅} is a direct
result of Lemma 2.4.8, which completes the proof.
Remark 2.4.10 In Theorem 2.4.9, together with strong symmetry and efficiency
we use linearity and restricted marginality. For the axioms used for the char-
acterization of the average tree solution in Theorem 2.4.9, we have no exam-
ples that show the logical independence. Unlike the Young’s axiomatization
(Young (1985)) of the Shapley value by efficiency, symmetry, and strong mono-
tonicity without a priori requirement of linearity, for the axiomatization of the
average tree solution on the class of TU-games with connected cycle-free com-
munication structure, we use both linearity and restricted marginality. The
reason why the induction argument of Young does not work in the latter case
is that while the decomposition of a TU-game is considered via the unanimity
basis determined by all possible coalitions, restricted marginality (as opposed
to marginality) considers only marginal contributions of a player while joining
some specific coalitions. In Young (1985) together with strong monotonicity,
which is a marginality axiom, symmetry is used as one of the other axioms.
In case the TU-game is a unanimity game on an arbitrary set, symmetry im-
plies equal payoff allocation to all members of the set on which the unanimity
game is defined. In our characterization together with restricted marginality
we use strong symmetry which only tells how to distribute the payoff in case
the TU-game is the unanimity game on the grand coalition.
The following example illustrates the reasoning used to show that the solu-
tion is a unique payoff vector.
Example 2.4.11 Consider a cycle free graph (N, L) as given in Example 2.3.24.
From strong symmetry it follows that ξi(N, uN, L) = 1/7 for all i ∈ N. Now
consider the TU-game with cycle-free communication structure (N, uS, L) where
S = {3, 4, 5, 6}. It holds that EL({3, 4, 5, 6}) = {3, 6}. Consider player 4 and
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the two unanimity games with cycle-free communication structure (N, uS, L)
and (N, uN, L). Note that uS(N)−∑K∈ĈL(N\{4}) uS(K) = uN(N)−∑K∈ĈL(N\{4})
uN(K) and uS(Q) − ∑K∈ĈL(Q\{4}) uS(K) = uN(Q) − ∑K∈ĈL(Q\{4}) uN(K) for
all Q ∈ 2N satisfying N \ Q ∈ ĈL(N \ {4}) = {{1, 2, 3}, {5}, {6, 7}}. Since
ξ4(N, uN, L) = 1/7, by restricted marginality we have ξ4(N, uS, L) = 1/7.
Similarly, we have ξ5(N, uS, L) = 1/7. Now consider player 3, then SL3 =
{3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, which is shown by the dashed set in Figure 2.3. Note that EL({3, 4,
5, 6, 7}) = {3}. For i = 4, 5, 6, 7, uSL3 (N) − ∑K∈ĈL(N\{i}) uSL3 (K) = uN(N) −
∑K∈ĈL(N\{i}) uN(K) and uSL3 (Q)−∑K∈ĈL(Q\{i}) uSL3 (K) = uN(Q)−∑K∈ĈL(Q\{i})
uN(K) for all Q ∈ 2N satisfying N \ Q ∈ ĈL(N \ {i}). So, by restricted
marginality we have ξi(N, uSL3 , L) = ξi(N, uN, L) = 1/7 for i = 4, 5, 6, 7. By
the restricted null player property we have ξi(N, uSL3 , L) = 0 for i = 1, 2. By
efficiency this implies ξ3(N, uS, L) = ξ3(N, uSL3 , L) = 3/7. Similarly, for player
6, it holds that SL6 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and ξ6(N, uS, L) = ξ6(N, uSL6 , L) = 2/7.







Mishra and Talman (2010) provides a characterization of the average tree
solution for TU-games with connected cycle-free communication structure by
using linearity, the dummy property, strong symmetry, and independence in
unanimity games. In Mishra and Talman (2010), the dummy property requires
zero payoff allocation for a player if this player has zero marginal contribu-
tion to any set that does not contain him and together they form a connected
set. For the new characterization of the average tree solution, we take the re-
stricted null player property. The restricted null player property requires zero
payoff allocation to a player if this player has zero marginal contribution to
any subcollection of his satellites and it is therefore stronger than the dummy
property. In Mishra and Talman (2010) independence of unanimity games,
which relates two unanimity games with the same communication structure,
is used for the characterization. We use restricted marginality by which it is
possible to relate any two TU-games with the same connected cycle-free com-
munication structure. The Shapley value is originally defined for TU-games
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where cooperation among the players is not restricted. The axioms used in
this chapter to characterize the average tree solution for the class of TU-games
with connected cycle-free communication structure have the same sprit with
the axioms of Shapley (1953) and Young (1985). In case the graph standing
for the communication structure is a connected cycle-free graph, the Myerson
value satisfies efficiency, linearity and strong symmetry. On the other hand,
the restricted null player property and restricted marginality are not satisfied
by the Myerson value on this class of TU-games with communication struc-
ture.
CHAPTER 3
SOLUTIONS FOR TU-GAMES WITH
DOMINANCE STRUCTURE
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 considers TU-games with communication structure which is repre-
sented by means of an undirected graph on the set of players. In this chapter,
we consider TU-games with dominance structure which is represented by a
directed graph on the set of players. In the literature, restricted cooperation
by means of a directed graph is modeled in different ways. TU-games with
permission structure refer to the situations where the players need the per-
mission of their superiors in order to cooperate. In Gilles et al. (1992), Derks
and Gilles (1995), and van den Brink and Gilles (1996) conjunctive approach is
employed. For the conjunctive approach it is assumed that each player needs
the permission of all of his superiors to cooperate. In Gilles and Owen (1999)
and van den Brink (1997), disjunctive approach is employed where it is as-
sumed that the permission of one direct superior is sufficient to cooperate. In
both cases, by taking the permission structure into account a new TU-game is
defined and the Shapley value of this game is taken as solution.
As a similar structure, Faigle and Kern (1992) considers TU-games with
precedence constraints where the players are partially ordered by some prece-
dence relation. For TU-games with precedence constraints, only the coalitions
that satisfy the precedence constraints are considered to be feasible. Faigle and
Kern (1992) defines a type of Shapley value for such situations and provides a
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characterization for this value.
In this chapter, we consider TU-games with dominance structure. Simi-
lar to TU-games with permission structure and TU-games with precedence
constraints, the dominance structure in the game is modeled by a directed
graph on the set of players. We consider an arbitrary digraph representing the
dominance structure, hence we allow for the existence of cycles which is not
covered by TU-games with precedence constraints. For the class of TU-games
with dominance structure, we introduce the average covering tree solution
and the dominance value.
For an arc in a digraph, there are several different basic interpretations.
One interpretation is that an arc represents a way of communication and in-
dicates which player has initiated the communication but at the same time it
represents a fully developed communication link where players are able to
communicate in both directions with each other. In such a case, following
Myerson (1977), it is natural to assume that there is no subordination of play-
ers and to focus on component efficient values. According to an alternative
interpretation, an arc represents only one-way communication situation. In
this case, we still have different options for the interpretation. The first option
is when the communication between players is supposed to be possible only
along the directed paths in the digraph. This assumption leads to the solu-
tion concepts of web values, in particular the tree value, and the average web
value for cycle-free digraph games introduced in Khmelnitskaya and Talman
(2014) and the covering values for cycle-free digraph games studied in Li and
Li (2011). Another option is to assume that the digraph represents the sub-
ordination of players such that after each player any of his subordinates may
follow as long as this does not hurt the subordination among the players pre-
scribed by the digraph. An example of such a situation is considering a set of
tasks as the set of players where the tasks that have to be performed are not
linearly ordered but the partial ordering of the tasks is represented by the arcs
of a digraph.
Both for the average covering tree solution and the dominance value, we
abide by the latter interpretation of an arc. The difference between these two
solutions is the assumption whether independent tasks can be performed at
the same time or not. For the dominance value, it is assumed that at every
moment only one task can be performed. When some task is completed, the
next task can be any of the tasks whose performance is not violating the sub-
ordination among the remaining tasks. For the average covering tree solution
for TU-games with dominance structure, it is assumed that at every moment
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several tasks can be performed as long as those performed ones belong to
independent groups of tasks. So, after some task is completed, from each con-
nected group of the remaining tasks, one task is performed as long as it does
not violate the subordination of the tasks in that group.
The average covering tree solution for TU-games with dominance struc-
ture is based on so-called covering trees of a digraph and the corresponding
marginal contribution vectors. For a digraph, an induced covering tree pre-
serves the domination relation in the digraph and the average covering tree
solution is defined as the average of the marginal contribution vectors corre-
sponding to all covering trees.
The dominance value for TU-games with dominance structure is based on
some specific permutations. To define the dominance value, for a digraph
we introduce the set of consistent permutations on the set of players. The
dominance value is defined as the average of the marginal contribution vec-
tors corresponding to all consistent permutations. We define the dominance
value for TU-games with arbitrary dominance structure. On the other hand,
the Shapley value introduced by Faigle and Kern (1992) is only defined for
cycle-free cases. When the digraph representing the dominance structure in
the game is cycle-free, the dominance value and the Shapley value of Faigle
and Kern (1992) coincide.
For both solution concepts, several properties are derived and a compari-
son is made with other solution concepts. Also convexity type of conditions
that guarantee the core stability of the solution concepts are given. TU-games
with specific dominance structure, like directed cycles, directed stars, and
trees, are considered and characterizations are provided.
This chapter is based on Khmelnitskaya et al. (2012) and Khmelnitskaya
et al. (2014) and the structure of this chapter is as follows. Basic definitions and
notation are introduced in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the average covering
tree solution for TU-games with connected dominance structure and studies
its properties including core stability. In Section 4, the dominance value is
defined for TU-games with dominance structure and properties of this solu-
tion are studied. Special digraphs as dominance structure are considered in
Section 5.
3.2 Preliminaries
In this chapter, together with a TU-game, we assume the existence of a domi-
nance structure which restricts the cooperation among the players. The dom-
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inance structure on the finite player set N = {1, . . . , n} is specified by a di-
rected graph on N.
Given a digraph (N, D) and coalition S ∈ 2N, the subgraph of (N, D) on
S is the digraph (S, D|S) where D|S = {(i, j) ∈ D | i, j ∈ S}. A coalition
S ∈ 2N is connected in a digraph (N, D) if for any two different players i, j ∈ S
there is a path in (S, D|S) between i and j. For a digraph (N, D), S ∈ 2N is
a component of (N, D) if S is a connected set and for any j ∈ N \ S, the set
S ∪ {j} is not connected. For a digraph (N, D) and S ∈ 2N, CD(S) denotes the
collection of connected subsets of S in (N, D) and ĈD(S) denotes the collection
of components of the subgraph (S, D|S).
Given a digraph (N, D) and coalition S ∈ 2N, node i ∈ S dominates node j ∈
S in (S, D|S), denoted i D|S j, if j ∈ SD|S(i) and i /∈ SD|S(j). Similarly, node
i ∈ S immediately dominates node j ∈ S in (S, D|S) if i dominates j and (i, j) ∈ D.
Node i ∈ S is an undominated node of (S, D|S) if for every predecessor j of i
in (S, D|S) there exists a directed path in (S, D|S) from i to j, i.e., j ∈ SD|S(i)
whenever i ∈ SD|S(j). Notice that, an undominated node of (S, D|S) is either
a node in S without any predecessors in (S, D|S) or a member of at least one
directed cycle in (S, D|S). Since N is assumed to be finite, any digraph (N, D)
and any subgraph of (N, D) has at least one undominated node. For a digraph
(N, D) and a coalition S ∈ 2N, UD(S) denotes the set of undominated nodes
of the subgraph (S, D|S). A tree (N, T) on N is a spanning tree of a digraph
(N, D) if T ⊆ D. The root of a tree (N, T) is denoted by r(N, T)
The combination of a TU-game and a digraph results in a TU-game with
dominance structure which is denoted by a triple (N, v, D), where N is the set
of players, (N, v) is a TU-game, and (N, D) is a digraph on N. GdsN denotes the
set of TU-games with dominance structure on a fixed player set N and GcdsN
denotes the set of TU-games with connected dominance structure on a fixed
player set N.
A single valued solution on G ⊆ GdsN is a function ξ : G → IR
n that assigns
to every TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ G a payoff vector
ξ(N, v, D) ∈ IRn.
3.3 The average covering tree solution for TU-games
with dominance structure
In this section it is assumed that for a TU-game with dominance structure the
connected coalitions in the digraph are the feasible coalitions. Considering the
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nodes in the digraph as tasks that need to be completed, we assume that at ev-
ery moment several of the remaining tasks can be performed as long as they
belong to independent groups of tasks. A group of tasks is independent if it
forms a component in the subgraph on the remaining tasks. After completing
a task, from each subgroup of independent remaining tasks a task can be per-
formed that does not violate the subordination in that subgroup. The average
covering tree solution of a TU-game with dominance structure is the average
of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all covering trees of the
underlying digraph where each covering tree describes a feasible partial or-
dering of the tasks to be completed. Without loss of generality, in this section
we assume that the digraph is connected, i.e., N is a feasible coalition. In case
the digraph representing the dominance structure is not connected, the aver-
age covering tree solution can be defined separately for each component of
the digraph.
The formal definition of a covering tree of a connected digraph is as follows.
Definition 3.3.1 Given a connected digraph (N, D), a tree (N, T) is a covering
tree of (N, D) if it holds that (i, j) ∈ T implies i ∈ UD(S̄T(i)) and S̄T(j) ∈
ĈD(ST(i)).
The root of a covering tree is one of the undominated nodes of the digraph
and each other node is an undominated node of the subgraph on its successor
set and this latter set is a component of the set of successors of its immediate
predecessor in the tree. Since the grand coalition is assumed to be a connected
set, the set of nodes in a covering tree coincides with the set of nodes of the
digraph. Notice that a covering tree of a digraph may contain arcs that do not
belong to the digraph, i.e., a covering tree is not necessarily a spanning tree of
the digraph.
Given a connected digraph (N, D), applying the following algorithm gives
the set of all covering trees (N, T) of (N, D).
Algorithm 3.3.2
0. Input (N, D). Choose i ∈ UD(N). Set T = ∅, Qi = N \ {i}, and Qj = ∅ for
j 6= i.
1. Let ĈD(Qi) = {K1, . . . , Km}. For k = 1, . . . , m, choose jk ∈ UD(Kk) and set
Qjk = Kk \ {jk}. Set T = T ∪ {(i, j1), . . . , (i, jm)} and Qi = ∅.
2. If Qj = ∅ for all j ∈ N, then stop. Otherwise, choose i ∈ N such that
Qi 6= ∅, and return to Step 1.
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In Step 0, the root r(N, T) of the covering tree is chosen among the un-
dominated nodes of (N, D), i.e., r(N, T) ∈ UD(N). We arrive to Step 1 with
some node i selected in the previous step. Node i is an undominated node of
some connected set in (N, D) where Qi is the set of remaining nodes in this
connected set, in particular, when coming from Step 0 node i is the already
chosen root r(N, T) and Qi = N \ {r(N, T)}. The set of nodes in Qi is the
union of one or more components, denoted by K1, . . . , Km. In each compo-
nent Kk, k = 1, . . . , m, an undominated node jk is chosen, which becomes an
immediate successor of i in the tree (N, T), and by Qjk we denote the set of
remaining nodes in Kk, i.e., Qjk = Kk \ {jk}. If all sets Qj, j ∈ N, are empty,
then there are no nodes left and the construction of the covering tree (N, T)
is completed. Otherwise, some node i with a nonempty set Qi is chosen and
repeat the procedure. For any digraph (N, D), applying Algorithm 3.3.2 on
(N, D) gives the set of all covering trees of (N, D) and any covering tree of
(N, D) can be constructed by Algorithm 3.3.2. Let T D denote the collection of
covering trees of a connected digraph (N, D).
Example 3.3.3 Consider the digraphs (N, D), (N′, D′) and (N′′, D′′) where
N = {1, 2, 3}, D = {(1, 3), (2, 3)}, N′ = {1, 2, 3, 4}, D′ = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4),
(4, 1)}, and N′′ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, D′′ = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2), (3, 4), (4, 1), (1, 4),
(3, 5)}, as depicted in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: The digraphs in Example 3.3.3
a) The digraph (N, D).
1 2
3
b) The digraph (N′, D′).
1 2
4 3




The sets of undominated nodes in digraphs (N, D), (N′, D′), and (N′′, D′′)
are {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, and {1, 2, 3, 4}, respectively. Following Algorithm 3.3.2
we may construct the covering trees of the digraphs as depicted in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: The covering trees in Example 3.3.3





































































We explain in detail the construction of the covering trees of (N, D). In
(N, D) both nodes 1 and 2 are undominated and can be chosen as the root of a
covering tree. If node 1 is taken as the root, the remaining nodes 2 and 3 form
a connected set with only node 2 being undominated, yielding covering tree
(N, T1) where T1 = {(1, 2), (2, 3)}. If node 2 is taken as the root, the remaining
nodes 1 and 3 form a connected set with node 1 being undominated, yielding
covering tree (N, T2) where T2 = {(2, 1), (1, 3)}.
The two covering trees of the digraph (N, D) are not spanning trees of
(N, D). In fact, (N, D) has no spanning trees. However, all four covering
trees of (N′, D′) are spanning trees. Among the covering trees of (N′′, D′′),
(N′′, T′′1 ), (N
′′, T′′4 ), (N
′′, T′′5 ), and (N
′′, T′′7 ) are spanning trees while the oth-
ers are not.
The next theorem states a structural relation between a connected digraph
and its covering trees.
Theorem 3.3.4 Let (N, T) be a covering tree of a connected digraph (N, D). If
(i, j) ∈ D and i /∈ SD(j), then S̄D(j) ⊆ ST(i).
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Proof Let i, j ∈ N be such that (i, j) ∈ D and i /∈ SD(j) and consider any
covering tree (N, T). If i = r(N, T), then i /∈ SD(j) and i 6= j imply S̄D(j) ⊆
N \ {i} = ST(i). Suppose i 6= r(N, T). Let k ∈ N be the node where S̄T(k) ⊇
S̄D(j) ∪ {i} and S̄T(k′) + S̄D(j) ∪ {i} for any k′ ∈ ST(k). Suppose k ∈ S̄D(j).
Since for every S ∈ 2N such that S ⊇ S̄D(j) ∪ {i}, node i dominates any node
of S̄D(j) in the subgraph (S, D|S), this contradicts with the definition of cov-
ering tree because k /∈ UD(S̄T(k). Now suppose k ∈ N \ (S̄D(j) ∪ {i}). Since
S̄T(k′) + S̄D(j) ∪ {i} for any k′ ∈ ST(k), this implies S̄D(j) ∪ {i} /∈ CD(ST(k))
which contradicts with the fact that S̄D(j) ∪ {i} is a connected set in (N, D).
So, k = i which completes the proof.
Theorem 3.3.4 says that a covering tree of a connected digraph preserves
the subordination between players prescribed by the digraph. More precisely,
if in a connected digraph (N, D) node i directly dominates node j, then in any
covering tree of (N, D) node i is a predecessor of both node j and all succes-
sors of j in (N, D). A covering tree of a digraph possesses also the following
properties.
Lemma 3.3.5 Let (N, T) be a covering tree of a connected digraph (N, D), then it
holds that
(i) S̄T(i) ∈ CD(N) for all i ∈ N;
(ii) for any i, j ∈ N, if S̄T(i) ∩ S̄T(j) = ∅, then S̄T(i) ∪ S̄T(j) /∈ CD(N).
Proof (i) Let i ∈ N. If i = r(N, T), then S̄T(i) = N and by assumption N is a
connected set in (N, D). If i 6= r(N, T), there exists j ∈ N such that (j, i) ∈ T
which implies S̄T(i) ∈ ĈD(ST(j)). Hence, S̄T(i) ∈ CD(N).
(ii) Let i, j ∈ N such that S̄T(i) ∩ S̄T(j) = ∅. Since (N, T) is a tree, there
exist h, k, m ∈ N with k 6= m satisfying (h, k), (h, m) ∈ T, S̄T(i) ⊆ S̄T(k),
and S̄T(j) ⊆ S̄T(m). Since S̄T(k) and S̄T(m) are two different components of
the subgraph (ST(h), D|ST(h)), it holds that S̄T(k) ∪ S̄T(m) /∈ C
D(N). Since
S̄T(i) ⊆ S̄T(k) and S̄T(j) ⊆ S̄T(m), also S̄T(i) ∪ S̄T(j) /∈ CD(N).
Property (i) of Lemma 3.3.5 says that in every covering tree of a connected
digraph each node together with all its successors forms a connected set in
the digraph. Property (ii) of Lemma 3.3.5 states that the union of different
branches of a covering tree is not connected in the digraph.
Given a TU-game with connected dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GcdsN , the
marginal contribution vector corresponding to a covering tree (N, T) of (N, D)
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is the payoff vector mT(N, v) given by
mTi (N, v) = v(S̄T(i))− ∑
K∈ĈD(ST(i))
v(K), for all i ∈ N. (3.1)
At the marginal contribution vector corresponding to a covering tree, as
payoff a player receives the difference between the worth of the set composed
by himself together with all his successors in the covering tree and the total
worths of the components of the set of all his successors in the covering tree.
This difference is the contribution of the player when he joins his successors
in the covering tree to form a connected set.
Definition 3.3.6 On the class of TU-games with connected dominance struc-
ture GcdsN , the average covering tree solution (ACT) of (N, v, D) ∈ GcdsN is the av-
erage of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all covering trees
of the digraph (N, D), i.e.,





Example 3.3.7 Consider a TU-game with connected dominance structure (N, v,
D) where N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, v(S) = |S|2, S ∈ 2N, and D = D′′ as depicted
in Figure 3.1(c). The marginal contribution vectors corresponding to the eight
covering trees depicted in Figure 3.2(c) are given by
mT
′′
1 (N, v) = (9, 7, 7, 1, 1), mT
′′
2 (N, v) = (9, 1, 13, 1, 1), mT
′′
3 (N, v) = (3, 9, 11, 1,
1), mT
′′
4 (N, v) = (1, 9, 11, 3, 1), mT
′′
5 (N, v) = (3, 1, 15, 5, 1), mT
′′
6 ( N, v) = (7, 1, 15,
1, 1), mT
′′
7 (N, v) = (7, 5, 3, 9, 1), mT
′′
8 (N, v) = (7, 1, 7, 9, 1). From this, we obtain







When the digraph underlying a TU-game with dominance structure is a
tree, there is only one covering tree, which coincides with the digraph itself.
In this case, the average covering tree solution is equal to the hierarchical out-
come as introduced in Demange (2004), which is later axiomatized in Khmel-
nitskaya (2010). When the digraph is complete, the average covering tree so-
lution is the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to n!
covering trees, which are all line trees, and therefore coincides with the Shap-
ley value of the underlying TU-game.
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3.3.1 Properties of the average covering tree solution
In this subsection, we study some properties that are satisfied by the average
covering tree solution. Namely, we show that the average covering tree so-
lution is efficient and satisfies linearity, the superfluous player property, hier-
archical efficiency, the weak player property, and the inessential arc property.
Although we do not have a characterization for the average covering tree so-
lution, based on the properties satisfied by the solution, we compare it with
some existing solution concepts. We also provide a convexity type condition
under which the average covering tree solution is stable.
For TU-games with permission structure, which can be modeled by a di-
graph on the set of players, Gilles and Owen (1999) studies the disjunctive
permission value and van den Brink (1997) provides a characterization for hi-
erarchical permission structures. Similarly, Gilles et al. (1992) introduces the
conjunctive permission value for TU-games with permission structure and
van den Brink and Gilles (1996) provides a characterization for this value.
Both disjunctive and conjunctive permission values define an appropriate re-
stricted game based on the permission structure and take the Shapley value of
the restricted game as solution. First we provide the definition of these values
on the class of TU-games with dominance structure.
For a digraph (N, D) and i ∈ N, let IPD(i) denote the set of immediate
predecessors of player i in (N, D).
Definition 3.3.8 Given a digraph (N, D), ΨdD = {S ⊆ N | i ∈ S and IPD(i) 6=
∅ imply j ∈ S for some j ∈ IPD(i)} is the collection of disjunctive formable
coalitions in (N, D).
For a digraph (N, D), a coalition S ⊆ N is disjunctive formable if for any
member of S there exists at least one immediate predecessor (if it exists) which
is also a member of S.
Definition 3.3.9 Given a digraph (N, D), for any S ⊆ N the disjunctive sovereign
part of S in (N, D) is the coalition given by
σdD(S) = ∪{S′ ∈ ΨdD | S′ ⊆ S}.
For a digraph (N, D), the disjunctive sovereign part of any coalition S is the
union of all disjunctive formable coalitions in (N, D) that are subsets of S.
Definition 3.3.10 For (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN , the disjunctive restriction of v on D is the
gameRdD(v) ∈ GN given byRdD(v)(S) = v(σdD(S)) for all S ⊆ N.
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For a TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN , the disjunctive
permission value (DPV) is the Shapley value of the corresponding disjunctive
restricted game, i.e., DPV(N, v, D) = Sh(N,RdD(v)).
Definition 3.3.11 Given a digraph (N, D), ΨcD = {S ⊆ N | i ∈ S implies j ∈ S
for all j ∈ IPD(i)} is the collection of conjunctive formable coalitions in (N, D).
For a digraph (N, D), a coalition S ⊆ N is conjunctive formable if for each
member of S, all immediate predecessors are also members of S.
Definition 3.3.12 Given a digraph (N, D), for any S ⊆ N the conjunctive sove-
reign part of S in (N, D) is the coalition given by
σcD(S) = ∪{S′ ∈ ΨcD | S′ ⊆ S}.
Given a digraph (N, D), the conjunctive sovereign part of any coalition S is
the union of all conjunctive formable coalitions in (N, D) that are subsets of S.
Definition 3.3.13 For (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN the conjunctive restriction of v on S is the
gameRcD(v) ∈ GN given byRcD(v)(S) = v(σcD(S)) for all S ⊆ N.
For a TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN , the conjunctive
permission value (CPV) is the Shapley value of the corresponding conjunctive
restricted game, i.e., CPV(N, v, D) = Sh(N,RcD(v)).
Now, we go through the properties satisfied by the average covering tree
solution. The first property we consider is efficiency.
Definition 3.3.14 On a subclass G ⊆ GdsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn is efficient if
for any (N, v, D) ∈ G, it holds that ∑i∈N ξi(N, v, D) = v(N).
On the class of TU-games with connected dominance structure, the web
values, in particular the tree value and the average web value, introduced
in Khmelnitskaya and Talman (2014), and the covering values studied in Li
and Li (2011), are not efficient. The average covering tree solution, how-
ever, satisfies efficiency on the class of TU-games with connected dominance
structure. Recall that, given a TU-game with connected dominance struc-
ture (N, v, D) ∈ GcdsN , the average covering tree solution is the average of the
marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all covering trees of digraph
(N, D). By (3.1) the marginal contribution vector corresponding to any cover-
ing tree of (N, D) distributes the worth v(N) over all players in N. Whence
the efficiency of the average covering tree solution follows.
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For a TU-game with dominance structure, the grand coalition N is a dis-
junctive and conjunctive formable coalition. Since the disjunctive permission
value is the Shapley value of the disjunctive restricted game and the conjunc-
tive permission value is the Shapley value of the conjunctive restricted game,
both the disjunctive and conjunctive permission values satisfy efficiency on
the class of TU-games with (connected) dominance structure. On the other
hand, if the dominance structure is not connected and the average covering
tree solution is applied separately to each component of the digraph, then the
average covering tree solution is component efficient.
The second property that is satisfied by the average covering tree solution
is linearity.
Definition 3.3.15 On a subclass G ⊆ GdsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn is linear if for
any (N, v, D), (N, w, D) ∈ G and for any a, b ∈ IR, it holds that
ξ(N, av + bw, D) = aξ(N, v, D) + bξ(N, w, D).
The linearity of the average covering tree solution follows straightforwardly
from its definition because the solution is defined as a linear combination of
the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all covering trees. Since
both the disjunctive and conjunctive permission values are defined as the
Shapley value of some restricted games, linearity is also satisfied by both of
these solutions.
Definition 3.3.16 On a subclass G ⊆ GdsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies the
superfluous player property if for any (N, v, D) ∈ G it holds that ξi(N, v, D) = 0
whenever v(S)−∑Q∈ĈD(S\{i}) v(Q) = 0 for all S ∈ C
D(N) such that i ∈ S.
The superfluous player property says that if a player has no contribution
in any connected coalition, then this player receives zero payoff. On the class
of TU-games with (connected) dominance structure, the superfluous player
property of the average covering tree solution follows immediately from its
definition because for any marginal contribution vector corresponding to a
covering tree, every player is receiving his marginal contribution to his set of
successors with whom, according to Lemma 3.3.5, he forms a connected set.
However, the disjunctive and conjunctive permission values do not satisfy the
superfluous player property. For the the disjunctive and conjunctive permis-
sion values, although a player has no contribution in a connected coalition, it
might be the case that some players with a nonzero contribution require his
permission. To illustrate this point, consider the following example.
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Example 3.3.17 Consider a TU-game with connected dominance structure (N,
v, D) ∈ GcdsN where N = {1, 2, 3}, D = {(1, 2), (2, 3)}, and v = u{3}. For
(N, D), we have ΨdD = Ψ
c
D = {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}} and RdD(v)(S) = RcD(v)(
S) = 0 for all S 6= {1, 2, 3} and RdD(v)({1, 2, 3}) = RcD(v)({1, 2, 3}) = 1.
Hence, DPV(N, v, D) = CDV(N, v, D) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Although player 1
and player 2 are superfluous players in (N, v, D), for the disjunctive and con-
junctive permission values they still receive a positive payoff because player 3
needs their permission in order to be able to cooperate with other players. On
the other hand, for the average covering tree solution we have ACT(N, v, D) =
(0, 0, 1) which shows that superfluous players receive zero payoff.
In van den Brink (1997) and van den Brink and Gilles (1996) it is stated that
the inessential player property is satisfied by the disjunctive permission value.
According to the inessential player property, a player receives zero payoff if
this player and all of his successors have no contribution to any coalition. The
inessential player property is weaker than the superfluous player property
and is therefore satisfied by the average covering tree solution.
In van den Brink and Gilles (1996), one of the axioms that is used for the
characterization of the conjunctive permission value for TU-games with cycle-
free permission structures is the strongly inessential player property. Accord-
ing to the strongly inessential player property a player should receive zero
payoff if he has no contribution to any set of players and the set of his im-
mediate successors is empty. The strongly inessential player property is also
weaker than the superfluous player property and is therefore satisfied by the
average covering tree solution.
Definition 3.3.18 For a digraph (N, D), a coalition S ∈ 2N is a closed hierarchy
if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) S = S̄D(i) for some i ∈ N;
(ii) j ∈ N \ S and h ∈ S \UD(S) imply (j, h) 6∈ D.
A coalition S ∈ 2N is a closed hierarchy in a digraph if it is a set composed
by one of the players in N together with all his successors in the digraph and
there is no player outside S that is an immediate predecessor of a dominated
player in S. If a digraph has only one undominated player, then the grand
coalition is a closed hierarchy.
Definition 3.3.19 On a subclass G ⊆ GdsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies hier-
archical efficiency if for every (N, v, D) ∈ G and closed hierarchy S for (N, D) it




ξi(N, v, D) = v(S).
The hierarchical efficiency of a solution implies efficiency for a TU-game
with dominance structure with only one undominated player in the digraph.
For a TU-game with dominance structure with the digraph being a tree, a hier-
archically efficient value assigns to every coalition composed by some player
together with all his successors in the tree exactly its worth.
For a TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN , a player is a weak
player if SD(i) = ∅
Definition 3.3.20 On a subclass G ⊆ GdsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies the
weak player property if for any (N, v, D) ∈ G, ξi(N, v, D) = v({i}) whenever
player i ∈ N is a weak player for (N, D).
The weak player property says that a player without any successors in the
digraph receives his own worth. In case the digraph representing the domi-
nance structure is a tree, the weak player property requires that every player
being a leaf of the tree receives his own worth.
Theorem 3.3.21 The average covering tree solution on GcdsN satisfies hierarchical ef-
ficiency.
Proof Take any (N, v, D) ∈ GcdsN and let S ∈ 2N be a closed hierarchy. Clearly,
S = S̄D(u) for any u ∈ UD(S). Moreover, for all Q ∈ CD(N) with Q ) S we
have UD(Q)∩ S = ∅ and for any i ∈ Q \ S there exists Q′ ∈ ĈD(Q \ {i}) such
that S ⊆ Q′. Since the number of players is finite, for all (N, T) ∈ T D we must
have that S = S̄T(u) for some u ∈ UD(S), which implies ∑i∈S ACTi(N, v, D) =
v(S).
Note that any coalition consisting of exactly one weak player is a closed
hierarchy. Since a weak player forms a closed hierarchy by its own, a value
satisfying hierarchical efficiency also satisfies the weak player property.
Example 3.3.22 Consider a TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) where
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, v(S) = |S|2 and D = {(1, 3), (2, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5)}. For the di-
graph (N, D) there exist two covering trees, (N, T1) and (N, T2). The digraph
(N, D) and the corresponding covering trees are depicted in Figure 3.3.
CHAPTER 3 45
b) The covering trees of (N, D).a) The digraph (N, D).















For the digraph (N, D), the coalitions {3, 4, 5}, {4} and {5} are the closed
hierarchies. Moreover, the players 4 and 5 are the weak players for (N, D). For
the two marginal contribution vectors corresponding to the covering trees, we
have mT1(N, v) = (9, 7, 7, 1, 1) and mT2(N, v) = (7, 9, 7, 1, 1). So, ACT(N, v,
D) = (8, 8, 7, 1, 1). For ACT(N, v, D), it holds that ∑i∈{3,4,5} ACTi(N, v, D) =
v({3, 4, 5}) = 9, ACT4(N, v, D) = v({4}) = 1, and ACT5(N, v, D) = v({5}) =
1. This illustrates that the average covering tree solution for (N, v, D) satisfies
hierarchical efficiency and the weak player property.
We remark that the average covering tree solution also satisfies hierarchical ef-
ficiency if the dominance structure is not connected. Hierarchical efficiency is
not satisfied by the disjunctive and conjunctive permission values. To see this,
consider Example 3.3.17, where the conjunctive and disjunctive permission
values coincide. The coalition containing only player 3 is a closed hierarchy
and player 3 is a weak player. In this example, both the disjunctive and con-
junctive permission values allocate 1/3 to this player as payoff which is less
than the worth of the coalition.
The next property that is satisfied by the average covering tree solution is
the inessential arc property.
Definition 3.3.23 Given a digraph (N, D), an arc (i, j) ∈ D is inessential if
i /∈ SD(j) and there exists i′ ∈ N such that (i, i′) ∈ D, i /∈ SD(i′), and j ∈ SD(i′).
An arc (i, j) in a digraph (N, D) is inessential if it is possible to reach node
j from i also by using a directed path in (N, D) different than the arc (i, j).
Moreover, the first node coming after i in this alternative path must be dom-
inated by i. For a digraph, the absence of an inessential arc does not change
the set of predecessors of any player and does not change the connectedness
of the digraph.
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Definition 3.3.24 On a subclass G ⊆ GdsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies the
inessential arc property if for any (N, v, D) ∈ G and inessential arc (i, j) ∈ D it
holds that ξ(N, v, D) = ξ(N, v, D \ {(i, j)}).
Theorem 3.3.25 The average covering tree solution on GcdsN satisfies the inessential
arc property.
Proof Take any (N, v, D) ∈ GcdsN and let (i, j) ∈ D be an inessential arc, so
there exists i′ ∈ N such that (i, i′) ∈ D, i /∈ SD(i′), and j ∈ SD(i′). Let D′ =
D \ {(i, j)}. We claim that T D = T D′ .
Take any (N, T) ∈ T D. Since (i, i′) ∈ D and i /∈ SD(i′), Theorem 3.3.4 im-
plies S̄D(i′) ⊆ ST(i). Hence, for all S ⊇ ST(i), UD(S) = UD′(S) and ĈD(S) =
ĈD
′
(S). Moreover, D|ST(i) = D
′|ST(i), which implies that (N, T) ∈ T
D′ .
Conversely, take any (N, T′) ∈ T D′ . The only difference between D and D′
is the absence of the arc (i, j). So, we have (i, i′) ∈ D′ and i /∈ SD′(i′). Again
from Theorem 3.3.4 it follows that S̄D′(i′) ⊆ ST′(i). Hence, for all S ⊇ ST′(i),
UD′(S) = UD(S) and ĈD
′
(S) = ĈD(S). Moreover, D′|ST′ (i) = D|ST′ (i), which
implies that (N, T′) ∈ T D.
Notice that, the average covering tree solution satisfies the inessential arc
property even if the dominance structure is not connected. On the class of TU-
games with dominance structure, the disjunctive permission value does not
satisfy the independence of inessential arcs. Because given a digraph (N, D)
and an inessential arc (i, j) ∈ D, if this inessential arc is deleted from the di-
graph, the collection of disjunctive formable coalitions do not need to stay the
same. On the other hand, for the conjunctive permission value if an inessential
arc is deleted from the digraph, the collection of conjunctive formable coali-
tions stays the same. This is because the digraph contains another directed
path from i to j. Since the collection of formable coalitions stays the same, the
conjunctive restricted game is also the same, which implies that the conjunc-
tive permission value allocates the same payoffs to every player.
Now we study stability of the average covering tree solution. In a TU-game
with connected dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GcdsN , if only connected sets
of players are able to cooperate, then the core is defined as the set of efficient
payoff vectors that are not dominated by any connected set, i.e.,
COREc(N, v, D) = {x ∈ IRn | x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ∈ CD(N)}.
Definition 3.3.26 For a digraph (N, D), a connected set S ∈ CD(N) is a hier-
archical network in (N, D) if for any i ∈ S and j ∈ N such that (i, j) ∈ D and
i /∈ SD(j), it holds that S̄D(j) ⊆ S.
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A connected set in a digraph is a hierarchical network if whenever a node
of the connected set dominates an immediate successor, then this immediate
successor together with all his successors in the digraph also belong to this
connected set. Let Hc(D) be the set of hierarchical networks in a digraph
(N, D).
From Theorem 3.3.4 we immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3.27 For a digraph (N, D), if (N, T) ∈ T D, then S̄T(i) ∈ Hc(D) holds
for all i ∈ N.
A TU-game (N, v) is called convex if v(S ∪ Q) + v(S ∩ Q) ≥ v(S) + v(Q),
for all S, Q ∈ 2N. For a TU-game (N, v) ∈ GN, it is well know that the Shapley
value is in the core of the game if the game satisfies convexity. In Chapter
2 of this monograph the Myerson value, which is the Shapley value of the
corresponding Myerson restricted game, is discussed. For a game with com-
munication structure, (N, v, L) ∈ GcsN , the Myerson value is in the core of the










holds for any S, Q ∈ 2N.
As the following result shows, for a TU-game with connected dominance
structure (N, v, D) ∈ GcdsN a weaker convexity condition is sufficient for the
stability of the average covering tree solution.
Theorem 3.3.28 For a TU-game with connected dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈
GcdsN , ACT(N, v, D) ∈ COREc(N, v, D) if
v(S) + v(Q) ≤ v(S ∪Q) + ∑
K∈ĈD(S∩Q)
v(K)
holds for any S, Q ∈ CD(N) satisfying:
(i) S ∪Q ∈ CD(N);
(ii) S ∈ Hc(D) or Q ∈ Hc(D);
(iii) K ∈ Hc(D) for all K ∈ ĈD(S ∩Q).
Proof Consider a TU-game with connected dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈
GcdsN that satisfies the condition in the theorem. We show that for every cover-
ing tree (N, T) ∈ T D, the corresponding marginal contribution vector mT(N, v)
is an element of the core and therefore also its average must be. Take any
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(N, T) ∈ T D. The efficiency of ACT(N, v, D) is shown above. Take any
S ∈ CD(N) and consider the subgraph (S, T|S). It has components S1, . . . , Sk′ .
Note that (S1, T|S1), . . . , (Sk′ , T|Sk′ ) are all subtrees of (N, T). For k = 1, . . . , k
′,
let rk denote the root of subtree (Sk, T|Sk). Without loss of generality, let r1, . . . , rk′
be such that k1 < k2 implies S̄T(rk1) ⊂ S̄T(rk2) or S̄T(rk1) ∩ S̄T(rk2) = ∅. For
k = 1, . . . , k′, let Grk be the set of immediate successors of the nodes of Sk in
(N, T) that are not in S, i.e., Grk = {j ∈ N \ S | (i, j) ∈ T for some i ∈ Sk}. Let
R = {r1, . . . , rk′} and I = ∪r∈RGr. We define a tree T∗ with root rk′ on the set
of nodes R ∪ I, where the set of immediate successors of a node r ∈ R is given
by Gr and the set of immediate successors of a node i ∈ I is given by the set
Gi = {r ∈ R| S̄T(r) ⊂ S̄T(i),@r′ ∈ R \ {r} with S̄T(r) ⊂ S̄T(r′) ⊂ S̄T(i)}.
Let I = {i1, . . . , il}. Without loss of generality, let i1, . . . , il′ be such that l1 <
l2 implies k1 ≤ k2 where kh, h = 1, 2, is such that (rkh , ilh) ∈ T∗. For l =
1, . . . , l′ consider the sets S̄T(il) and Bil−1 = S ∪ (S̄T(i1) ∪ · · · ∪ S̄T(il−1)). By
Corollary 3.3.27, S̄T(il) is a hierarchical network in (N, D) for any l = 1, . . . , l′.
To apply the induction argument on l to show that the set Bil is a connected
set, suppose that Bil−1 is a connected set. Notice that for l = 1 the set Bil−1 = S
is a connected set. Let i ∈ N be the unique immediate predecessor of il in
(N, T), then from the construction of T∗ it follows that i ∈ S and from (ii) of
Definition 3.3.1 it follows that S̄T(il) ∈ ĈD(ST(i)). Due to (i) of Lemma 3.3.5
S̄T(i) is a connected set, which implies that (i, j) ∈ D for some j ∈ S̄T(il).
Because j ∈ S̄T(il) and i ∈ Bil−1 , (i, j) ∈ D implies that their union, which is
equal to Bil , is indeed a connected set. Moreover, by construction of T
∗, the
components of their possibly empty intersection are the hierarchical networks
S̄T(r), r ∈ Gil . From the condition in the theorem it follows that
v(S ∪ (S̄T(i1) ∪ · · · ∪ S̄T(il−1))) + v(S̄T(il)) ≤
v(S ∪ (S̄T(i1) ∪ · · · ∪ S̄T(il))) + ∑
r∈Gil
v(S̄T(r)).
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Since T∗ is a tree, every hierarchical network S̄T(rk), k = 1, . . . , k′, appears

























From the last two equations it follows that ∑
i∈S
miT(N, v) ≥ v(S), which com-
pletes the proof.
3.4 The dominance value for TU-games with dom-
inance structure
In this section, given a TU-game with dominance structure we assume that
not the connected coalitions but the coalitions that do not violate the subor-
dination of players in the dominance structure are able to form. Considering
the nodes in the digraph as tasks that need to be completed, for the dominance
value, we assume that at every moment exactly one of the remaining tasks can
be performed as long as it does not violate the subordination of the remaining
tasks in the digraph. We introduce a single-valued solution concept, the so-
called dominance value for the class of TU-games with dominance structure.
For TU-games the Shapley value is the average of the marginal contribution
vectors corresponding to all permutations on the player set. At such a vector,
every player receives as payoff the marginal contribution when he joins his
predecessors in the permutation. For TU-games with dominance structure,
we define the dominance value as the average of the marginal contribution
vectors corresponding to all permutations on the player set that are consistent
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with the dominance structure prescribed by the digraph. To each of these con-
sistent permutations corresponds a sequence of feasible coalitions such that
every player together with his predecessors in the permutation, if they exist,
forms a feasible coalition. Faigle and Kern (1992) considers TU-games with
precedence constraints which is represented by a partial ordering on the set of
players. The dominance structure considered in this section is more general
and can be any binary relation on the set of players and is represented by an
arbitrary digraph.
In this section, under the dominance relation induced by a digraph, the
set of feasible coalitions is assumed to be determined by the set of so-called
hierarchical coalitions.
Definition 3.4.1 For a digraph (N, D), a coalition S ∈ 2N is a hierarchical coali-
tion in (N, D) if for any i ∈ S and j ∈ N, such that (i, j) ∈ D and i /∈ SD(j), it
holds that S̄D(j) ⊂ S.
Recall that a hierarchical network is a connected set that satisfies the con-
dition in Definition 3.4.1. On the other hand, a hierarchical coalition does not
need to be a connected set. So, each hierarchical network is a hierarchical
coalition but a hierarchical coalition does not need to be a hierarchical net-
work.
If a player in a hierarchical coalition dominates an immediate successor in
the digraph, then the coalition also contains this latter player and all his suc-
cessors in the digraph. The set of hierarchical coalitions contains all coalitions
that preserve the domination relations between the players and is assumed
to be the set of feasible coalitions that are able to cooperate. For a cycle-free
digraph (N, D), a coalition S ∈ 2N is hierarchical if and only if for any i ∈ S,
it holds that the successors set of i in (N, D) belongs to S, i.e., S̄D(i) ⊆ S.
So, for a cycle-free digraph the set of hierarchical coalitions coincides with
the set of feasible coalitions considered in Faigle and Kern (1992) when the
precedence constraints are induced by the same digraph. Notice that both the
empty coalition and the grand coalition of all players are always hierarchical.
If the digraph is empty, then every coalition is hierarchical. The set of all hi-
erarchical coalitions of a digraph (N, D) is denoted by H(D). Observe that
S, T ∈ H(D) implies that S ∪ T ∈ H(D) and S ∩ T ∈ H(D).
Definition 3.4.2 For a digraph (N, D), a permutation π on N is consistent with
(N, D) if i ∈ UD(P̄π(i)) holds for all i ∈ N.
Given a digraph, a permutation is consistent if each player is an undomi-
nated player of the subgraph on the set of players consisting of this player and
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his predecessors in the permutation. The set of permutations on N consistent
with the digraph (N, D) is denoted by ΠD. Since N is finite and therefore any
subgraph of (N, D) has at least one undominated node, ΠD 6= ∅ for any di-
graph (N, D). A consistent permutation keeps the subordination of players
prescribed by the digraph in the sense that for any permutation π ∈ ΠD con-
sistent with (N, D) it holds that π(j) < π(i) whenever there exists h ∈ N such
that (i, h) ∈ D, i /∈ SD(h) and j ∈ S̄D(h). As the next proposition shows, in
any consistent permutation, every player together with his predecessors and
also his predecessors themselves form hierarchical coalitions in the digraph.
Proposition 3.4.3 For a digraph (N, D), if π ∈ ΠD, then both P̄π(i) ∈ H(D) and
Pπ(i) ∈ H(D) for all i ∈ N.
Proof Take any π ∈ ΠD and suppose Pπ(i) /∈ H(D) for some i ∈ N. Then
there exists i′ ∈ Pπ(i) and j′ ∈ N such that (i′, j′) ∈ D, i′ /∈ SD(j′) but
k /∈ Pπ(i) for some k ∈ SD(j′). Let k′ ∈ SD(j′) be the node such that k′ ∈
N \ Pπ(i) and Pπ(k′) ⊇ Pπ(k) for all k ∈ SD(j′). So, Pπ(k′) ⊇ SD(j′) and
i, i′, j′ ∈ Pπ(k′). Since (i′, j′) ∈ D, SD(j′) ⊆ Pπ(k′), and k′ ∈ SD(j′), it
holds that k′ ∈ SD|Pπ(k′)(i
′). On the other hand, k′ ∈ SD(j′) and i′ /∈ SD(j′)
imply i′ /∈ SD|Pπ(k′)(k
′). This implies k′ /∈ UD(Pπ(k′)), which contradicts
π ∈ ΠD. Since, for any i ∈ N, Pπ(i) = Pπ(j) where j ∈ Pπ(i) is such that
π(j) = maxk∈Pπ(i) π(k), it also holds that Pπ(i) ∈ H(D) for all i ∈ N.
Given a TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN , for each con-
sistent permutation π ∈ ΠD, there corresponds a marginal contribution vector
mπ(N, v) given by
mπi (N, v) = v(P̄π(i))− v(Pπ(i)), i ∈ N.
Definition 3.4.4 On the class of TU-games with dominance structure GdsN , the
dominance value (DOM) of (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN is the average of the marginal con-
tribution vectors that correspond to all permutations consistent with (N, D),
i.e.,





Example 3.4.5 Consider the 5-player TU-games with dominance structure (N,
v, D), (N, v, D′) and (N, v, D′′) with characteristic function v(S) = |S|2 for all
S ⊆ N and D = {(1, 2), (3, 5), (4, 5)}, D′ = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 5), (5, 1)}
and D′′ = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 1), (4, 5)}, as depicted in Figure 3.5.












a) The digraph (N, D). b) The digraph (N, D′). c) The digraph (N, D′′).
Figure 3.5 : The digraphs in Example 3.4.5
There are 20 permutations consistent with the digraph (N, D) : π1 = (5, 4, 3, 2,
1), π2 = (5, 3, 4, 2, 1), π3 = (5, 4, 2, 3, 1), π4 = (5, 2, 4, 3, 1), π5 = (2, 5, 4, 3, 1),
π6 = (5, 3, 2, 4, 1), π7 = (5, 2, 3, 4, 1), π8 = (2, 5, 3, 4, 1), π9 = (5, 2, 4, 1, 3),
π10 = (2, 5, 4, 1, 3), π11 = (5, 4, 2, 1, 3), π12 = (5, 2, 1, 4, 3), π13 = (2, 5, 1, 4, 3),
π14 = (2, 1, 5, 4, 3), π15 = (5, 2, 3, 1, 4), π16 = (2, 5, 3, 1, 4), π17 = (5, 3, 2, 1, 4),
π18 = (5, 2, 1, 3, 4), π19 = (2, 5, 1, 3, 4), π20 = (2, 1, 5, 3, 4), and DOM(N, v, D) =
(7, 3, 13/2, 13/2, 2). For the digraph (N, D′) there are 5 permutations consis-
tent with (N, D′) : π1 = (5, 4, 3, 2, 1), π2 = (4, 3, 2, 1, 5), π3 = (3, 2, 1, 5, 4),
π4 = (2, 1, 5, 4, 3), π5 = (1, 5, 4, 3, 2), and DOM(N, v, D′) = (5, 5, 5, 5, 5).
For the digraph (N, D′′) there are 10 permutations consistent with (N, D′′) :
π1 = (5, 4, 3, 2, 1), π2 = (1, 5, 4, 3, 2), π3 = (5, 1, 4, 3, 2), π4 = (2, 1, 5, 4, 3),
π5 = (5, 2, 1, 4, 3), π6 = (2, 5, 1, 4, 3), π7 = (3, 2, 1, 5, 4), π8 = (5, 3, 2, 1, 4),
π9 = (3, 5, 2, 1, 4), π5 = (3, 2, 5, 1, 4), and DOM(N, v, D′) = (52/10, 46/10,
52/10, 70/10, 30/10).
When there is no dominance relation between the players in the digraph
(N, D), i.e., (j, i) ∈ D whenever (i, j) ∈ D, the dominance value of the TU-
game with dominance structure (N, v, D) and the Shapley value of the TU-
game (N, v) coincide. Since a cycle-free digraph on the player set corresponds
to a partial ordering of the players, on the subclass of TU-games with cycle-
free dominance structure the dominance value coincides with the Shapley
value defined in Faigle and Kern (1992) for cooperative games under prece-
dence constraints.
3.4.1 Properties of the dominance value
In this section we discuss several properties of the dominance value for TU-
games with dominance structure. Since on the class of TU-games with cycle-
free dominance structure, the Shapley value introduced in Faigle and Kern
(1992) and the dominance value coincides, for this class the properties intro-
duced below are also satisfied by the Shapley value of Faigle and Kern (1992).
The first two of these properties are efficiency and linearity. Recall that, for
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TU-games with dominance structure, efficiency requires the total payoff al-
located to the players to be equal to the worth of the grand coalition. Effi-
ciency of the dominance value immediately follows from the fact that each
marginal contribution vector corresponding to a consistent permutation is ef-
ficient. Moreover, since the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to
consistent permutations are linear in the worths of coalitions and the solution
is a linear combination of these vectors, the dominance value also satisfies lin-
earity. Notice that efficiency of the dominance value also holds if the digraph
is not connected, whereas the average covering tree solution in that case is not
efficient but component efficient.
Given a TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN , a player i ∈ N
is called a restricted null player in (N, v, D) if v(S)− v(S \ {i}) = 0 for all S ∈
H(D) such that i ∈ S and S \ {i} ∈ H(D). Such a player should receive zero
payoff.
Definition 3.4.6 On a subclass G ⊆ GdsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies the
restricted null player property if for any (N, v, D) ∈ G it holds that ξi(N, v, D) =
0 whenever i ∈ N is a restricted null player in (N, v, D).
According to the restricted null player property a player receives zero pay-
off if this player has no marginal contribution to the hierarchical coalitions
that are still hierarchical after joining them. The superfluous player property,
however, requires a player to receive zero payoff if this player has no marginal
contribution when joining a collection of connected sets such that after joining
they all together form a connected set in the digraph. Recall that a hierarchical
coalition does not need to be connected and a connected set does not need to
be a hierarchical coalition.
Proposition 3.4.7 The dominance value on GdsN satisfies the restricted null player
property.
Proof Take any TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN and re-
stricted null player i in (N, v, D). Consider any π ∈ ΠD. By Proposition 3.4.3,
both P̄π(i) and Pπ(i) are hierarchical coalitions. Since i is a restricted null
player in (N, v, D), mπi (N, v) = v(P̄π(i))− v(Pπ(i)) = 0. Hence, DOMi(N, v,
D) = 0.
The restricted null player property is not satisfied by both the disjunctive
and conjunctive permission values. In order to see this, consider Example
3.3.17 where player 2 is a restricted null player and both the disjunctive and
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conjunctive permission values distribute 1/3 as payoff to player 2. The aver-
age covering tree solution does not satisfy the restricted null player property
and the dominance value does not satisfy the restricted superfluous property.
This is because the two properties are based on the marginal contributions
while joining to different collection of coalitions.
Given a digraph (N, D), i, j ∈ N are symmetric in (N, D) if i and j have
the same set of immediate successors and immediate predecessors, i.e., {k |
(i, k) ∈ D} = {k | (j, k) ∈ D} and {k | (k, i) ∈ D} = {k | (k, j) ∈ D}.
Given a TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN , players i, j ∈ N
are symmetric in worth if for all hierarchical coalitions S ⊆ N \ {i, j} for which
coalitions S ∪ {i}, S ∪ {j} and S ∪ {i, j} are also hierarchical, v(S ∪ {i}) =
v(S ∪ {j}). Given a TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN , two
different players in N are symmetric in (N, v, D) if they are symmetric in (N, D)
and symmetric in worth. Such players should receive the same payoff.
Definition 3.4.8 On a subclass G ⊆ GdsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn satisfies the
restricted equal treatment property if for any (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN and i, j ∈ N sym-
metric in (N, v, D), it holds that ξi(N, v, D) = ξ j(N, v, D).
Remark 3.4.9 For players i, j ∈ N being symmetric in a digraph (N, D) it
holds that π ∈ ΠD if and only if π′ ∈ ΠD, where π′(i) = π(j), π′(j) = π(i)
and π′(k) = π(k) for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}.
Proposition 3.4.10 The dominance value on GdsN satisfies the restricted equal treat-
ment property.
Proof Take any TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN and two
players i, j ∈ N symmetric in (N, v, D). We show that mπi (N, v) = mπ
′
j (N, v)
and mπj (N, v) = m
π′
i (N, v) for any π, π
′ ∈ ΠD such that π′(i) = π(j), π′(j) =
π(i), and π′(k) = π(k) for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}. Then Remark 3.4.9 implies
DOMi(N, v, D) = DOMj(N, v, D), because the dominance value for a TU-
game with dominance structure is the average of the marginal vectors corre-
sponding to all consistent permutations. Without loss of generality assume
that π(i) > π(j). To show mπi (N, v) = m
π′
j (N, v), note that π
′(i) = π(j) and
π′(k) = π(k) for all k ∈ N \ {i, j} implies P̄π(i) = P̄π′(j) and Pπ(i) \ {j} =
Pπ′(j) \ {i}. Let S = Pπ(i) \ {j} = Pπ′(j) \ {i}. By Proposition 3.4.3, S ∪ {i},
S ∪ {j} and S ∪ {i, j} are hierarchical coalitions. Since i and j are symmetric
in worth, v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}), which means v(Pπ(i)) = v(Pπ′(j)). To-
gether with P̄π(i) = P̄π′(j), we obtain mπi (N, v) = v(P̄π(i)) − v(Pπ(i)) =
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v(P̄π′(j)) − v(Pπ′(j)) = mπ
′
j (N, v). In order to show m
π
j (N, v) = m
π′
i (N, v),
note that Pπ(j) = Pπ′(i). Let S = Pπ(j) = Pπ′(i). By Proposition 3.4.3,
S ∪ {i}, S ∪ {j} and S are hierarchical coalitions. Since i and j are symmet-
ric in worth, v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}), which means v(P̄π(j)) = v(P̄π′(i)). So,
mπj (N, v) = v(P̄π(j))− v(Pπ(j)) = v(P̄π′(i))− v(Pπ′(i)) = mπ
′
i (N, v).
For the average covering tree solution on the class of TU-games with dom-
inance structure, the inessential arc property is discussed in Section 3. As the
next proposition shows, on the class of TU-game with dominance structure
this property is also satisfied by the dominance value.
Proposition 3.4.11 The dominance value on GdsN satisfies the inessential arc prop-
erty.
Proof Take any TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN and let
(i, j) ∈ D be inessential. Then there exists i′ ∈ N such that (i, i′) ∈ D, i /∈
SD(i′), and j ∈ SD(i′). Let D′ = D \ {(i, j)}. We show that ΠD = ΠD
′
, which
implies DOM(N, v, D) = DOM(N, v, D′).
Take any π ∈ ΠD. Since (i, i′) ∈ D and i /∈ SD(i′), Proposition 3.4.3 im-
plies P̄π(i′) ⊆ Pπ(i). Hence, for all S ⊇ Pπ(i), UD(S) = UD′(S). Moreover,
D|Pπ(i) = D
′|Pπ(i). This implies that π ∈ Π
D′ .
Conversely, take any π′ ∈ ΠD′ . Since D′ = D \ {(i, j)}, it holds that (i, i′) ∈
D′ and i /∈SD′(i′). From Proposition 3.4.3 it follows that P̄π′(i′)⊆Pπ′(i). Hence,
for all S⊇ Pπ′(i), UD′(S) =UD(S). Moreover, D′|Pπ′ (i)= D|Pπ′ (i). This implies
π′∈ΠD.
Now we study the stability of the dominance value and provide a convexity
type condition under which the dominance value is stable. In a TU-game with
dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN , if only hierarchical coalitions are able to
cooperate, then the core is defined as the set of efficient payoff vectors that are
not dominated by any hierarchical coalition, i.e.,
COREh(N, v, D) = {x∈ IRn | x(N)=v(N), x(S)≥v(S) ∀S ∈ H(D)}.
Theorem 3.4.12 For a TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN , if
v(S) + v(T) ≤ v(S ∪ T) + v(S ∩ T)
holds for any S, T ∈ H(D), then DOM(N, v, D) ∈ COREh(N, v, D).
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Proof Take any TU-game with dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GdsN that sat-
isfies the condition in the theorem. Due to efficiency and since the value is
the average of all consistent marginal contribution vectors, it suffices to show
that ∑i∈S mπi (N, v) ≥ v(S) for any S ∈ H(D) and π ∈ ΠD. Let S1, . . . , Sk be
the unique maximal partition of S such that Sh = {i ∈ S | bh ≤ π(i) ≤ ah},
h = 1, . . . , k, where ah and bh, h = 1, . . . , k, satisfy ah−1 < bh ≤ ah, with
a0 = 0. We define P̄π(0) = ∅. For any given h ∈ {1, . . . , k} consider the
sets S ∪ P̄π(ah−1) and Pπ(bh). By Proposition 3.4.3 and since S is hierarchical,
both sets are hierarchical coalitions. Moreover, their intersection is equal to
P̄π(ah−1) and their union is equal to S ∪ P̄π(ah) which are both hierarchical
coalitions. From the condition in the theorem, it then follows that
v(S ∪ P̄π(ah)) + v(P̄π(ah−1)) ≥ v(S ∪ P̄π(ah−1)) + v(Pπ(bh)).
By repeated application of this inequality for h = 1, . . . k, we obtain


















Since for h = 1, . . . , k it holds that
∑
i∈Sh
mπi (N, v) = v(P̄π(ah)− v(Pπ(bh))




i (N, v), we obtain ∑i∈S m
π
i (N, v) ≥ v(S).
The condition for the stability in the theorem is weaker than convexity of
the underlying TU-game, because the convexity relation is only required for
hierarchical coalitions.
3.5 Special cases for dominance structure
In this section, we consider some special digraphs representing the dominance
structure in a TU-game with dominance structure. Although generally the av-
erage covering tree solution and the dominance value are different from each
other, as the following proposition states, for TU-games with some specific
connected dominance structures these two solution concepts coincide.
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Proposition 3.5.1 For a TU-game with connected dominance structure (N, v,
D) ∈ GcdsN , if each covering tree (N, T) ∈ T D is a line tree, then ACT(N, v, D) =
DOM(N, v, D).
Proof Take any TU-game with connected dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈
GcdsN such that every (N, T) ∈ T D is a line tree. For each (N, T) ∈ T D, let
πT : N → N be the permutation such that PπT(i) = ST(i) for all i ∈ N. We
claim that ΠD = {πT | (N, T) ∈ T D}. Take any (N, T) ∈ T D and suppose
for a contradiction πT /∈ ΠD. So, there exists i ∈ N such that i /∈ UD(PπT(i)).
Since PπT(i) = ST(i), this contradicts with the fact that i ∈ UD(ST(i)). Now
take any π ∈ ΠD. If Pπ(i) ∈ CD(N) for all i ∈ N, then it holds that (N, T) ∈
T D such that ST(i) = Pπ(i) for all i ∈ N. Now suppose Pπ(i) /∈ CD(N) for
some i ∈ N. Let i′ ∈ N be such that ĈD(Pπ(i′)) = {K1, . . . , Km} for some
m > 1 and Pπ(j) ∈ CD(N) for all j ∈ N \ Pπ(i′). This implies the existence
of a covering tree (N, T) ∈ T D such that (i′, ik) ∈ T and ik ∈ UD(Kk) for
k = 1, . . . , m. This contradicts that every tree T D is a line tree.
3.5.1 Directed cycle as dominance structure
In this subsection, we consider TU-games with dominance structure which is
represented by a directed cycle on the set of players. Faigle and Kern (1992)
considers TU-games with precedence constraints which are modeled by some
partially ordered set of players and provide a characterization of their Shapley
value for such situations. In case the precedence constraints are modeled by
a cycle-free digraph on the set of players, the dominance value coincides with
the Shapley value defined in Faigle and Kern (1992) for cooperative games un-
der precedence constraints. In this subsection, we provide a characterization
of the dominance value for TU-games with directed cycle dominance struc-
ture which are not covered by the model in Faigle and Kern (1992).
Definition 3.5.2 A connected digraph (N, D) is a directed cycle if there exists a
permutation π : N → N such that
D = {(π(1), π(2)), (π(2), π(3)), . . . , (π(n− 1), π(n)), (π(n), π(1))}.
A directed cycle is a connected digraph where each player has exactly one
immediate successor and exactly one immediate predecessor. A TU-game
with directed cycle dominance structure is a combination of a TU-game and
a dominance structure represented by a directed cycle on the set of players.
Let GcycleN be the set of all TU-games with directed cycle dominance structure,
with the player set N.
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Proposition 3.5.3 For any TU-game with directed cycle dominance structure (N, v,
D) ∈ GcycleN , it holds that ACT(N, v, D) = DOM(N, v, D).
Since for a TU-game with directed cycle dominance structure each (N, T) ∈
T D is a line tree, the equivalence of the average covering tree solution and the
dominance value on the class of TU-games with directed cycle dominance
structure directly follows from Proposition 3.5.1.
In Chapter 2, we introduce strong symmetry for TU-games with connected
cycle-free communication structures which implies equal payoff distribution
whenever any proper subset of the grand coalition has zero worth. For TU-
games with connected dominance structure, now we introduce strong sym-
metry among undominated players which requires equal payoff allocation to
the undominated players of the connected digraph when any proper subset
of the grand coalition has zero worth.
Definition 3.5.4 On a subclass G ⊆ GcdsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn, satisfies strong
symmetry among undominated players if for any (N, v, D) ∈ G with v(S) = 0 for
all S ∈ 2N, S 6= N, it holds that ξi(N, v, D) = ξ j(N, v, D) for all i, j ∈ UD(N).
Definition 3.5.5 A solution ξ : GcdsN → Rn satisfies restricted marginality if
for any (N, v, D), (N, w, D) ∈ GcdsN and i ∈ N, it holds that ξi(N, v, D) =
ξi(N, w, D) whenever v(S)− v(S \ {i}) = w(S)−w(S \ {i}) for all S ∈ Hc(D)
such that i ∈ UD(S) and S \ {i} ∈ Hc(D).
According to restricted marginality, a player should receive the same payoff
in two TU-games with the same connected dominance structure if this player
has the same marginal contribution in both games when joining to a hier-
archical network as an undominated node such that after joining it is still a
hierarchical network.
Theorem 3.5.6 The average covering tree solution is the unique solution on GcycleN
that satisfies efficiency, linearity, the restricted null player property, strong symmetry
among undominated players, and restricted marginality.
Proof First, we show that the average covering tree solution for any TU-game
with directed cycle dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GcycleN satisfies all ax-
ioms. Efficiency and linearity are shown in Section 3. If player i ∈ N is a
restricted null player in (N, v, D), then mTi (N, v) = 0 for any (N, T) ∈ T D
and therefore the average of his marginal contributions is also zero. To see
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the average covering tree solution satisfies strong symmetry among undomi-
nated players, take any (N, v, D) ∈ GcycleN such that v(S) = 0 for all S ∈ 2N,
S 6= N. Since UN(D) = N, we need to show ξi(N, v, D) = ξ j(N, v, D)
for all i, j ∈ N. Consider any (N, T) ∈ T D and let r(N, T) = r for some
r ∈ N. Since v(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N, we have mTr (N, v) = v(N) and
mTi (N, v) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ {r}. Since each i ∈ N is the root of exactly
one covering tree and the number of covering trees is equal to n, this im-
plies ξi(N, v, D) = v(N)/n for all i ∈ N. Finally, consider two TU-games
with the same directed cycle dominance structure (N, v, D) and (N, w, D),
and for some i ∈ N let v(S) − v(S \ {i}) = w(S) − w(S \ {i}) holds for all
S ∈ Hc(D) such that i ∈ UD(S) and S \ {i} ∈ Hc(D). Since in each corre-
sponding covering tree, player i is joining to a hierarchical network as an un-
dominated player and after joining the coalition is still hierarchical network,
then mTi (N, v) = m
T
i (N, w) for all (N, T) ∈ T N, and therefore player i re-
ceives the same payoff at the average covering tree solution in both (N, v, D)
and (N, w, D).
Second, we show that there exists a unique solution that satisfies all five
axioms. For this, because of linearity it is sufficient to show that for a solution
ξ : GcycleN → Rn satisfying all five axioms ξ(N, uS, D) is a unique payoff vector
for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. Take any S ∈ 2N \∅ and consider (N, uS, D).
If S = N, then UD(S) = N and strong symmetry among undominated
players and efficiency imply ξi(N, uN, D) = 1n for all i ∈ N.
If S ∈ CD(N), S 6= N, then UD(S) = {r} for some r ∈ S. For each i ∈ S \
UD(S), it holds that uS(Q)− uS(Q \ {i}) = uN(Q)− uN(Q \ {i}) for all Q ∈
Hc(D) such that i ∈ UD(Q) and Q \ {i} ∈ Hc(D). By restricted marginality,
this implies ξi(N, uS, D) = ξi(N, uN, D) = 1n for all i ∈ S \ UD(S). Since
each i ∈ N \ S is a restricted null player in (N, uS, D), by the restricted null
player property we have ξi(N, uS, D) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S. Efficiency implies
ξr(N, uS, D) = 1− |S|−1n .
Finally, take any S /∈ CD(N). Let ĈD(S) = {S1, . . . , Sk}, then UD(Sh) =
{rh} for some rh ∈ Sh, h = 1, . . . , k. Note that each i ∈ N \ S is a restricted
null player in (N, uS, D). By the restricted null player property, we have
ξi(N, uS, D) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S. For each i ∈ S \ {r1, . . . , rk}, it holds
that uS(Q) − uS(Q \ {i}) = uN(Q) − uN(Q \ {i}) for all Q ∈ Hc(D) such
that i ∈ UD(Q) and Q \ {i} ∈ Hc(D). By restricted marginality, this im-
plies ξi(N, uS, D) = ξi(N, uN, D) = 1n for all i ∈ S \ {r1, . . . , rk}. For any
h ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let Sh ∈ CD(N) be the unique smallest connected set contain-
ing S such that UD(Sh) = rh. For each i ∈ Sh \ {rh}, it holds that uSh(Q) −
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uSh(Q \ {i}) = uN(Q)− uN(Q \ {i}) for all Q ∈ Hc(D) such that i ∈ UD(Q)
and Q \ {i} ∈ Hc(D). By restricted marginality, this implies ξi(N, uSh , D) = 1n
for all i ∈ Sh \ {rh}. Since each i ∈ N \ Sh is a restricted null player in
(N, uSh , D), by the restricted null player property we have ξi(N, uSh , D) = 0
for all i ∈ N \ Sh. By efficiency, this implies ξrh(N, uSh , D) = 1−
|Sh|−1
n . Since
uSh(Q)− uSh(Q \ {rh}) = uS(Q)− uS(Q \ {rh}) for all Q ∈ Hc(D) such that
rh ∈ UD(Q) and Q \ {i} ∈ Hc(D), we have ξrh(N, uSh , D) = ξrh(N, uS, D) =
1− |S
h|−1
n , which completes the proof.
Unlike Young’s axiomatization (Young (1985)) of the Shapley value for TU-
games by efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity without a priori re-
quirement of additivity, for the axiomatization of the average covering tree
solution for TU-games with directed cycle dominance structure we use both
linearity and restricted marginality. The reason why the induction argument
of Young does not work in the latter case is that while the decomposition
of a TU-game is considered via the unanimity basis determined by all possi-
ble coalitions, restricted marginality as opposed to marginality considers only
some specific coalitions.
Given a TU-game with directed cycle dominance structure, since all cover-
ing trees are line trees, by Proposition 3.5.3 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.5.7 The dominance value is the unique solution on GcycleN that satisfies
efficiency, linearity, the restricted null player property, strong symmetry among un-
dominated players, and restricted marginality.
On the class of TU-games with directed cycle dominance structure the Shap-
ley value introduced in Faigle and Kern (1992) is not defined. Considering the
permission values, given a TU-game with directed cycle dominance structure
(N, v, D) ∈ GcycleN , it holds that ΨdD = ΨcD = {N}. This implies RdD(v)(S) =
RcD(v)(S) = 0 for all S 6= N and RdD(v)(N) = RcD(v)(N) = v(N). Hence,
for any TU-game with directed cycle dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GcycleN ,
it holds that DPVi(N, v, D) = CPVi(N, v, D) = v(N)/n for all i ∈ N. On
the other hand, both the average covering tree solution and the dominance
value take into account the players’ marginal contributions when joining to
hierarchical networks and allocate the payoff accordingly.
On the class of TU-games with directed cycle dominance structure, the dis-
junctive and conjunctive permission values do not satisfy restricted marginal-
ity. In order to see this, consider two TU-games with directed cycle domi-
nance structure (N, v, D), (N, w, D) ∈ GcycleN where D = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1)}.
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Let v = uN and w(N) = 2, w({2, 3}) = 1, and w(S) = 0 for all S ∈ 2N,
S 6= N, S 6= {2, 3}. Note that v(S)− v(S \ {1}) = w(S)− w(S \ {1}) holds
for all S ∈ Hc(D) such that 1 ∈ UD(S) and S \ {1} ∈ Hc(D). But we have
DPV1(N, v, D) = CPV1(N, v, D) = 1/3 and DPV1(N, w, D) = CPV1(N, w, D) =
2/3.
3.5.2 Directed star as dominance structure
In this subsection we consider TU-games with dominance structure which is
represented by a directed star and we provide a characterization of the aver-
age covering tree solution for such situations.
Definition 3.5.8 A connected digraph (N, D) is a directed star if there exists a
unique node h ∈ N, called the hub, for which either (i, h) ∈ D or (h, i) ∈ D
holds for all i ∈ N \ {h} and D contains no other arcs.
Note that a directed star is a connected and strongly cycle-free digraph. A TU-
game with directed star dominance structure is a combination of a TU-game
and a domination structure represented by a directed star on the set of players.
Let GstarN be the set of TU-games with directed star dominance structure.
For a directed star (N, D), let h(N, D) be the hub of the digraph, i.e., either
(i, h(N, D)) ∈ D or (h(N, D), i) ∈ D holds for all i ∈ N, i 6= h(N, D). More-
over, given a directed star (N, D), let A(N, D) = {i ∈ N | (i, h(N, D)) ∈ D}
and B(N, D) = {i ∈ N | (h(N, D), i) ∈ D} be the set of predecessors and suc-
cessors of the hub, respectively. Note that for a directed star (N, D), UD(N) =
A(N, D) if A(N, D) 6= ∅. If A(N, D) = ∅, then UD(N) = {h(N, D)} and
(N, D) is a tree with root h(N, D).
Given a TU-game with connected dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GcdsN , a
player i ∈ N is called a hierarchical null player in (N, v, D) if v(S)−∑Q∈ĈD(S\{i})
v(Q) = 0 for all S ∈ Hc(D) such that i ∈ S and S \ {i} ∈ H(D). For a TU-game
with connected dominance structure, a player is a hierarchical null player if
his marginal contribution to the components of any hierarchical coalition is
zero such that after joining to this coalition it becomes a hierarchical network.
Such a player should receive zero payoff.
Definition 3.5.9 On a subclass G ⊆ GcdsN , a solution ξ : G → Rn, satisfies the
hierarchical null player property if for any (N, v, D) ∈ G and hierarchical null
player i ∈ N in (N, v, D), it holds that ξi(N, v, D) = 0.
Given a TU-game with connected dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GcdsN ,
two players i, j ∈ N are called symmetric in (N, v, D) if SD(i) = SD(j) and
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v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for any S ∈ Hc(D) such that i, j /∈ S, S ∪ {i} ∈ Hc(D)
and S ∪ {j} ∈ Hc(D). For a TU-game with connected dominance structure
two players are symmetric if they have the same set of successors and their
marginal contributions are the same when joining to a hierarchical network
such that after joining the it is still a hierarchical network.
Definition 3.5.10 A solution ξ : GstarN → Rn satisfies star-symmetry if for any
(N, v, D) ∈ GstarN it holds that ξi(N, v, D) = ξ j(N, v, D) whenever i ∈ N and
j ∈ N are symmetric in (N, v, D).
Theorem 3.5.11 The average covering tree solution is the unique solution on GstarN
that satisfies efficiency, linearity, the hierarchical null player property, and star-sym-
metry.
Proof First, we show that the average covering tree solution for any TU-game
with directed star dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ GstarN satisfies all axioms.
Efficiency and linearity are shown in Section 3. If player i ∈ N is a hierarchical
null player in (N, v, D), then mTi (N, v) = 0 for any (N, T) ∈ T D and there-
fore the average of his marginal contributions is also zero. To see the average
covering tree solution satisfies star-symmetry, take any (N, v, D) ∈ GstarN and
i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, that are symmetric in (N, v, D). Since i, j ∈ N are symmetric
players in (N, v, D), either i, j ∈ A(N, D) or i, j ∈ B(N, D). If i, j ∈ A(N, D),
then for any (N, T) ∈ T D there exists a unique (N, T′) ∈ T D such that
ST(i) = ST′(j), ST(j) = ST′(i), and ST(k) = ST′(k) for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}. Since
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) holds for all S ∈ Hc(D) such that S ∪ {i} ∈ Hc(D),
S ∪ {j} ∈ Hc(D) and the average covering tree solution is the average of the
marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all covering trees, this implies
ACTi(N, v, D) = ACTj(N, v, D). If i, j ∈ B(N, D), then for any (N, T) ∈ T D, it
holds that ST(i) = ST(j) = ∅. Since v({i}) = v({j}), this implies mTi (N, v) =
mTj (N, v) for any (N, T) ∈ T D, hence ACTi(N, v, D) = ACTj(N, v, D).
Second, we show that there exists a unique solution that satisfies all ax-
ioms. For this, because of linearity it is sufficient to show that for a solution ξ :
GstarN → Rn satisfying all axioms ξ(N, uS, D) is a unique payoff vector for any
S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
Take S = N. If A(N, D) 6= ∅, each i ∈ N \ A(N, D) is a hierarchical null
player in (N, uN, D) and by the hierarchical null player property this implies
ξi(N, uN, D) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ A(N, D). Moreover, any i ∈ A(N, D) and
j ∈ A(N, D) are symmetric in (N, uN, D). By efficiency and star-symmetry,
this implies ξi(N, uN, D) = 1/|A(N, D)| for all i ∈ A(N, D). If A(N, D) = ∅,
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each i ∈ N \ {h(N, D)} is a hierarchical null player in (N, uN, D) and by the
hierarchical null player property this implies ξi(N, uN, D) = 0 for all i ∈ N \
{h(N, D)} and by efficiency ξh(N,D)(N, v, D) = 1.
Next, take any S ∈ CD(N), S 6= N. Since (N, D) is a directed star, S ∈
CD(N) implies |S| = 1 or h(N, D) ∈ S. If S = {j} for some j ∈ N, by the
hierarchical null player property ξi(N, uS, D) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ {j} and
by efficiency ξ j(N, uN, D) = 1. Now consider the case where S ∈ CD(N)
and |S| > 1, then h(N, D) ∈ S which implies each i ∈ B(N, D) is a hierar-
chical null player in (N, uS, D) and by the hierarchical null player property
ξi(N, uS, D) = 0 for all i ∈ B(N, D). If S ∩ A(N, D) = ∅, then each i ∈
A(N, D) is also a hierarchical null player in (N, uS, D) and by the hierarchical
null player property we have ξi(N, uS, D) = 0 for all i ∈ A(N, D) and by effi-
ciency ξh(N,D)(N, uS, D) = 1. Now consider the case where S ∩ A(N, D) 6= ∅.
Let S ∩ A(N, D) = A′. Then ξi(N, uS, D) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ A′ because
any i ∈ N \ A′ is a hierarchical null player in (N, uS, D). Since any i, j ∈
A′ are symmetric in (N, uS, D), by efficiency and star-symmetry, this implies
ξi(N, uS, D) = 1/|A′| for all i ∈ A′.
Now consider the case where S /∈ CD(N) which implies h(N, D) /∈ S.
Let S ∩ A(N, D) = A′ and S ∩ B(N, D) = B′. If A′ 6= ∅, then each i ∈
N \ A′ is a hierarchical null player in (N, uS, D) and any i, j ∈ A′ are sym-
metric in (N, uS, D). Hence, by the hierarchical null player property we have
ξi(N, uS, D) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ A′ and efficiency together with star-symmetry
for the players in A′ implies ξi(N, uS, D) = 1/|A′| for all i ∈ A′. If A′ = ∅,
then |B′| ≥ 2 and each i ∈ N \ {h(N, D)} is a hierarchical null player in
(N, uS, D). By the hierarchical null player property this implies ξi(N, uS, D) =
0 for all i ∈ N \ {h(N, D)} and by efficiency we have ξh(N,D)(N, uS, D) = 1.
On the class of TU-games with directed star dominance structure, both the
disjunctive and conjunctive permission values and the dominance value do
not satisfy the hierarchical null player property and star-symmetry.
3.5.3 Tree as dominance structure
In this subsection we consider TU-games with dominance structure that is
represented by a tree on the set of players. Demange (2004) introduces the
marginal contribution vector corresponding to a tree as the hierarchical out-
come. Khmelnitskaya (2010) provides a characterization of the tree value,
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which is the hierarchical outcome, for TU-games with dominance structure
represented by a tree on the set of players. For this characterization, Khmelnit-
skaya (2010) uses component efficiency and successor equivalence. According
to successor equivalence, if an arc from one player to another one is deleted
from the tree, then the payoff remains the same for the latter player and all
of his successors. The tree value and the average covering tree solution coin-
cide on the class of TU-games with dominance structure represented by a tree.
In this subsection, we provide a characterization of the average covering tree
solution which can be seen as an alternative characterization of the hierarchi-
cal outcome introduced in Demange (2004) and the tree value introduced in
Khmelnitskaya (2010).
A TU-game with tree dominance structure is a combination of a TU-game
and a dominance structure represented by a tree on the set of players. Let G treeN
be the set of all TU-games with tree dominance structure.
Lemma 3.5.12 Given two TU-games with tree dominance structure (N, v, D), (N, w,
D) ∈ G treeN , if a solution ξ : G treeN → Rn satisfies linearity and the hierarchical null
player property, then ξ(N, v, D) = ξ(N, w, D) whenever v(S) = w(S) holds for all
S ∈ Hc(D).
Proof Take any (N, v, D), (N, w, D) ∈ G treeN such that v(S) = w(S) for all
S ∈ Hc(D). Consider the TU-game with tree dominance structure (N, v −
w, D). In (N, v − w, D) every player is a hierarchical null player because
(v−w)(S) = 0 for all S ∈ Hc(D). Hence, by the hierarchical null player prop-
erty ξi(N, v− w, D) = 0 for all i ∈ N. By linearity, this implies ξ(N, v, D) =
ξ(N, w, D), which completes the proof.
Theorem 3.5.13 The average covering tree solution is the unique solution on G treeN
that satisfies efficiency, linearity, and the hierarchical null player property.
Proof First, we show that the average covering tree solution for any TU-game
with tree dominance structure (N, v, D) ∈ G treeN satisfies all axioms. Since the
dominance structure is represented by the tree (N, D), the only covering tree
is (N, D). Efficiency and linearity are shown in Section 3. If player i ∈ N is
a hierarchical null player in (N, v, D), then ACTi(N, v, D) = mDi (N, v) = 0.
Hence, the average covering tree solution for (N, v, D) satisfies the hierarchi-
cal null player property.
Second, we show that there exists a unique solution that satisfies all three
axioms. For this, because of linearity it is sufficient to show that for a solution
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ξ : G treeN → Rn satisfying all three axioms ξ(N, uS, D) is a unique payoff vector
for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
If S = N, then each i ∈ N \ {r(N, D)} is a hierarchical null player in
(N, uN, D) and together with efficiency the hierarchical null player property
implies ξi(N, v, D) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ {r(N, D)} and ξr(N,D)(N, v, D) = 1.
If S ∈ Hc(D), then each i ∈ N \ {r(S, D|S)} is a hierarchical null player in
(N, uS, D) and together with efficiency the hierarchical null player property
implies ξi(N, v, D) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ {r(S, D|S)} and ξr(S,D|S)(N, v, D) = 1.
If S /∈ Hc(D), let S′ ∈ Hc(D) be the unique smallest hierarchical network
(in terms of set inclusion) that contains S. Since uS(Q) = uS′(Q) holds for all
Q ∈ Hc(D), by Lemma 3.5.12 we have ξ(N, uS, D) = ξ(N, uS′ , D). Since S′ ∈
Hc(D) and each i ∈ N \ {r(S′, D|S′)} is a hierarchical null player in (N, uS′ , D),
this implies ξi(N, uS, D) = ξi(N, uS′ , D) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ {r(S′, D|S′)} and
by efficiency ξr(S′,D|S′ )(N, uS, D) = ξr(S′,D|S′ )(N, uS′ , D) = 1.

CHAPTER 4
TU-GAMES WITH COALITIONAL STRUCTURE
4.1 Introduction
In the standard cooperative game theory literature it is assumed that all coali-
tions of players are able to form. However, in many practical situations the
collection of feasible coalitions is restricted by some social, economical, hier-
archical or technical structure. Chapter 2 of this monograph considers undi-
rected communication graphs which restrict cooperation among players. For
TU-games with communication structure, only the members of a connected
set of players are assumed to be able to cooperate. Although TU-games with
communication structure are more general than TU-games and can be ap-
plied to many situations, they are still not enough to explain some real life
phenomenon. To illustrate this insufficiency, consider a situation defined on
country A, country B, country C, and country D. The restriction on the co-
operation of these countries is as follows. Country A and country D do not
have any diplomatic relation and in order to be able to participate in a feasible
coalition they need country B which is the only country that has a diplomatic
relation with both countries. In this example, all coalitions are feasible except
the coalition containing country A and country D and the coalition containing
country A, country C and country D. This situation can not be represented by
a graph, because country A is able to cooperate with country C and country C
is able to cooperate with country D, but countries A, C, and D are not able to
form a feasible coalition. As this example shows, in some situations modeling
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restricted cooperation by means of a graph on the set of players may not be an
adequate representation of the restricted cooperation. In the literature, a large
collection of papers considers specific classes of set systems as a way to repre-
sent limited cooperation among the players. In all of these research, some re-
strictions are assumed on the set systems. Algaba et al. (2001) considers union
stable cooperation structures, Bilbao and Edelman (2000a) considers convex
geometries, Bilbao et al. (2001) considers matroids, Algaba et al. (2003) consid-
ers antimatroids, Bilbao and Ordónez (2009a) considers augmenting systems,
and Ui et al. (2011a) considers complete coalition structures. The set system
given in the example above that is defined on countries, does not fit in these
models. In the example, the coalition containing country A and country C,
and the coalition containing country D and country C are feasible. However,
the union of these two feasible coalitions is not feasible. The set system rep-
resenting this situation in the example is neither a union closed set system
nor an antimatroid, because both union closed set systems and antimatroids
require the union of any two feasible coalition to be also feasible. Similarly,
for an augmenting set system if two feasible coalitions have nonempty inter-
section, then the union of these coalitions is also feasible. Since the coalition
containing the countries A, C, and D is not feasible, the set system in the exam-
ple is not an augmenting set system. Since any subset of the feasible coalition
containing country A, country B and country D is not feasible in the example,
it is also not a matroid. Moreover, for the example above if it is also assumed
that singleton coalitions are not feasible, then the resulting situation will not
be a convex geometry.
Aumann and Dréze (1974) considers TU-games with coalition structure,
which is represented with a partition of the grand coalition. Aumann and
Dréze (1974) assumes that it is not possible to transfer payoff among two dif-
ferent members of the partition of the grand coalition and a solution should
allocate the total worth of each member of the partition to the players in that
coalition. With this approach, cooperation is not restricted within each mem-
ber of the partition, but on the other hand, for the players that belong to dif-
ferent elements of the partition it is impossible to cooperate. Aumann and
Dréze (1974) studies well-known solution concepts, including the Shapley
value, and establishes relations of each solution when applied to a TU-game
with coalition structure (represented by a partition on the set of players) and
when applied to appropriately defined games on each of the members of the
partition.
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Owen (1977) defines the Owen value for TU-games with priori unions which
is also represented by a partition of the grand coalition. The model in Owen
(1977) differs from the approach of Aumann and Dréze (1974) by dropping the
assumption which states that the total payoff available for the players in each
member of the partition should be equal to the worth of that coalition. Owen
(1977) assumes the grand coalition will form and requires that the worth of
the grand coalition should be distributed among all players. The Owen value
considers all permutations on the set of players in which all players of the
same partition member appears successively and assigns to each player his
expected marginal contribution with respect to those permutations.
In this chapter, we assume that the grand coalition of all players is always
able to form a coalition. Together with the grand coalition, we consider an ar-
bitrary collection of subsets of the grand coalition as the collection of feasible
coalitions that are able to cooperate and obtain some worth. Considering the
example above, instead of the connected sets in a graph, one could assume
feasibility of all coalitions except the coalitions that contains country A and
country D but not country B. For such situations, as solution concept we pro-
pose the average coalitional tree solution, being the average of the marginal
contribution vectors corresponding to all maximal nested sets of the set sys-
tem representing the coalitional structure. A nested set is a collection of fea-
sible coalitions such that for any two different coalitions in the collection, ei-
ther one of them is a subset of the other or they are disjoint, and, moreover,
the union of two or more disjoint coalitions in the collection is not a feasible
coalition. To each maximal nested set a coalitional tree corresponds. In a coali-
tional tree each node is a coalition, which may not be feasible by its own, but
together with its set of successors in the coalitional tree it is feasible and it
is a member of the maximal nested set. For each of these coalitional trees, a
marginal contribution vector is defined, at which the players at a node receive
together as payoff the marginal contribution when they join to their succes-
sors in the coalitional tree and this payoff is equally distributed among them.
We discuss several properties of the solution and consider some special cases
of coalitional structures.
For the average coalitional tree solution, we assume the grand coalition
is feasible. This assumption is quite restrictive and even not satisfied by the
communication structures that are considered in Chapter 2, i.e., the undirected
graph representing a communication structure does not need to be connected.
In case the grand coalition is not a feasible coalition, the average coalitional
tree solution can still be applied if the set of all players can be partitioned
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into feasible coalitions and each feasible coalition in the set system is a subset
of one of these partition members. Then the average coalitional tree solution
can be applied separately to each member of the partition. This also covers
the case if we consider the collection of connected coalitions in an undirected
graph which is not connected.
Now we provide a numerical example where the average coalitional tree
solution is applied. Consider a communication structure represented by a
graph (N, L) where N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is the set of players and L = {{1, 2}, {2,
3}, {3, 4 }, {4, 5}} is the set of edges. Since (N, L) is a connected communica-
tion structure as discussed in Chapter 2, CL(N) is the collection of feasible
coalitions. Additional to being connected set in the communication struc-
ture, in order to be a feasible winning coalition also the size of the coalition
must be greater than or equal to 3. The collection of feasible winning coali-
tions is given by the set systemF = {{1, 2, 3}, {2, 3, 4}, {3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {2,
3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}}. Let the worth of any feasible coalition be equal to 1, i.e.,
v(S) = 1 for all S ∈ F . There exist four maximal nested sets to be consid-
ered for the average coalitional tree solution, X 1 = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, N},
X 2 = {{2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, N}, X 3 = {{2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4, 5}, N}, X 4 = {{3, 4, 5
}, {2, 3, 4, 5}, N}. For the corresponding marginal contribution vectors, we
have (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0, 0) forX 1, (0, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0) forX 2, (0, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0)
for X 3, and (0, 0, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3) for X 4. The average of these marginal contri-
bution vectors is the average coalitional tree solution, which is (1/12, 3/12,
4/12, 3/12, 1/12). For this example, the collection of feasible coalitions is in-
duced by the communication structure and a predetermined quota. Now con-
sider a situation where the feasibility of a coalition depends only on the size.
Given the set of players N as the set of n voters and some q, 12 ≤ q ≤ 1, let
F q = {S ∈ 2N | |S| ≥ qn} be the set of winning coalitions under the quota
majority rule with quota q. Let (N, v,F ) be a TU-game (N, v) with coalitional
structure F ⊆ F q and worth v(S) = 1 for all S ∈ F . The average coalitional
tree solution (ACOT) allocates to each player i ∈ N a payoff which is given by
ACOTi(N, v,F ) =
1
|MF | ∑S∈MF (i)
1
|S|
whereMF is the collection of minimal feasible winning coalitions andMF (i)
is the collection of minimal feasible winning coalitions that contain player i.
Aguilera et al. (2010) also considers TU-games with arbitrary coalitional
structures and defines a Shapley value for such situations. As solution, they
consider the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all
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maximal chains. A chain is a collection of feasible coalitions such that for any
two different members one of them is a subset of the other. Hence, chains do
not consider the cases where one or more players are able to join simultane-
ously to two or more feasible disjoint coalitions whose union is not feasible, to
form a larger feasible coalition. A chain only considers the marginal contribu-
tion of a set of players when they simultaneously join to a single feasible coali-
tion to form a larger feasible coalition. For a maximal nested set, no proper
subset of any set of players that simultaneously join is a feasible coalition and
therefore is able to obtain some contribution by its own. This property makes
a maximal nested set a natural concept to define marginal contributions for
the players. A similar approach with maximal chains is employed in Lange
and Grabisch (2009) for more restricted structures. They consider regular set
systems where the feasible coalitions form a poset whose maximal chains all
have the same length. They propose an axiomatization of the Shapley value
for this class of games.
For games with building sets as coalitional struture, the gravity center (GC)
solution is introduced by Koshevoy and Talman (2014). Koshevoy and Talman
(2014) proposes to use the GC solution for games with arbitrary coalitional
structure by taking its building cover, which is the smallest building set that
contains the coalitional structure. By using the Möbius inversion, they extend
the game to this building cover and take the GC solution of the extended game
as the GC solution of the game. For games with building sets as coalitional
structure, the average coalitional tree solution coincides with the GC solution
This chapter is based on Selçuk and Talman (2013) and the structure of the
chapter is as follows. Basic definitions and notation are given in Section 2.
Section 3 introduces the new solution concept for TU-games with coalitional
structure. Some properties of the solution concept are given in Section 4. Sec-
tion 5 considers some special coalitional structures.
4.2 Preliminaries
A TU-game with coalitional structure is a triple (N, v,F ), where N = {1, ..., n}
is a finite set of players, F ⊆ 2N is a set system on N representing the coali-
tional structure with N ∈ F , and v : F → R is a characteristic function satis-
fying v(∅) = 0.1 A set S ∈ F is a feasible coalition and the real number v(S)
represents the worth of S, which can be freely distributed among its members.
1The empty set is always assumed to be a member of the set system representing the coali-
tional structure. However, we do not mention it every time we refer to a coalitional structure.
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We denote the set of TU-games with coalitional structure with a fixed player
set N by GcosN .
A solution on GcosN is a function ξ : GcosN → IR
n that assigns to any TU-game
with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN a payoff vector ξ(N, v,F ) ∈ IR
n. In
the sequel, we use notation x(S) = ∑i∈S xi for any payoff vector x ∈ IRn and
S ⊆ N.
Given a partition P of the set of players N, (P , T) stands for a coalitional di-
rected graph, or coalitional digraph, on P , where T ⊆ {(P1, P2) | P1, P2 ∈ P , P1 6=
P2} is a collection of directed links on the set of members of the partition P of
N. A coalitional digraph may be seen as a generalization of a digraph, where
the nodes, being elements of N, are replaced with subsets of N that together
form a partition of N and the directed links are defined on these subsets.
Given a partition P of N and a coalitional digraph (P , T) on P , a sequence
of different members of P , (P1, . . . , Pk) with k ≥ 2, is a directed coalitional path
in (P , T) from P1 to Pk if (Ph, Ph+1) ∈ T for h = 1, . . . , k − 1. If there exists
a directed coalitional path in (P , T) from P ∈ P to P′ ∈ P , then P′ is a suc-
cessor of P and P is a predecessor of P′. If (P, P′) ∈ T then P′ is an immediate
successor of P and P is an immediate predecessor of P′. For any P ∈ P , ST(P)
denotes the union of all successors of P in the coalitional digraph (P , T) and
ST(P) denotes the union of all successors of P together with the members of
P, i.e., ST(P) = ST(P) ∪ P. Furthermore, IT(P) denotes the set of immediate
successors of P in (P , T), i.e., IT(P) = {P′ ∈ P|(P, P′) ∈ T}.
A coalitional digraph (P , T) on a given partition P of N is a coalitional tree
if there exists a unique member of the partition P , called the coalitional root of
(P , T) and denoted by r(P , T), having no predecessors in (P , T) and there is a
unique directed coalitional path in (P , T) from r(P , T) to every other member
of the partition.
4.3 Average coalitional tree solution
For a TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN , the idea is that the
grand coalition N will form and the problem is how to distribute its worth
v(N) among the agents. Among the solution concepts we discussed earlier,
Bilbao and Edelman (2000b) which considers the Shapley value for convex ge-
ometries, Bilbao et al. (2001) which considers the Shapley value for matroids,
and Ui et al. (2011b) which considers the Myerson value for complete coali-
tion structures also require this assumption. On the other hand, Bilbao and
Ordónez (2009b) which considers the Shapley value for augmenting systems
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does not assume the feasibility of the grand coalition. Although an antima-
troid does not need to contain the grand coalition, Algaba et al. (2003) consid-
ers antimatroids satisfying a normality assumption which requires the grand
coalition as a feasible coalition. As solution concept, we propose to take the
average of the marginal contribution vectors induced by all maximal nested
sets of the set system representing the coalitional structure. In case the grand
coalition is not feasible but there is a partition of it into feasible coalitions such
that each feasible coalition is a subset of one of the partition members, the
solution concept can be applied separately to each partition member. This in-
cludes the case where the set system is the collection of connected coalitions
in an undirected graph which is not connected. Also when in an augmenting
system each player belongs to at least one feasible coalition, such a partition
exists and the solution can be applied in the same way. Nested sets of a set
system are introduced by Postnikov (2009).
Definition 4.3.1 Given a coalitional structure F on N, a subset X of F is a
nested set of F if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) For any two different X1, X2 ∈ X it holds that either X1 ⊂ X2 or X2 ⊂ X1
or X1 ∩ X2 = ∅;
(ii) For any collection of h, h ≥ 2, disjoint nonempty subsets X1,. . . ,Xh in X it
holds that X1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xh /∈ F ;
(iii) ∅ /∈ X and N ∈ X .
A nested set of a coalitional structure is a collection of non-empty feasi-
ble coalitions, including the set of all players, such that for any two different
members either one of them is a subset of the other one or they are disjoint,
and, moreover, the union of two or more disjoint members is not a feasible
coalition. Notice that every chain of a coalitional structure F is a nested set of
F , where Y is called a chain of F if N ∈ Y and for any two different Y1, Y2 ∈ Y
it holds that either Y1 ⊂ Y2 or Y2 ⊂ Y1.
A nested set X of a coalitional structure F is maximal if there does not exist
any other nested set X ′ of F that contains X . Each maximal nested set defines
a unique way to build the grand coalition by letting one or simultaneously
several players join to one or more disjoint feasible coalitions to form bigger
feasible coalitions, starting from disjoint minimal (by set inclusion) coalitions
in the set system. For a maximal nested set of a coalitional structure, no proper
subset of any set of simultaneously joining players is a feasible coalition, oth-
erwise we can add this subcoalition and obtain a larger nested set. This means
that no proper subset of a set of joining players can form a feasible coalition by
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its own. A maximal chain may not have this natural property, because players
can only simultaneously join one feasible coalition and therefore may contain
players that together form a feasible coalition. In general, any maximal chain
is a nested set, but may not be a maximal nested set, and a maximal nested set
may not be a maximal chain. If a maximal chain is not a maximal nested set,
then there exists at least one maximal nested set that contains the chain as a
proper subset.
Example 4.3.2 Consider the coalitional structureF = {{1}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2,
3, 4}} on N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. This set system has two maximal nested sets, X 1 =
{{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} and X 2 = {{1}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}. In X 1, player 2
joins feasible singleton player 1 to form feasible coalition {1, 2} and players
3 and 4 join simultaneously the latter coalition to form the grand coalition.
In X 2, player 4 joins to both feasible singleton player 1 and minimal feasi-
ble coalition {2, 3} to form immediately the grand coalition. The two feasible
coalitions {1, 2} and {2, 3} cannot be members of a same maximal nested set
because one is not a subset of the other and their intersection is nonempty.
On the other hand, the two disjoint feasible coalitions {1} and {2, 3} can be
members of the same maximal nested set, because their union, {1, 2, 3}, is not
a feasible coalition. The maximal nested set X 1 is also a maximal chain, but
X 2 is not. On the other hand, Y = {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} is a maximal chain that
is not a maximal nested set, because it is a proper subset of X 2. In Y , although
singleton player 1 is a feasible coalition, players 1 and 4 simultaneously join
to the feasible minimal coalition {2, 3} to form the grand coalition.
Any coalitional structure on N contains at least one maximal nested set. To
see this, note that N itself is a nested set, which does not need to be maximal.
If it is not a maximal nested set, then we can include any other feasible coali-
tion. If this new collection of two feasible coalitions is again not maximal, we
continue with including feasible coalitions which do not violate the definition
of a nested set, and so on. Because the number of feasible coalitions is finite, at
some point we end up with a maximal nested set. This argument also shows
that every feasible coalition is member of at least one maximal nested set.
For a coalitional structure F on N, X F denotes the collection of maximal
nested sets of F . Notice that in case the coalitional structure F contains all
subsets of N, i.e., F = 2N, then the number of maximal nested sets is maximal
and equal to n! and all maximal nested sets are maximal chains.
Given a coalitional structure F on N, for a nested set X of F and i ∈ N,
the set MX (i) denotes the unique minimal element of X that contains player
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i. Notice that this set is well defined.
Lemma 4.3.3 For any maximal nested set X ∈ X F of a coalitional structure F on
N, it holds that for every X ∈ X there exists i ∈ N such that MX (i) = X.
Proof Suppose there exists a feasible coalition X ∈ X for which there is no
i ∈ N with MX (i) = X. Since X is a maximal nested set and MX (i) 6= X
for all i ∈ X, it holds that MX (i) ⊂ X, MX (i) ∈ X and i ∈ MX (i) for all
i ∈ X. Since MX (i) ∈ X for all i ∈ X, there exist i1, . . . , ik ∈ X such that
MX (i1), . . . , MX (ik) are disjoint and ∪kh=1MX (ih) = X. Since X is a feasible
coalition, this violates condition (ii) of Definition 4.3.1.
Example 4.3.4 Consider the coalitional structureF = {{1, 2}, {3}, {2, 3, 4}, {1,
2, 3, 4, 5}} on {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. It has two maximal nested sets, X 1 = {{1, 2}, {3},
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}} andX 2 = {{3}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}}. For these maximal nested
sets we have MX 1(1) = MX 1(2) = {1, 2}, MX 1(3) = {3}, MX 1(4) = MX 1(5) =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and MX 2(1) = MX 2(5) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, MX 2(2) = MX 2(4) =
{2, 3, 4}, MX 2(3) = {3}.
As the example shows, for distinct players the minimal elements of a max-
imal nested set that contain these players can be the same.
Definition 4.3.5 For a collection S of subsets of N, two players i, j ∈ N are
equivalent with respect to S if {S ∈ S | i ∈ S} = {S ∈ S | j ∈ S}.
For a collection S of subsets of N and i ∈ N, PS(i) denotes the set of equiv-
alent players of i with respect to S .
Remark 4.3.6 Given a coalitional structure F on N, for a maximal nested set
X ∈ X F , two players i, j ∈ N are equivalent with respect to X if and only if
MX (i) = MX (j).
Remark 4.3.7 For a coalitional structure F on N, if two players i, j ∈ N are
equivalent with respect to F , then i and j are equivalent with respect to every
maximal nested set in X F .
Remark 4.3.6 follows from condition (i) of Definition 4.3.1. Remark 4.3.7 is
an immediate result of the fact that each maximal nested set is a subset of the
set system representing the coalitional structure.
A maximal nested set X ∈ X F of a coalitional structure F on N induces
a partition PX of N into sets of equivalent players with respect to X , with
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PX (i) the partition member containing the equivalent players of player i ∈ N.
Since any P ∈ PX is a set of equivalent players with respect to X , it holds that
MX (i) = MX (j) for all i, j ∈ P. For P ∈ PX , we denote MX (P) to be the set
MX (i) for any i ∈ P.
Given a maximal nested set X of a coalitional structure F on N and the
corresponding partition PX , the coalitional digraph (PX , TX ) is given by
(P1, P2) ∈ TX if MX (P1) ⊃ MX (P2) and there exists no X ∈ X with MX (P1) ⊃
X ⊃ MX (P2). The next theorem shows that this coalitional digraph is a coali-
tional tree.
Theorem 4.3.8 Given a a coalitional structure F on N, for any X ∈ X F , the coali-
tional digraph (PX , TX ) is a coalitional tree satisfying the following properties:
(i) Its coalitional root r(PX , TX ) is equal to {i ∈ N | MX (i) = N};
(ii) For any P ∈ PX it holds that STX (P) = MX (P);
(iii) For any P ∈ PX it holds that {STX (P′) | (P, P′) ∈ TX } is the unique maximal
partition of STX (P) = MX (P) \ P into elements of X .
Proof To show that (PX , TX ) is a coalitional tree we need to prove the unique-
ness of a coalitional root and the uniqueness of a directed coalitional path in
the tree from the coalitional root to any other member of PX . By Lemma 4.3.3
the set R = {i ∈ N | MX (i) = N} is nonempty and consists of equivalent
players with respect to X . Hence, R ∈ PX . Since there exists no P ∈ PX with
MX (P) ⊃ MX (R) = N, it holds that R has no predecessor in (PX , TX ). Since
X is a maximal nested set there exists a unique directed path in (PX , TX ) from
R to any other member of PX . This implies that (PX , TX ) is a coalitional tree
with the coalitional root being the set R, which also proves property (i).
Property (ii) is shown by induction. Take any P ∈ PX without successor
in (PX , TX ), then STX (P) = P and P ⊆ MX (P). Suppose there exists i ∈
MX (P) \ P, then i is not equivalent to the players in P with respect to X and
therefore MX (i) ⊂ MX (P). This implies the existence of a directed coalitional
path in (PX , TX ) from P to PX (i), which contradicts that P has no successors.
Next, we show STX (P) = MX (P) if STX (P
′) = MX (P′) for all P′ satisfying
(P, P′) ∈ TX . Let P1, . . . , Pk be the collection of immediate successors of P
in (PX , TX ), then MX (P) ⊃ MX (Pi) = STX (Pi) for all i = 1, . . . , k. Since
STX (P) = (∪i=ki=1STX (Pi)) ∪ P and P ⊆ MX (P), this implies MX (P) ⊇ STX (P).
Suppose j ∈ MX (P) \ STX (P). Since j is not equivalent to the players in P
with respect to X and j ∈ MX (P), we have MX (j) ⊂ MX (P). This implies
the existence of a directed coalitional path in (PX , TX ) from P to PX (j), which
contradicts that j /∈ STX (P).
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To show property (iii), let P1, . . . , Pk be the collection of immediate succes-
sors of P ∈ PX in (PX , TX ). Property (ii) implies that STX (P) = MX (P) and
STX (Pj) = MX (Pj) for all j = 1 . . . , k. Hence, MX (P) \ P = STX (P) \ P =
STX (P) = ∪kj=1STX (Pj) = ∪kj=1MX (Pj). Since X is a maximal nested set,
MX (Pj) ∩ MX (Ph) = ∅ for all j 6= h, and MX (Pj) ∈ X for j = 1, . . . , k.
This implies that {STX (P1), . . . , STX (Pk)} is the unique maximal partition of
STX (P) = MX (P) \ P into members of X .
A coalitional tree on a set of players N that is induced by a maximal nested
set may be seen as a generalization of a tree on N in which the nodes of the tree
are sets of equivalent players with respect to the maximal nested set instead
of individual players.
Since each maximal nested set X of a coalitional structure F on N contains
the grand coalition N and by applying Lemma 4.3.3, there exist players for
which the grand coalition is the minimal set in X containing them. According
to property (i) the root of the coalitional tree (PX , TX ) induced byX precisely
consists of these players. So, if a maximal nested set is considered as a way
to build the grand coalition, the root of the induced coalitional tree is the final
set of equivalent players that simultaneously join after all other sets of equiv-
alent players have joined each other. According to property (ii), the players
at a node of (PX , TX ) together with the players in all succeeding nodes is the
minimal set in X that contains any player at that node. A direct implication
of this property is that the union of the successors of any partition member
P ∈ PX together with the elements of P is a member of the set system F , and
hence is a feasible coalition. Moreover, no proper subset of any P ∈ PX is
a feasible coalition. Property (iii) says that for each member X of a maximal
nested set, it holds that if we delete from X all players for which X is the min-
imal set containing them, then there is a unique maximal partition of the set
of remaining players in X into members of the maximal nested set.
Example 4.3.9 Consider the coalitional structures F = {{1}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}
and F ′ = {{1}, {2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}} on N = {1, 2, 3}. Both F and F ′ contain
two maximal nested sets, X 1 = {{1}, {1, 2, 3}} and X 2 = {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}
for F , and Y1 = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2, 3}} and Y2 = {{2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}} for
F ′. For the partitions induced by these maximal nested sets we have PX 1 =
{{1}, {2, 3}},PX 2 = {{2, 3}, {1}} andPY1 = {{1}, {2}, {3}},PY2 = {{2}, {3
}, {1}}. The coalitional trees on these partitions are equal to (PX 1 , TX 1), (PX 2 ,
TX
2
), (PY1 , TY1) and (PX 2 , TY2) where TX 1 = {({2, 3}, {1})}, TX 2 = {({1},
{2, 3})} and TY1 = {({3}, {1}), ({3}, {2})}, TY2 = {({1}, {3}), ({3}, {2})}.
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Note that MX 1({1}) = {1} and MX 1({2, 3}) = {1, 2, 3}. Since MX 1({1}) ⊂
MX 1({2, 3}) we have ({2, 3}, {1}) ∈ TX
1
. Similarly for X 2, we have MX 2({1}
) = {1, 2, 3} and MX 2({2, 3}) = {2, 3}which means MX 2({2, 3}) ⊂ MX 2({1}).
Hence, ({1}, {2, 3}) ∈ TX 2 . The graphical representation of these coalitional
trees is depicted in Figure 4.1. The root of (PX 1 , TX 1) is {2, 3}with succeeding
set STX 1 ({2, 3}) = {1}, whereas {1} is the root of (P
X 2 , TX
2
) with succeed-
ing set STX 2 ({1}) = {2, 3}. In (P
Y1 , TY
1
), the set {3} is the root and the sets
STY1 ({1}) = {1} and STY1 ({2}) = {2} partition the set of players in the suc-
ceeding sets of the root, STY1 ({3}) = {1, 2}, into members of Y
1. Coalitional
tree (PY2 , TY2) has {1} as root and feasible coalition STY2 ({1}) = {2, 3} is the
only succeeding set of the root. Since both {2} and {2, 3} are feasible coali-
tions in F ′ but {3} is not, only {3} can be an immediate successor of {1} and










(PX 1 , TX 1)(PX 2 , TX 2) (PY1 , TY1) (PY2 , TY2)
Figure 4.1: The coalitional trees of F and F ′ in Example 4.3.9.
The following example shows that the sets of equivalent players may differ in
different coalitional trees of the same set system.
Example 4.3.10 Consider the coalitional structureF = {{3}, {8}, {1, 2}, {1, 8},
{2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, N} on N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. F contains two max-
imal nested sets, X 1 = {{1, 2}, {3}, {8}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}} and
X 2 = {{3}, {8}, {1, 8}, {2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}}. For the maximal nested
set X 1, we have MX 1(1) = MX 1(2) = {1, 2}, MX 1(3) = {3}, MX 1(4) =
MX 1(5) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, MX 1(6) = MX 1(7) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, MX 1(8) =
{8}, and for the maximal nested set X 2, we have MX 2(1) = {1, 8}, MX 2(2) =
MX 2(4) = MX 2(5) = {2, 3, 4, 5}, MX 2(3) = {3}, MX 2(6) = MX 2(7) =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, MX 2(8) = {8}. With respect to X 1, player 1 is equiva-
lent to player 2, player 4 is equivalent to player 5, and player 6 is equivalent
to player 7. However, with respect to X 2, player 6 is equivalent to player
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7, and players 2, 4, 5 are equivalent to each other. For the induced parti-
tions of equivalent players we have PX 1 = {{1, 2}, {3}, {8}, {4, 5}, {6, 7}}
and PX 2 = {{1}, {3}, {2, 4, 5}, {6, 7}, {8}}. The graphical representation of
the corresponding coalitional trees (PX 1 , TX 1) and (PX 2 , TX 2) is depicted in
Figure 4.2. Coalition STX 1 ({6, 7}) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8} is partitioned into feasible
coalitions STX 1 ({4, 5}) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and STX 1 ({8}) = {8}, and coalition
STX 1 ({4, 5}) = {1, 2, 3} is partitioned into feasible coalitions STX 1 ({1, 2}) =
{1, 2} and STX 1 ({3}) = {3}. Similarly, coalition STX 2 ({6, 7}) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8}
is partitioned into feasible coalitions STX 2 ({2, 4, 5}) = {2, 3, 4, 5} and STX 2 ({1}
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Definition 4.3.11 Given a TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN ,
for each maximal nested set X ∈ X F the marginal contribution vector mX (N,
v,F ) is the payoff vector given by








, i ∈ N.
For a marginal contribution vector corresponding to the coalitional tree in-
duced by a maximal nested set, each set of equivalent players receives as total
payoff the marginal contribution when these players simultaneously join to
the players in the sets of their successors in the tree. The total payoff avail-
able for a set of equivalent players is distributed equally among the players of
the set. The intuition behind this marginal contribution vector is as follows.
Given a maximal nested set and the corresponding coalitional tree, each set
of equivalent players contains no feasible subcoalitions and is the smallest set
that can join to its successors to form a bigger feasible coalition. So, each set
of equivalent players should receive its marginal contribution when joining to
80 TU-GAMES WITH COALITIONAL STRUCTURE
its successors. On the individual level, since all members of a set of equiva-
lent players join simultaneously, this marginal contribution is equally divided
among them. We assume that every maximal nested set of the underlying
coalitional structure of the game is as likely to occur. This gives the following
definition of a solution.
Definition 4.3.12 For a TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN ,
the average coalitional tree solution assigns the payoff vector ACOT(N, v,F )
which is given by




mX (N, v,F ).
The average coalitional tree solution of a TU-game with coalitional struc-
ture is the average of the marginal contribution vectors that correspond to the
coalitional trees induced by all maximal nested sets of the coalitional structure.
Like the Shapley value, the solution considers players’ marginal contributions.
However, for some players it may not be possible to join a feasible coalition in-
dividually in order to form a larger feasible coalition. To illustrate such a case,
consider the coalitional structureF given in Example 4.3.9. For this coalitional
structure, there exists no feasible coalition to which player 2 can join, make it a
larger feasible coalition and receive his own marginal contribution. However,
together with player 3, player 2 is able to join to the feasible coalition consist-
ing of singleton player 1. This contribution is realized in the coalitional tree
(PX 1 , TX 1) of the example. The joint marginal contribution of players 2 and 3
while joining to singleton player 1 is divided equally among the two players.
Example 4.3.13 Consider a TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) where
the coalitional structure F is the one given in Example 4.3.10. For the charac-
teristic function v : 2N → R, let v(S) = |S|2 for all S ∈ 2N. The two maximal
nested sets, X 1 and X 2, induce the two marginal contribution vectors mX 1 =
mX
1
(N, v,F ) and mX 2 = mX 2(N, v,F ). For mX 1 it holds that mX 11 = mX
1
2 =










v({1, 2, 3, 4, 5})− v({8}))/2 = 19, mX 18 = v({8})− v(∅) = 1, and so mX
1
=




(N, v,F ) it holds that mX 21 =




5 = (v({2, 3, 4, 5})− v({3}))/3 = 5,
mX
2




7 = (v(N)− v({2, 3, 4, 5})− v({1, 8}))/2
= 22, mX
2
8 = v({8})− v(∅) = 1, and so mX
2
= (3, 5, 1, 5, 5, 22, 22, 1). The av-
erage coalitional tree solution of the game is the average of these two marginal
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) = (5/2, 7/2, 1, 15/2,
15/2, 41/2, 41/2, 1).
We remark that the average coalitional tree solution is defined for cooper-
ative games with any coalitional structure that contains the grand coalition.
For a TU-game with complete coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN where
F = 2N, any set of players forms a feasible coalition. This means there is no
restriction on cooperation and the TU-game with coalitional structure is in fact
a TU-game.
Lemma 4.3.14 Given a complete coalitional structure F on N, for any maximal
nested set X ∈ X F and S, Q ∈ X it holds that S ⊆ Q or Q ⊆ S.
Proof Suppose there exists a maximal nested set X ∈ X F and distinct S,
Q ∈ X with S ∩Q = ∅. Since F is complete, it holds that S ∪Q ∈ F . But this
contradicts with condition (ii) of Definition 4.3.1. Since X is a maximal nested
set and we can rule out the case S ∩Q = ∅ for distinct members S and Q, we
end up with S ⊆ Q or Q ⊆ S for all S, Q ∈ X .
Lemma 4.3.15 Given a complete coalitional structure F on N, for any maximal
nested set X ∈ X F and S ∈ X with |S| ≥ 2, it holds that there exists i ∈ S
such that S \ {i} ∈ X .
Proof Take any X ∈ X F and S ∈ X with |S| ≥ 2. Let Q ∈ X be a maximal
proper subset of S in X , i.e., either Q = ∅ or Q ∈ X , Q ⊂ S and there
exists no Q′ ∈ X with S ⊃ Q′ ⊃ Q. Suppose |S \ Q| ≥ 2. So there exists
i, j ∈ S \ Q, i 6= j. Then Q ⊂ Q ∪ {i} ⊂ S and Q ∪ {i} /∈ X . Since F is
complete, Q ∪ {i} ∈ F , which contradicts that X is a maximal nested set of
F .
Remark 4.3.16 For a complete coalitional structureF on N, it holds that |X F | =
n!.
Remark 4.3.16 is an immediate result of Lemma 4.3.14 and Lemma 4.3.15. To
form a maximal nested set, first we can include the grand coalition. By Lemma
4.3.15 we should also include a subset of the grand coalition with cardinality
one less. The number of possibilities is n for this step. At the next step we
will have n− 1 possibilities and so on. Hence, in total there are n! possibilities
each of which corresponds to a maximal nested set.
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For TU-games, the Shapley value is the best known single-valued solution
concept, see Shapley (1953). To find the Shapley value, all permutations over
the players are considered and a marginal contribution vector is associated
to each permutation, at which each player receives his marginal contribution
when joining to his set of successors in the permutation. The Shapley value is
the average of all these marginal contribution vectors. Clearly, these permu-
tations correspond one-to-one to the set of maximal nested sets. Let Sh(N, v)
stand for the Shapley value of a TU-game (N, v).
Proposition 4.3.17 For a TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN with
complete coalitional structureF on N, i.e.,F = 2N, it holds that ACOT(N, v,F ) =
Sh(N, v).
4.4 Properties of the average coalitional tree solu-
tion
In this section we provide some properties that are satisfied by the average
coalitional tree solution. The first property we consider is efficiency.
For a TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN , a payoff vector
x ∈ IRn is efficient if x distributes the worth v(N) of the grand coalition, i.e.
x(N) = v(N). A value ξ on GcosN is efficient if for any TU-game with coalitional
structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN the payoff vector ξ(N, v,F ) is efficient.
Since each marginal contribution vector corresponding to each coalitional
tree distributes exactly v(N) over all players and the average coalitional tree
solution is the average of those vectors, the efficiency of the average coalitional
tree solution immediately follows.
The second property that is satisfied by the average coalitional solution is
linearity. A value ξ on GcosN satisfies linearity if for any (N, v,F ) and (N, w,F ) ∈
GcosN and for any a, b ∈ IR, it holds that
ξ(N, av + bw,F ) = aξ(N, v,F ) + bξ(N, w,F ),
where the characteristic function av+ bw is defined as (av+ bw)(S) = av(S)+
bw(S) for all S ∈ F .
Given two TU-games with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) and (N, w,F ) in
GcosN and real numbers a, b ∈ IR, since the coalitional structure is represented
by F for (N, v,F ), (N, w,F ) and (N, av + bw,F ), the collection of maximal
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nested sets is the same for each of these three TU-games with coalitional struc-
ture. Since the average coalitional tree solution of a TU-game with coalitional
structure is a linear combination of the marginal contribution vectors induced
by all maximal nested sets and each marginal contribution vector is a linear
combination of the worths of the coalitions, the average coalitional tree solu-
tion satisfies linearity.
Now we consider the equal treatment of equivalent players property. For a
TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN , two players i, j ∈ N are
equivalent if they are equivalent with respect to F . A solution ξ : GcosN → IR
n
satisfies the equal treatment of equivalent players property if for any TU-game with
coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN it holds that ξi(N, v,F ) = ξ j(N, v,F )
whenever i ∈ N and j ∈ N are equivalent players for (N, v,F ). The intu-
ition behind this property is that since equivalent players for a TU-game with
coalitional structure are members of the same feasible coalitions, these players
should receive the same payoff.
Proposition 4.4.1 The average coalitional tree solution on GcosN satisfies the equal
treatment of equivalent players property.
Proof Take any TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN , maximal
nested set X ∈ X F , and two players i, j ∈ N being equivalent for (N, v,F ).
Let (PX , TX ) be the coalitional tree induced by X . According to Remark 4.3.7,
players i and j are equivalent also with respect toX . This implies the existence
of P ∈ PX such that i, j ∈ P. Hence,














mX (N, v,F ),
it implies that ACOTi(N, v,F ) = ACOTj(N, v,F ).
For TU-games, since any subset of players is feasible, a player is able to
join any subset of players he doesn’t belong to. For TU-games, a null player
is defined to be a player whose marginal contribution is zero when joining
to any set of players. For our setting, since not all coalitions are feasible, a
player may not be able to join all coalitions. Moreover, a player may need
other players to be able to join to a feasible coalition and also we may have
cases where players are not joining to a single feasible coalition but to several
disjoint feasible coalitions.
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Definition 4.4.2 Given a coalitional structure F on N and S ∈ F , {S1, . . . , Sk}
is a maximal subpartition of S if it satisfies the following conditions:




(ii) Sh ∈ F and Sh ∩ Sm = ∅ holds for all distinct h, m ∈ {1, . . . , k};
(iii) S′ ∪ (
⋃
m∈M
Sm) /∈ F for all S′ ⊂ (S \
k⋃
h=1
Sh) and M ⊆ {1, . . . , k}.
For a feasible coalition S ∈ F , a collection of disjoint feasible coalitions
{S1, . . . , Sk} is a maximal subpartition of S if their union is a proper subset of
S and it is not possible to find any other such collection that is obtained by
combining some of the members of the collection with some other players in
S. A maximal subpartition of a feasible coalition S does not need to be unique
and is the empty set if there exists no S′ ∈ F such that S′ ⊂ S. For S ∈ F ,
DF (S) denotes the collection of maximal subpartitions of S. Note that if the
empty set is a maximal subpartition of a feasible coalition S, then there exists
no other maximal subpartition of S.
Example 4.4.3 Consider the coalitional structure F = {{1}, {2}, {2, 3}, {4, 5},
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}} on N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. For the grand coalition N there exist three
maximal subpartitions, {{1}, {2, 3}}, {{1}, {2}, {4, 5}}, and {{2, 3}, {4, 5}}.
Furthermore, DF ({2, 3}) = {{{2}}} and DF ({4, 5}) = {∅}.
In a TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN , player i ∈ N is
called a null player if v(S) − ∑Q∈D v(Q) = 0 for all S ∈ F and D ∈ DF (S)
satisfying i ∈ S \⋃Q∈D Q.
A player is a null player if his contribution in worth is zero when he and
possibly other players join to any maximal subpartition of a feasible coalition
he belongs to. Notice that if a player i ∈ N is a null player and {i} ∈ F , then
v({i}) = 0.
Definition 4.4.4 A value ξ on GcosN satisfies the null player property if for any
TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN , it holds that ξi(N, v,F ) =
0 whenever i ∈ N is a null player in (N, v,F ).
Proposition 4.4.5 The average coalitional tree solution on GcosN satisfies the null
player property.
Proof Take any TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN and i ∈ N
such that player i is a null player in (N, v,F ). Consider any maximal nested
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set X ∈ X F and let PX (i) = P. By property (iii) of Theorem 4.3.8, {STX (P′) |
P′ ∈ ITX (P)} is a maximal subpartition of STX (P) not containing i. Since i is
a null player in (N, v,F ) and STX (Q) = MX (Q) for any Q ∈ PX , we have
v(MX (P))− ∑
P′∈ITX (P)














Since the average coalitional tree solution is the average of the marginal con-
tribution vectors corresponding to the coalitional trees induced by all maximal
nested sets of F , it holds that ACOTi(N, v,F ) = 0.
Now we state that the average coalitional tree solution is independent of
closed coalitions. If a feasible coalition of a coalitional structure is disjoint to
any other feasible coalition that does not contain it or is not a subset of it and
is not able to join to other feasible coalitions to form a larger feasible coalition,
then this coalition is called a closed coalition.
Definition 4.4.6 Given a coalitional structure F on N, a feasible coalition Q ∈
F is a closed coalition if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) For all S ∈ F , S 6= Q, either Q ⊂ S or Q ⊃ S or Q ∩ S = ∅;




Sj) ∪Q /∈ F .
Subsets of a closed coalition are not able to join to coalitions that also contain
players outside the coalition. In some sense, a closed coalition performs on its
own. Hence, the members of a closed coalition should receive together just the
worth of that coalition, the payoffs of players inside a closed coalition should
only depend on the worths of the feasible subcoalitions of the closed coalition,
and the payoffs of players outside the closed coalition should be independent
of these worths.
Definition 4.4.7 A value ξ on GcosN satisfies independence of closed coalitions if for
any TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN and closed coalition
Q ∈ F the following conditions hold:
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(i) ∑i∈Q ξi(N, v,F ) = v(Q);
(ii) For any TU-game with coalitional structure (N, w,F ) ∈ GcosN such that
w(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ F satisfying S ⊆ Q, it holds that ξi(N, v,F ) =
ξi(N, w,F ) for all i ∈ Q;
(iii) For any TU-game with coalitional structure (N, w,F ) ∈ GcosN such that
w(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ F satisfying S ⊇ Q or S ∩ Q = ∅, it holds that
ξi(N, v,F ) = ξi(N, w,F ) for all i ∈ N \Q.
Proposition 4.4.8 The average coalitional tree solution on GcosN satisfies indepen-
dence of closed coalitions.
Proof Take any TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN and closed
coalition Q ∈ F . We first show that Q ∈ X for all X ∈ X F . Suppose there
exists a maximal nested set X ∈ X F such that Q /∈ X . Since Q is a closed
coalition and X ⊆ F , conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 4.4.6 imply that
X ∪ {Q} is a nested set, which contradicts that X is a maximal nested set.
To prove condition (i) of Definition 4.4.7, take any X ∈ X F . By Lemma
4.3.3 and Theorem 4.3.8, there exists P ∈ PX such that MX (P) = STX (P) =
Q. This implies ∑i∈Q mXi (N, v,F ) = v(MX (P)) = v(Q). Since the average
coalitional tree solution is the average of the marginal contribution vectors
corresponding to the coalitional trees induced by all maximal nested sets, we
have ∑i∈Q ACOTi(N, v,F ) = v(Q).
To show condition (ii) of Definition 4.4.7, take any i ∈ Q and TU-game with
coalitional structure (N, w,F ) such that w(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ F satisfying
S ⊆ Q. Both (N, v,F ) and (N, w,F ) have the same coalitional structure F
and Q ∈ X for all X ∈ X F . Take any X ∈ X F , then


















Q ∈ X and i ∈ Q imply both MX (i) ⊆ Q and MX (P) ⊆ Q for all P ∈
ITX (PX (i)). Since v(S) = w(S) for all S ⊆ Q, we obtain v(MX (i)) = w(MX (i))
and v(MX (P)) = w(MX (P)) for all P ∈ ITX (PX (i)). Hence, mXi (N, v,F ) =
mXi (N, w,F ) for allX ∈ X
F
and therefore ACOTi(N, v,F ) = ACOTi(N, w,F ).
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To show condition (iii) of Definition 4.4.7, take any i ∈ N \ Q and TU-
game with coalitional structure (N, w,F ) ∈ GcosN such that w(S) = v(S) for
all S ∈ F satisfying S ⊇ Q or S ∩ Q = ∅. Again both TU-games with coali-
tional structure (N, v,F ) and (N, w,F ) have the same coalitional structure
F and Q ∈ X for all X ∈ X F . Take any X ∈ X F . Since Q ∈ X is a
closed coalition and i ∈ N \ Q, either MX (i) ∩ Q = ∅ or MX (i) ⊃ Q. If
MX (i) ∩ Q = ∅ then MX (P) ∩ Q = ∅ for all P ∈ ITX (PX (i)), which implies
v(MX (i)) = w(MX (i)) and v(MX (P)) = w(MX (P)) for all P ∈ ITX (PX (i))
and therefore mXi (N, v,F ) = mXi (N, w,F ). If MX (i) ⊃ Q, then MX (P′) ⊇ Q
for precisely one P′ ∈ ITX (PX (i)) and MX (P) ∩ Q = ∅ for all other P ∈
ITX (PX (i)). Since v(S) = w(S) for all S ⊇ Q or S ∩ Q = ∅, this implies
v(MX (i)) = w(MX (i)) and v(MX (P)) = w(MX (P)) for all P ∈ ITX (PX (i))
and therefore mXi (N, v,F ) = mXi (N, w,F ). The two cases together imply that
ACOTi(N, v,F ) = ACOTi(N, w,F ).
Since we assume N ∈ F , the grand coalition N is a closed coalition. Hence,
efficiency of the average coalitional tree solution also follows from indepen-
dence of closed coalitions, condition (i) of Definition 4.4.7. For a TU-game
with coalitional structure, a closed coalition can be seen as a set of players
whose performance is not affected by the other players of the game (condition
(ii)) and also does not affect the performance of the other players (condition
(iii)). Condition (ii) also implies that the average coalitional tree solution of
the subgame obtained by the players of a closed coalition is the same as the
average coalitional tree solution for these players under the original game.
For the Shapley value introduced in Aguilera et al. (2010), the property of
independence of closed coalitions is not satisfied, because a closed coalition
may not be a member of every maximal chain of the coalitional structure.
Example 4.4.9 Consider the coalitional structure F = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3},
{4, 6}, {5, 7}, {6, 7}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8}, N} on N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}.
F contains six maximal nested sets,X 1 = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {5, 7}, {1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8},
N},X 2 = {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {5, 7}, {1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8}, N},X 3 = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {6,
7}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, N}, X 4 = {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {6, 7}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, N}, X 5 = {{1,
2}, {1, 2, 3}, {4, 6}, {5, 7}, N}, andX 6 = {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {4, 6}, {5, 7}, N}. The
corresponding coalitional trees are depicted in Figure 4.3.

























(PX 1 , TX 1)(PX 2 , TX 2)(PX 3 , TX 3)(PX 4 , TX 4) (PX 5 , TX 5) (PX 6 , TX 6)
Coalition {1, 2, 3} is a closed coalition. Therefore it is a member of all maxi-
mal nested sets and a branch in each coalitional tree. However, {{5, 7}, {1, 2, 3,
5, 7, 8}, N} is a maximal chain which is not a maximal nested set and does not
contain {1, 2, 3}. For each of the six maximal nested sets the total payoff for
the members of the coalition {1, 2, 3} at the induced marginal contribution
vector is equal to its worth v({1, 2, 3}). If for two TU-games with coalitional
structure (N, v,F ) and (N, w,F ) it holds that v(S) = w(S) for all feasible
S ⊆ {1, 2, 3}, then at the average coalitional tree solution the payoffs for the
players in {1, 2, 3} are the same. Similarly, if v(S) = w(S) holds for all feasible
S satisfying S ∩ {1, 2, 3} = ∅ or S ⊇ {1, 2, 3}, then at the average coalitional
tree solution the payoffs for the players in {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} are the same.
4.5 Special cases for coalitional structure
As discussed before, for complete coalitional structures, which is a special case
for coalitional structure, the average coalitional tree solution and the Shap-
ley value coincide. In this section we consider some other special coalitional
structures.
4.5.1 Building set as coalitional structure
This subsection considers the case where building sets represent the coali-
tional structure in a TU-game. A set system on N is a building set if all single-
ton coalitions, the union of any intersecting feasible coalitions, and the grand
coalition are feasible. For TU-games with a building set as the coalitional
structure, Koshevoy and Talman (2014) uses maximal nested sets to define the
gravity center solution (GC) which coincides with the average coalitional tree
solution on this class of games. Koshevoy and Talman (2014) also proposes a
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way to use the GC solution for games with arbitrary coalitional structure by
taking its building cover. Given a set system F on N, the building cover of
F , B(F ), is defined as the smallest building set on N that contains F . For
a TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) on N, by using the Möbius
inversion, they define the so called M-extension vF of the characteristic func-
tion v and propose as GC solution of (N, v,F ) the GC solution of the game
(N, vF ,B(F )). The definition of Möbius inversion and M-extension is given
below.
For a TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN , the Möbius inver-
sion of v is given by
µ(T) = ∑
T′⊆T
(−1)|T|−|T′|v(T), T ∈ 2N.
Definition 4.5.1 Given a TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN ,
the M-extension vF : 2N → R of v is given by the following conditions:
(i) vF (S) = v(S) for all S ∈ F ;
(ii) For the Möbius inversion of vF , µF , it holds that µF (S) = 0 for all S /∈ F .
Although for a TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ), where F is a
building set, the average coalitional tree solution and the GC solution coin-
cide, for games with more general coalitional structure, they differ from each
other.
Example 4.5.2 Consider the TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) with
F = {{2, 4}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} and v(S) = |S|2 for all S ∈ F . F has two
maximal nested sets, X 1 = {{2, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} and X 2 = {{3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}},
with corresponding coalitional trees depicted in Figure 4.5a. Since F contains
no singleton coalitions and also not the union {2, 3, 4} of the feasible coali-
tions {2, 4} and {3, 4}, F is not a building set. The building cover of F is
the collection B(F ) = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}},
having ten maximal nested sets, Y1 = {{4}, {3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y2 =
{{3}, {3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y3 = {{4}, {2, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y4 =
{{2}, {2, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y5 = {{2}, {3}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y6 =
{{1}, {4}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y7 = {{1}, {3}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y8 = {{1},
{4}, {2, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y9 = {{1}, {2}, {2, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y10 = {{1}, {2},
{3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, with corresponding coalitional trees depicted in Figure 4.5b.
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a. The coalitional trees of F .





Figure 4.5: Example 4.5.2.






















































For the M-extension of v, vF , we obtain vF (S) = v(S) if S ∈ F , vF (S) =
0 if |S| = 1, and vF ({2, 3, 4}) = v({2, 4}) + v({3, 4}) = 8. It holds that
ACOT(N, v,F ) = (6, 4, 4, 2) and GC(N, v,F ) = GC(vN,F ,B(F )) = (4, 4, 4, 4).
Notice that some of the marginal contribution vectors that correspond to the
coalitional trees of the building cover B(F ) are the same.
Chapter 2 of this monograph studies TU-games with connected commu-
nication structure for which the collection of feasible coalitions is the set of
connected coalitions of an (undirected) graph on the set of players. For a con-
nected communication structure which is represented by a graph, the collec-
tion of feasible coalitions forms a building set, because together with the grand
coalition, all singleton coalitions are connected and given any two intersect-
ing connected sets the union is also connected. So, a TU-game with connected
communication structure can be considered as a TU-game with coalitional
structure which is represented by a building set.
A coalitional structure F on N is called graphical, if F is the collection of
all connected sets of players of a graph (N, L), i.e., F = CL(N). In order to
have the grand coalition N as a feasible set, throughout this subsection, we
assume that N forms a connected set in the graph that induces the coalitional
structure. In case the set of feasible coalitions is restricted to the collection of
connected sets of a connected undirected graph, the TU-game with coalitional
structure is a TU-game with communication structure, see Chapter 2.
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Lemma 4.5.3 Given a graphical coalitional structure F on N, for any maximal
nested set X ∈ X F it holds that PX (i) = {i} for all i ∈ N.
Proof Let the graphical coalitional structure F on N be induced by a con-
nected graph (N, L) and take any X ∈ X F . Suppose there exists i ∈ N
for which j ∈ PX (i), for some j 6= i. Then MX (i) = MX (j). Let K ∈
ĈL(MX (i) \ {i}) be the component of MX (i) \ {i} in (N, L) containing j. Then
K ∈ F and K 6∈ X . Since (N, L) is a connected graph, X ∪ {K} is a nested set,
contradicting that X is a maximal nested set.
An immediate result of Lemma 4.5.3 is that, for a TU-game with graphical
coalitional structure, all coalitional trees corresponding to the maximal nested
sets are trees.
Lemma 4.5.4 Given a graphical coalitional structure F on N induced by a graph
(N, L), for any X ∈ X F it holds that STX (P′) ∈ ĈL(STX (P)) if (P, P′) ∈ TX .
Proof Take any X ∈ X F and let (P, P′) ∈ TX . As a direct result of Theorem
4.3.8 and since F = CL(N), we have STX (P) ∈ CL(N) and STX (P′) ∈ CL(N).
Let S1, . . . , Sk be the components of STX (P) in (N, L), i.e., Sh ∈ ĈL(STX (P))
holds for all h = 1, . . . , k. First, suppose STX (P
′) ⊂ Sh for some h ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Since (P, P′) ∈ TX , we have MX (P) ⊃ MX (P′) and there exists no X ∈ X
such that MX (P) ⊃ X ⊃ MX (P′). Hence, Sh /∈ X , which contradicts that X is
a maximal nested set. Next, suppose STX (P
′)∩ Sh 6= ∅ and STX (P′)∩ Sm 6= ∅
for some h, m ∈ {1, . . . , k}, h 6= m. Since STX (P′) ∈ CL(N), this contradicts
that Sh and Sm both are components of STX (P) in (N, L). Hence, STX (P
′) is
equal to Sh for some h ∈ {1, . . . , k}, which completes the proof.
Example 4.5.5 Consider the graph (N, L) on {1, 2, 3}with L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}
as depicted in Figure 4.6a. F = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}} is the
corresponding graphical coalitional structure on N. F has five maximal nested
sets, X 1 = {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}}, X 2 = {{2}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}}, X 3 = {{2}, {2,
3}, {1, 2, 3}}, X 4 = {{3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}, X 5 = {{3}, {1}, {1, 2, 3}}, with
corresponding coalitional trees as depicted in Figure 4.6b.
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Figure 4.6: Example 4.5.5.


























Since the collection of connected sets of a graph is a building set, it holds
that on the class of TU-games with graphical coalitional structure the GC so-
lution and the average coalitional tree solution coincide.
In Chapter 3, the average covering tree solution is introduced for TU-games
with dominance structure. The average covering tree solution is applicable
to TU-games with communication structure by considering the directed ana-
logue of the communication structure. The directed analogue of an undirected
graph is obtained by replacing each edge in the communication structure by
two arcs with opposite directions. On the class of TU-games with graphical
coalitional structure, the average coalitional tree solution and the average cov-
ering tree solution coincide when the average covering tree solution is applied
to the TU-game with dominance structure whose dominance structure is the
directed analogue of the graph inducing the coalitional structure.
4.5.2 Partitional coalitional structures
In this subsection we consider coalitional structures where for each player the
only alternative of not participating in the grand coalition is to participate in
a unique smaller coalition. A coalitional structure F is called partitional if it
contains exactly the grand coalition N and a proper partition of N.
Lemma 4.5.6 If F is a partitional coalitional structure on N, then |X F | = |F | − 1.
Proof Let F = {S1, . . . , Sk, N} where S1, . . . , Sk forms a partition of N for
some k ≥ 2. Then X is a maximal nested set of F if and only if there exists
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that X = F \ {Si}. So |X
F | = k, which completes the
proof.
A direct result of Lemma 4.5.6 is that, given a partitional coalitional struc-
ture, each collection of feasible coalitions that excludes only one of the parti-
tion members is a maximal nested set.
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Lemma 4.5.7 Given a partitional coalitional structure F = {S1, . . . , Sk, N}, if i ∈
Sh for some h ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then PX (i) = Sh for all X ∈ X
F .
Proof Take any h ∈ {1, . . . , k} and i ∈ Sh and let X ∈ X
F
. Suppose Sh ∈ X .
Since S1, . . . , Sk forms a partition of N and Sh ∈ X , we have MX (j) = Sh for
all j ∈ Sh. So, PX (i) = Sh. Next, suppose Sh /∈ X . Since S1, . . . , Sk forms a
partition of N and Sh /∈ X , we have MX (j) = N for all j ∈ Sh. Hence, again
PX (i) = Sh, which completes the proof.
Since coalitional trees are defined on the sets of equivalent players, by Lemma
4.5.7, for a partitional coalitional structure F = {S1, . . . , Sk, N}, all of the in-
duced coalitional trees are defined on the partition {S1, . . . , Sk}.
Theorem 4.5.8 Given a TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN with















Proof Take any m ∈ {1, . . . , k}. By Lemma 4.5.6 we have |X F | = k. Let
X F = {X 1, . . . ,X k}. Then k− 1 of these maximal nested sets contain Sm and
only one of them does not contain Sm. Without loss of generality let Sm ∈ X h
hold for h = 1, . . . , k− 1. Then ∑i∈Sm m
X h
i (N, v,F ) = v(Sm) for h ∈ {1, . . . , k−
1} and for X k we have ∑i∈Sm m
X k
i (N, v,F ) = v(N) − ∑
k−1
h=1 v(Sh). Since the
average coalitional tree solution is the average of these marginal contribution
vectors, we obtain ∑i∈Sm ACOTi(N, v,F ) = v(Sm) + (v(N)−∑
k
h=1 v(Sh))/k.
As Theorem 4.5.8 shows, given a TU-game with a partitional coalitional
structure, each member of the partition receives its worth plus an equal share
of the total contribution of all members of the partition while forming the
grand coalition. On the individual level, each player receives an equal share
of the total payoff available to the partition member he belongs to. So, we
have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.5.9 Given a TU-game with coalitional structure (N, v,F ) ∈ GcosN with
partitional coalitional structureF = {S1, . . . , Sk, N}, for any i ∈ Sm, m ∈ {1, . . . , k},
it holds that
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This result is confirmed by the property of equal treatment of equivalent
players, because for a TU game with partitional coalitional structure the play-
ers in any partition member are equivalent to each other.
Example 4.5.10 Consider a partitional coalitional structure F = {{1, 2, 3},
{4, 5}, {6}, {7}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}}. F has four maximal nested sets, X 1 =
{{4, 5}, {6}, {7}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}},X 2 = {{1, 2, 3}, {6}, {7}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}},
X 3 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}, {7}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}} andX 4 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}, {6}, {
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}}, with corresponding coalitional trees as depicted in Figure
4.7.
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CHAPTER 5
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE COPELAND
SOLUTION FOR TOURNAMENTS
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 of this monograph considers TU-games with dominance structure
where the dominance structure is represented by a directed graph. In the lit-
erature a special type of directed graphs, tournaments, that contain an arc be-
tween any pair of nodes, attract special attention. In real life, such a directed
graph may be the result of a sports competition where every contestant meets
every other contestant. For a tournament representing the result of a sports
competition, the nodes are the contestants and each arc in the directed graph
represents the result of the competition between those contestants. Alterna-
tively, given a set of candidates and a set of an odd number of individuals
with preferences on these candidates, pairwise majority comparison of the
candidates yields a tournament on the set of candidates. With this approach,
in a tournament an arc from a candidate to another candidate means the ma-
jority of the individuals prefers the first candidate to the latter one. To solve
the problem of choosing from a tournament, Copeland (1951) proposes to pick
the candidates that beat the maximum number of candidates. The proposal of
Copeland received attention from a variety of fields, including graph theory
as in van den Brink and Gilles (2003); economics as in Paul (1997); computer
science as in Singh and Kurose (1991); and social choice theory as in Moulin
(1986). As a result, it has been the subject matter of thorough investigations
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and we know, at present, many of its properties. However, the literature is
not very rich in characterizations of the Copeland solution. In fact, the origi-
nal proposal of Copeland (1951) is not supported by a characterization. Later,
Moon (1968) shows the equivalence between the Copeland ranking and the
one generated by the maximum likelihood solution of Zermelo (1929) which
assigns a strength to each candidate and derives the social ranking accord-
ingly. The first axiomatic characterization of the Copeland solution is by Ru-
binstein (1980) who characterizes the Copeland welfare function as a method
to rank the candidates in a tournament. Henriet (1985) extends this character-
ization to environments which allow for ties between candidates. Similarly,
van den Brink and Gilles (2003) provides a characterization of the Copeland
welfare function for an arbitrary digraph which is a more general class than
tournaments.
In this chapter, we provide a new characterization of the Copeland rule
based on the number of steps in which candidates beat each other. In a tour-
nament, the Condorcet winner is the candidate which beats every other can-
didate in one step i.e., there exists an arc from the Condorcet winner to every
other candidate. So, given n candidates and a tournament on these candi-
dates, a Condorcet winner beats all remaining candidates in a total of n − 1
number of steps. When choosing from a tournament, there is universal agree-
ment on the Condorcet principle which requires to pick the Condorcet winner,
whenever it exists. As a Condorcet winner may fail to exist, the Condorcet
principle can be extended to what we call the minisum principle: Choose the
candidate(s) that beat all remaining candidates in the smallest total number
of steps. The minisum principle can be seen also as choosing the most central
candidate in a tournament. We show that the minisum principle characterizes
the Copeland solution. This chapter is based on Sanver and Selçuk (2010) and
its structure is as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic notions. Section 3
states the results.
5.2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of candidates with n ≥ 3. A tournament
on N is a directed graph (N, T) which is obtained by assigning a direction to
each edge of a complete undirected graph on N. We write ΘN for the set of
all tournaments on N. So, for a tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN and distinct i, j ∈ N,
either (i, j) ∈ T or (j, i) ∈ T holds. Given a tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN, if (i, j) ∈
T, then we say that candidate i ∈ N directly beats candidate j ∈ N in (N, T).
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A tournament solution is a mapping f : ΘN → 2N \ {∅}. For (N, T) ∈ ΘN, let
δT(i) = |{j ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ T}| be the Copeland score of i ∈ N, i.e., the number of
candidates that i ∈ N directly beats in (N, T). The Copeland solution (CS) is the
tournament solution defined as CS(N, T) = {i ∈ N | δT(i) ≥ δT(j) for all j ∈
N} for any tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN. Given a tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN and
i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, a directed path from i to j in (N, T) is a sequence (i1, . . . , ik)
of different candidates with i1 = i and ik = j such that (ih, ih+1) ∈ T for all
h ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}. We refer to k as the length of the directed path. Note that in
a tournament, there may exist more than one directed path from a candidate to
another one. For i, j ∈ N, let λT(i, j) be the length of the shortest directed path
from i to j in (N, T), i.e., the length of any directed path from i to j in (N, T)
is at least λT(i, j). Note that in a tournament there may not exist a directed
path from any player to any other player. We set λT(i, j) = n, when (N, T)
contains no directed path from i ∈ N to j ∈ N and λT(i, i) = 0 for all i ∈ N. If
λT(i, j) = 1, this means i ∈ N directly beats j ∈ N in (N, T). In a tournament,
the Condorcet winner is the candidate (if it exists) which directly beats all other
candidates.
5.3 Characterization of the Copeland solution
Given a set of candidates N, an ordering is a complete, transitive, and reflexive
binary relation R on N. For an ordering R on N, let i R j if and only if
(i, j) ∈ R. Let Π stand for the set of all orderings on N. A ranking method
f : ΘN → Π is a function that assigns an ordering f (N, T) to any tournament
(N, T) ∈ ΘN, which, with slight abuse of notation, we denote by  f (N,T). For
a tournament, the Copeland scores of the candidates can be used to rank the
candidates. For a tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN, the Copeland score ranking method
(CR) is the ordering defined as i CR(N,T) j if δ(i) ≥ δ(j), for all i, j ∈ N.
In Zermelo (1929), a method that is based on the strengths of the candi-
dates is introduced to rank the candidates in a tournament. For a tournament
(N, T) ∈ ΘN and i ∈ N, let σ(i) be the strength of player i where σ(i) > 0
for all i ∈ N and ∑i∈N σ(i) = 1. According to Zermelo (1929), if the strengths
of all players are known, it is possible to assign a probability to each arc of
a tournament where for any arc (i, j) ∈ T, the probability to have that arc,
p(i, j), depends on the relative strengths of the candidates involved in this
arc, i.e., p(i, j) = σ(i)/(σ(i) + σ(j)). With this approach, the probability of a
tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN is p(N, T) = ∏(i,j)∈T p(i, j). According to Zermelo
(1929), the strengths of players in a tournament (N, T) ∈ Θ should be cho-
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sen in a way to maximize p(N, T). Later, Moon (1968) shows that ranking the
candidates according to Zermelo’s strengths is the same as ranking them ac-
cording to their Copeland scores. So, the candidates with maximum strength
are also the candidates with the maximum Copeland score which means they
are members of the Copeland solution.
For tournaments, Rubinstein (1980) provides another characterization of
the Copeland score ranking method.
For a tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN and permutation π on N, let (N, π(T)) be
the tournament such that (i, j) ∈ T implies (π(i), π(j)) ∈ π(T).
Definition 5.3.1 A ranking method f : ΘN → Π satisfies anonymity if for any
(N, T) ∈ ΘN and permutation π on N, i  f (N,T) j implies π(i)  f (N,π(T))
π(j).
According to Definition 5.3.1, in order to be anonymous a ranking method
should not depend on the labels of the candidates.
Definition 5.3.2 A ranking method f : ΘN → Π satisfies positive responsive-
ness if for any (N, T), (N, T′) ∈ ΘN, i  f (N,T) j implies i  f (N,T′) j whenever
T′ = (T \ {(k, i)}) ∪ {(i, k)} for some (k, i) ∈ T.
According to positive responsiveness, if a candidate is ranked above another
candidate for a tournament, then the same should hold for any another tour-
nament where the above ranked candidate is favored.
Definition 5.3.3 A ranking method f : ΘN → Π is independent of irrelevant
candidates if for any (N, T), (N, T′) ∈ ΘN and distinct i, j, k, l ∈ N, i  f (N,T) j
implies i  f (N,T′) j whenever T′ = (T \ {(k, l)}) ∪ {(l, k)} and (k, l) ∈ T.
Independence of irrelevant candidates says that the comparison of any two
candidates should be independent of the relation of any other two candidates
in the tournament.
Theorem 5.3.4 (Rubinstein, 1980) The Copeland ranking method is the only rank-
ing method that satisfies anonymity, positive responsiveness, and independence of
irrelevant candidates.
Henriet (1985) extends the Copeland scoring method to a more general case
of complete binary relations. In Henriet (1985), a complete binary relation
refers to a directed graph in which there exist exactly two arcs, possibly with
the same direction, between any pair of candidates. Together with modified
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versions of anonymity and positive responsiveness of Rubinstein (1980), for
complete binary relation case, Henriet (1985) uses independence of cycles for
the characterization. For the complete binary relation case, independence of
cycles requires no change in the ranking if a cycle is reversed in the complete
binary relation.
As a generalization of Rubinstein (1980), van den Brink and Gilles (2003)
provides the characterization of the Copeland score ranking method for arbi-
trary digraphs. Together with a modification of the anonymity and positive
responsiveness axioms which are used in Rubinstein (1980), van den Brink
and Gilles (2003) uses independence of non-dominated arcs. According to
independence of non-dominated arcs, the ordering between two candidates
does not change as long as the set of immediate successors stays the same for
both of these candidates.
Now we provide a characterization of the Copeland solution that is based
on the lengths of the shortest directed paths from a candidate to other candi-
dates. Given a tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN and i ∈ N, let SUMT(i) = ∑j∈N λT(i, j)
be the sum of the lengths of the shortest paths from candidate i to all remain-
ing candidates.
Definition 5.3.5 Given a tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN, i ∈ N is a minisum candi-
date in (N, T) if SUMT(i) ≤ SUMT(j) for all j ∈ N.
For a tournament (N, T) ∈ θN, µ(N, T) denotes the set of minisum candi-
dates in (N, T). We provide a new characterization of the Copeland solution
in terms of the set of minisum candidates.
Following Miller (1980), given a tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN and distinct i, j ∈
N, we say that i covers j in (N, T) if (i, j) ∈ T and, moreover, (j, j′) ∈ T implies
(i, j′) ∈ T. We denote UC(N, T) = {i ∈ N | @j ∈ N which covers i in (N, T)}
for the uncovered set of (N, T).
Remark 5.3.6 Given a tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN, for any i, j, k ∈ N, if i covers
j in (N, T) and j covers k in (N, T), then i covers k in (N, T).
Remark 5.3.6 says that the covering relation in a tournament is transitive.
Together with the fact that N is finite, this implies UC(N, T) 6= ∅.
When a tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN does not admit a Condorcet winner,
Shepsle and Weingast (1984) shows that for the candidates in the uncovered
set of a tournament, the length of the shortest directed paths from this candi-
date to other candidates is at most 2.
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Proposition 5.3.7 (Shepsle and Weingast, 1984) For any tournament (N, T) ∈
ΘN, if i ∈ UC(N, T), then λT(i, j) ∈ {1, 2} holds for all j ∈ N, j 6= i.
Proof Suppose there exists i ∈ UC(N, T) and j ∈ N such that λT(i, j) > 2.
Since λT(i, j) > 2, it holds that (j, i) ∈ T and (j, i′) ∈ T for all i′ ∈ N such that
(i, i′) ∈ T. This implies that j covers i, which contradicts with i ∈ UC(N, T).
According to Proposition 5.3.7, the uncovered set of a tournament consists
of all candidates that beats every other candidate minimally in at most two
steps. This is an extension of the Condorcet principle through the require-
ment of minimizing the maximum number of steps. We call this the maximin
principle. In Shepsle and Weingast (1984) this is called the two step principle.
So, for a tournament choosing the uncovered set is equivalent to choosing
according to the maximin principle. The literature admits various solutions
that refine the uncovered set. Proposition 5.3.8 quotes a result of Miller (1980)
showing that the Copeland solution is a refinement of the uncovered set.
Proposition 5.3.8 (Miller, 1980) For any tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN, CS(N, T) ⊆
UC(N, T).
Proof Suppose there exists i ∈ CS(N, T) where i /∈ UC(N, T). Then there
exists j ∈ N \ {i} which covers i. This means (j, i) ∈ T and (j, i′) ∈ T holds
for all i′ ∈ N such that (i, i′) ∈ T. This implies δT(j) ≥ δT(i) + 1, which
contradicts with i ∈ CS(N, T).
The following proposition shows that also the set of minisum candidates is
a refinement of the uncovered set.
Proposition 5.3.9 For any tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN, µ(N, T) ⊆ UC(N, T).
Proof Take any i ∈ µ(N, T). So, SUMT(i) ≤ SUMT(j) holds for all j ∈ N.
Suppose i /∈ UC(N, T). Then there exists k ∈ N \ {i} that covers i in (N, T).
This means (k, i) ∈ T and (i, m) ∈ T implies (k, m) ∈ T for any m ∈ N \ {k, i}.
By the definition of shortest path, we have λT(k, j) ≤ λT(i, j) for all j ∈ N \
{i, k}. Thus, ∑j∈N\{i,k} λT(k, j) ≤ ∑j∈N\{i,k} λT(i, j). Moreover, (k, i) ∈ T
implies λT(k, i) = 1 < λT(i, k). Hence, ∑j∈N λT(k, j) < ∑j∈N λT(i, j), which
means SUMT(k) < SUMT(i), contradicting with SUMT(i) ≤ SUMT(j) for all
j ∈ N. Thus, there exists no k ∈ N that covers i ∈ N, hence i ∈ UC(N, T).
The following theorem shows that for any tournament the set of minisum
candidates coincides with the set of Copeland solution.
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Theorem 5.3.10 For any tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN, CS(N, T) = µ(N, T)
Proof If (N, T) has a Condorcet winner, then the result immediately holds.
Suppose (N, T) has no Condorcet winner. To show CS(N, T) ⊆ µ(N, T), take
any i ∈ CS(N, T). By Proposition 5.3.8, it follows that i ∈ UC(N, T). Hence,
by Proposition 5.3.7, for any j ∈ N \ {i} we have λT(i, j) = 1 if (i, j) ∈ T and
λT(i, j) = 2 if (j, i) ∈ T. So, SUMT(i) = |{j ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ T}|+ 2|{j ∈ N |
(j, i) ∈ T}| = δT(i)+ 2(n− 1− δT(i)) = 2n− 2− δT(i). Moreover, SUMT(j) ≥
2n− 2− δT(j) for all j ∈ N. Since i ∈ CS(N, T), we have δT(i) ≥ δT(j) for all
j ∈ N. Hence, SUMT(i) ≤ SUMT(j) for all j ∈ N. This implies i ∈ µ(N, T).
To show µ(N, T) ⊆ CS(N, T), take any i ∈ µ(N, T). From Proposition 5.3.9, it
follows that i ∈ UC(N, T). By Proposition 5.3.7, this implies SUMT(i) = 2n−
2− δT(i). Suppose i /∈ CS(N, T). Since CS(N, T) ⊆ UC(N, T), this implies
that there exists j ∈ UC(N, T) such that δT(j) > δt(i). Since SUMT(k) =
2n− 2− δT(k) holds for all k ∈ UC(N, T), this implies SUMT(i) > SUMT(j),
which contradicts with the fact that i ∈ µ(N, T).
Example 5.3.11 Consider a tournament (N, T) ∈ ΘN where N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
and T = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 5), (1, 6), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 4), (3, 5), (3, 6), (4, 1),
(5, 4), (5, 6), (6, 2), (6, 4)} as depicted in Figure 5.1. Note that (N, T) has no
Condorcet winner and candidate 1 directly beats four candidates in (N, T).
Hence δT(1) = 4. Similarly, we have δT(2) = 3, δT(3) = 3, δT(4) = 1, δT(5) =
2, and δT(6) = 2. So, we have CS(N, T) = {1}. Moreover, UC(N, T) = N and
CS(N, T) ⊆ UC(N, T). Note that λT(1, j) = 1 for j = 2, 3, 5, 6 and λT(1, 4) = 2.
Hence, SUMT(1) = 6. Similarly we have SUMT(2) = 7 , SUMT(3) = 7,
SUMT(4) = 9, SUMT(5) = 10, and SUMT(6) = 9. Since minisum candi-
dates are the ones minimising the total number of steps to reach every other
alternative we have µ(N, T) = {1}, which is also the Copeland solution.
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As the Copeland rule (which is equivalent to the minisum principle) refines
the uncovered set (which is equivalent to the maximin principle), tournament
solutions exemplify a case where the minisum principle refines the maximin
principle — a fact which is not common in the literature. For a detailed dis-





With the seminal work of Arrow (1951), Kenneth Arrow is considered to be the
founder of modern social choice theory. Given a set of alternatives and indi-
viduals with preferences on these alternatives, social choice theory deals with
the problem of creating a collective preference on these alternatives. In Arrow
(1951), a social welfare function is defined as a functional relation specifying
a unique social ordering for any given profile of individual orderings. A pref-
erence is a complete and transitive ordering of alternatives and a preference
aggregation rule is a function which maps profiles of individual preferences
into a social preference. Arrow (1951) provides an impossibility result which
states the non-existence of an aggregation rule satisfying a set of desirable
properties. The desirable properties in Arrow (1951) are the unrestricted do-
main property, Pareto optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and
non-dictatorship. The unrestricted domain property states that the domain of
the aggregation rule is the set of all possible profiles of individual preferences.
Pareto optimality requires an alternative to be socially preferred to another
one if this preference is shared by all individuals. Independence of irrele-
vant alternatives states that social comparison of any two alternatives should
only depend on the individual preferences on these alternatives. Finally, non-
dictatorship requires non-existence of an individual such that whenever this
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individual prefers one alternative to another one the same holds for the so-
cial preference. The Arrow impossibility theorem states the non-existence of
a social welfare function that satisfy all these axioms. Following Arrow’s im-
possibility result, in the literature several other related impossibility results
emerged. Among those Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) are the most
well known which show that every voting procedure, except the dictatoriality,
can be manipulated by the voters if they act strategically.
It is also possible to have a more general perspective of the preference
aggregation problem by incorporating elements of ambiguity into the pref-
erences. As there are various ways of conceiving ambiguity, there are also
various ways of generalizing the aggregation model of Arrow (1951) through
ambiguous preferences. In the literature, there are two major strands dealing
with the ambiguity of the preferences. One group of research considers a pref-
erence as a fuzzy binary relation and the other has a probabilistic conception
of preferences, see Fishburn (1998) and Barrett and Salles (2011) for a survey of
the related literature. The analysis in this chapter belongs to the latter strand.
In this chapter, we introduce the concept of sophisticated preference which
is a weighted pairwise comparison of alternatives that allows some kind of a
mixed feeling in comparing any given pair of alternatives. To illustrate this
point, suppose individuals are asked to reveal their preferences on two cities,
Amsterdam and Paris, based on various criteria like public transportation, air
quality, business opportunities or education quality. Depending on the num-
ber of criteria for which Paris is better than Amsterdam, a sophisticated pref-
erence allows an answer of the following type: I like Paris more than Amster-
dam in some respect but I like Amsterdam more than Paris in other respects.
The answer is also required to quantify the rate at which Paris is better than
Amsterdam and vice versa.
In this chapter, we consider situations where individuals have standard
preferences and the social preference is allowed to be a sophisticated pref-
erence. We define the sophisticated social welfare function as a mapping from
the profiles of individual preferences to sophisticated social preferences. We
give a full characterization of Pareto optimal and pairwise independent so-
phisticated social welfare functions in terms of oligarchies induced by some
power distribution on the set individuals. For a sophisticated social welfare
function, Pareto optimality states that if all individuals prefer an alternative
to another one, then according to the sophisticated social preference the first
alternative is preferred to the latter one with a rate equal to 1. A sophisticated
social welfare function satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives if the
CHAPTER 6 105
sophisticated social preference between any pair of alternatives depends only
on the individual preferences on this pair of alternatives.
The preference aggregation approach of this chapter is closely related to
the collective probabilistic judgement model of Barberá and Valenciano (1983)
where probabilistic judgement is defined as a function which assigns a num-
ber between zero and one to any ordered pair of alternatives. In fact, their
collective probabilistic judgement functions are more general than the sophis-
ticated social welfare functions. On the other hand we provide a strong result
which does not follow from Barberá and Valenciano (1983). The character-
ization in this chapter generalizes two major results of the literature. The
first one is the impossibility theorem of Arrow (1951). Because when the
ranges of Pareto optimal and pairwise independent SSWFs are restricted to
non-sophisticated preferences, that are linear orderings, the oligarchies must
contain precisely one individual which is a dictator. Moreover, in case the
social outcome is restricted to non-sophisticated preferences that are com-
plete and quasitransitive, Pareto optimal and pairwise independent SSWFs
are oligarchical in the sense that the oligarchy has full decision power while
all proper subsets of the oligarchy have equal decision power. This result is
known as the oligarchy theorem of Gibbard (2014).
This chapter is based on Sanver and Selçuk (2009). Section 2 contains the
preliminaries and provides the characterization of sophisticated social welfare
functions that are independent of irrelevant alternatives and satisfy Pareto
optimality.
6.2 Sophisticated social welfare function
We consider a finite set of individuals N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2, confronting
a finite set of alternatives A with |A| ≥ 3. A sophisticated preference over A
is a mapping σ : A × A → [0, 1] such that for all distinct x, y ∈ A we have
σ(x, y) + σ(y, x) = 1 while σ(x, x) = 0 holds for all x ∈ A. Interpreting σ(x, y)
as the weight by which x is preferred to y, the former condition imposes a
kind of completeness over σ while the latter is an irreflexivity requirement.
With this approach, a (nonsophisticted) preference over A is a mapping π :
A × A → {0, 1} where π(x, y) = 1 means x ∈ A is preferred to y ∈ A. A
sophisticated preference σ is transitive if σ(x, y) = 1 =⇒ σ(x, z) ≥ σ(y, z)
for all x, y, z ∈ A. We write Σ for the set of transitive sophisticated preferences
and Π ⊂ Σ for the set of transitive preferences over A.
A sophisticated social welfare function (SSWF) over A is a mapping γ :
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ΠN → Σ, for which we assume that individual preferences belong to Π and
we write πi ∈ Π for the preference of individual i ∈ N over A. A preference
profile over A is an n-tuple π = (π1, π2, . . . , πn) ∈ ΠN of individual prefer-
ences. So, γ(π) ∈ Σ is a sophisticated preference over A which, by a slight
abuse of notation, we denote γπ. Thus, γπ(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] stands for the weight
that the sophisticated social welfare function γ assigns to (x, y) ∈ A × A at
the preference profile π ∈ ΠN.
Definition 6.2.1 An SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ is Pareto optimal (PO) if for any distinct
x, y ∈ A and π ∈ ΠN where πi(x, y) = 1 for all i ∈ N, it holds that γπ(x, y) =
1.
According to PO, if all individuals prefer an alternative to another one, then
the sophisticated social welfare function should do the same by assigning a
weight equal to 1.
Definition 6.2.2 An SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ is independent of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) if for any distinct x, y ∈ A and π, π′ ∈ ΠN with πi(x, y) = π′i(x, y) for
all i ∈ N, it holds that γπ(x, y) = γπ′(x, y).
According to IIA, a sophisticated social preference on a pair of alternatives
should only depend on the individual preferences on this pair.
Any SSWF satisfying IIA can be expressed in terms of pairwise SSWFs.
To see this, take any distinct x, y ∈ A and let Πxy be the set of preferences
over x, y and similarly let Σxy be the set of sophisticated preferences over x, y.
Given any π ∈ ΠN, let πxy ∈ (Πxy)N be the preference profile restricted to any
distinct x, y ∈ A. A pairwise SSWF defined over distinct x, y ∈ A is a mapping
f xy : (Πxy)N → Σxy. For any r ∈ (Πxy)N, f xy(r) ∈ Σxy is a sophisticated
preference over x, y which, by a slight abuse of notation, we denote f xyr . Thus,
every SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ satisfying IIA can equivalently be expressed in terms
of a family of pairwise SSWFs { f xy} indexed over all distinct x, y ∈ A such
that for any π ∈ ΠN and distinct x, y ∈ A it holds that f xyπxy(x, y) = γπ(x, y).
We first show that given an SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ that can be represented by a
family of pairwise SSWFs, the pairwise functions are the same for any pair of
alternatives.
Given x, y, z, t ∈ A satisfying x 6= y and z 6= t, for any f xy : (Πxy)N → Σxy
and f zt : (Πzt)N → Σzt, let f xy ≈ f zt if it holds that f xyr (x, y) = f zts (z, t) for
every r ∈ (Πxy)N and s ∈ (Πzt)N such that ri(x, y) = si(z, t) for all i ∈ N.
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Proposition 6.2.3 Take any PO and IIA SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ which is expressed by
a family of pairwise SSWFs { f xy} over all distinct x, y ∈ A. For every a, b, c, d ∈ A
satisfying a 6= b and c 6= d, it holds that f ab ≈ f cd.
Proof To establish f ab ≈ f ac when |{a, b, c, d}| = 3, take any distinct a, b, c ∈ A
and any r ∈ (Πab)N and s ∈ (Πac)N such that ri(a, b) = si(a, c) for all i ∈ N.
Let S ⊆ N such that ri(a, b) = si(a, c) = 1 for all i ∈ S and ri(a, b) = si(a, c) = 0
for all i ∈ N \ S. Suppose for a contradiction f abr (a, b) > f acs (a, c). Consider
some π ∈ ΠN such that πi(a, b) = πi(b, c) = πi(a, c) = 1 for all i ∈ S and
πi(b, c) = πi(c, a) = πi(b, a) = 1 for all i ∈ N \ S. Since πi(b, c) = 1 for
all i ∈ N, by PO we have γπ(b, c) = 1. Since γπ is transitive, we obtain
γπ(b, a) ≥ γπ(c, a). This means γπ(a, b) ≤ γπ(a, c). Since πab = r and πac = s
we have f abr (a, b) ≤ f acs (a, c) which is the desired contradiction.
To establish f ab ≈ f cb when |{a, b, c, d}| = 3, take any distinct a, b, c ∈ A and
any r ∈ (Πab)N and s ∈ (Πcb)N such that ri(a, b) = si(c, b) for all i ∈ N. Let
S ⊆ N such that ri(a, b) = si(c, b) = 1 for all i ∈ S and ri(a, b) = si(c, b) = 0
for all i ∈ N \ S. Suppose for a contradiction f cbr (c, b) > f abs (a, b). Consider
some π ∈ ΠN such that πi(a, c) = πi(c, b) = πi(a, b) = 1 for all i ∈ S and
πi(b, a) = πi(a, c) = πi(b, c) = 1 for all i ∈ N \ S. Since πi(a, c) = 1 for
all i ∈ N, by PO we have γπ(a, c) = 1. Since γπ is transitive, we obtain
γπ(a, b) ≥ γπ(c, b). Since πab = r and πcb = s we have f cbr (c, b) ≤ f abs (a, b)
which is the desired contradiction.
We have shown f ab ≈ f ac and f ac ≈ f bc and f bc ≈ f ba. Hence f ab ≈ f ba
when |{a, b, c, d}| = 2.
When a, b, c, d are all distinct alternatives in A, we have already shown that
f ab ≈ f ad and f ad ≈ f cd, which implies f ab ≈ f cd.
According to Proposition 6.2.3, if an SSWF satisfies PO and IIA then any
pair of alternatives is compared with the same principles. Note that f xy ≈ f yx
implies f xyr (x, y) = f
xy
s (y, x) for all r, s ∈ (Πxy)N with ri(x, y) = si(y, x) for all
i ∈ N. Hence the pairwise SSWFs are also neutral. So, by Proposition 6.2.3,
any PO and IIA SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ can be expressed with a single neutral
pairwise SSWF f : (Πxy)N → Σxy for any given x, y ∈ A. Hence, for a PO
and IIA SSWF, there is no need to refer to a specific pair when we talk about a
pairwise SSWF. We now show that the pairwise SSWF satisfies monotonicity.
Definition 6.2.4 A pairwise SSWF f : (Πxy)N → Σxy is monotonic if for any
r, r′ ∈ (Πxy)N with ri(x, y) ≥ r′i(x, y) for all i ∈ N, it holds that fr(x, y) ≥
fr′(x, y).
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Proposition 6.2.5 Let γ : ΠN → Σ be a PO and IIA SSWF. If f : (Πxy)N → Σxy
is the pairwise SSWF that expresses γ, then f is monotonic.
Proof Suppose f fails monotonicity. So there exists x, y ∈ A and r, r′ ∈ (Πxy)N
with ri(x, y) ≥ r′i(x, y) for all i ∈ N while fr(x, y) < fr′(x, y). Let K = {i ∈
N | ri(x, y) = 1} and L = {i ∈ N | r′i(x, y) = 1}. Note that L ⊆ K. Take any
distinct a, b, c ∈ A and any π ∈ ΠN such that πi(a, b) = πi(b, c) = πi(a, c) = 1
for all i ∈ L, πi(a, c) = πi(c, b) = πi(a, b) = 1 for all i ∈ K \ L, and πi(c, a) =
πi(a, b) = πi(c, b) = 1 for all i ∈ N \ K. By PO, we have γπ(a, b) = 1.
Since f is the pairwise SSWF that expresses γ, by the choice of π, we have
γπ(a, c) = fr(x, y) and γπ(b, c) = fr′(x, y). Thus, γπ(a, c) < γπ(b, c), violating
the transitivity of γπ.
According to Proposition 6.2.5, an SSWF satisfying PO and IIA increases
weight assigned to a pair (x, y) ∈ A × A as the number of individuals who
prefers x to y increases.
Definition 6.2.6 For an SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ, a coalition S ⊆ N is decisive for
x ∈ A over y ∈ A \ {x} if for some π ∈ ΠN such that πi(x, y) = 1 for all i ∈ S
and πi (x, y) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S, it holds that γπ(x, y) > 0.
Note that, if an SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ satisfies IIA and a coalition is decisive
for x ∈ A over y ∈ A \ {x} for some π ∈ ΠN, then this coalition is decisive
for x over y for any preference profile π′ ∈ ΠN.
Lemma 6.2.7 For any PO and IIA SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ, if S ⊆ N is decisive for
some a ∈ A over some b ∈ A \ {a}, then for any distinct x, y ∈ A, it holds that S is
decisive for x over y.
Proof Let S ⊆ N be decisive for some a ∈ A over some b ∈ A \ {a}.
Claim 1: S is decisive for a over x for any x ∈ A \ {a, b}. Take any x ∈
A \ {a, b}. Consider a preference profile π ∈ ΠN where πi(a, b) = πi(b, x) =
πi(a, x) = 1 for all i ∈ S and πi(b, x) = πi(x, a) = πi(b, a) = 1 for all i ∈ N \ S.
Note that πi(a, b) = 1 for all i ∈ S and πi(a, b) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S. Since S is
decisive for a over b, we have γπ(a, b) > 0. By PO, πi(b, x) = 1 for all i ∈ N
implies γπ(b, x) = 1. By the transitivity of γπ, this implies γπ(b, a) ≥ γπ(x, a),
which means γπ(a, x) ≥ γπ(a, b) > 0. Since πi(a, x) = 1 for all i ∈ S and
πi(a, x) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S, this means S is decisive for a over x.
Claim 2: S is decisive for x over b for any x ∈ A \ {a, b}. Take any x ∈ A \
{a, b} and consider a preference profile π ∈ ΠN where πi(x, a) = πi(a, b) =
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πi(x, b) = 1 for all i ∈ S and πi(b, x) = πi(x, a) = πi(b, a) = 1 for all i ∈ N \ S.
Since S is decisive for a over b, then γπ(a, b) > 0. By PO, πi(x, a) = 1 for all
i ∈ N implies γπ(x, a) = 1. Transitivity of γπ implies γπ(x, b) ≥ γπ(a, b) > 0.
So, S is decisive for x over b as well.
Now take any distinct x, y ∈ A and consider the following three exhaustive
cases.
CASE 1: x ∈ A \ {b}. By claim 2 S is decisive for x over b and by Claim 1 S is
decisive for x over y.
CASE 2: x = b and y ∈ A \ {a}. By Claim 1 S is decisive for a over y and by
Claim 2 S is decisive for b over y for y 6= b.
CASE 3: x = b and y = a. Take some z ∈ A \ {a, b}. By Claim 1 S is decisive
for a over z, by Claim 2 S is decisive for b over z, and by Claim 1 S is decisive
for b over a.
According to Lemma 6.2.7, given an SSWF for which a coalition is decisive
for a pair of alternatives, by PO and IIA this coalition is decisive for any pair
of alternatives. Hence, there is no need to refer to a pair of alternatives when
we say that a coalition is decisive.
Lemma 6.2.8 For any PO and IIA SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ, if disjoint S, L ⊆ N are
both not decisive, then S ∪ L is not decisive either.
Proof Take any disjoint S, L ⊆ N which are both not decisive. Consider dis-
tinct x, y, z ∈ A and a profile π ∈ ΠN where πi(x, z) = πi(z, y) = πi(x, y) = 1
for all i ∈ S, πi(z, y) = πi(y, x) = πi(z, x) = 1 for all i ∈ L, and πi(y, x) =
πi(x, z) = πi(y, z) = 1 for all i ∈ N \ (S ∪ L). Since S and L are not decisive,
we have γπ(x, y) = 0 and γπ(z, x) = 0. By transitivity of γπ, this implies
γπ(z, y) = 0, showing that S ∪ L is not decisive.
According to Lemma 6.2.8, the union of any two coalitions is not decisive if
these coalitions are not decisive by their own.
Lemma 6.2.9 For any PO and IIA SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ, if S ⊆ N is decisive and
L ⊂ S, then L or S \ L is decisive.
Proof Suppose neither L nor S \ L is decisive. By Lemma 6.2.8, L∪ (S \ L) = S
is not decisive either, which contradicts that S is decisive.
According to Lemma 6.2.9, if a decisive coalition is partitioned into two
sets, at least one of these sets is a decisive coalition. So, every decisive coali-
tion contains a decisive subset. Since N is finite, from Lemma 6.2.9 it can be
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concluded that every decisive coalition contains an individual who is decisive
as a singleton coalition.
Lemma 6.2.10 For any PO and IIA SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ, if S ⊆ N is decisive, then
any L ⊇ S is also decisive.
Proof Consider any distinct x, y, z ∈ A and take a profile π ∈ ΠN where
πi(z, x) = πi(x, y) = πi(z, y) = 1 for all i ∈ S, πi(z, y) = πi(y, x) = πi(z, x) =
1 for all i ∈ L \ S, and πi(y, z) = πi(z, x) = πi(y, x) = 1 for all i ∈ N \ L.
Since S is decisive, we have γπ(x, y) > 0. By PO, πi(z, x) = 1 for all i ∈ N
implies γπ(z, x) = 1. Transitivity of γπ implies γπ(z, y) ≥ γπ(x, y). Since
γπ(x, y) > 0, this implies γπ(z, y) > 0, showing that L is decisive.
We now show that PO and IIA SSWFs fall into a class that is called oli-
garchical SSWFs.
Definition 6.2.11 An SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ is oligarchical if there exists O ∈
2N \ {∅}, which is the oligarchy, such that for every distinct x, y ∈ A and
π ∈ ΠN it holds that γπ(x, y) > 0 if and only if πi(x, y) = 1 for some i ∈ O.
An SSWF is oligarchical if there exists a nonempty set of individuals, which is
the oligarchy, such that a social preference assigns a positive weight to a pair
(x, y) ∈ A× A if and only if there exists at least one member of the oligarchy
who prefers x to y.
Given an SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ, let ∆γ be the set of decisive coalitions.
Lemma 6.2.12 For a PO and IIA SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ, there exists O ∈ 2N \ {∅}
such that for any S ∈ 2N it holds that S ∈ ∆γ if and only if S ∩O 6= ∅.
Proof By PO, we have N ∈ ∆γ. Applying Lemma 6.2.9 successively and by
the finiteness of N, the set {i ∈ N | {i} ∈ ∆γ} is non-empty. We now claim
that O = {i ∈ N | {i} ∈ ∆γ} and S ∈ ∆γ if and only if S ∩O 6= ∅. Take any
S ⊂ N. If S ∩O 6= ∅, then i ∈ S for some {i} ∈ ∆γ. So, by Lemma 6.2.10,
S ∈ ∆γ as well. If S ∈ ∆γ, then again by applying Lemma 6.2.9 successively
and by the finiteness of S, there exists i ∈ S such that {i} ∈ ∆γ, hence i ∈ O,
establishing that S ∩O 6= ∅.
According to Lemma 6.2.12, every decisive coalition contains at least one
individual who is decisive by himself. As the following theorem shows, if an
SSWF satisfies PO and IIA, then the set of individuals who are as a singleton
coalition decisive is the oligarchy which makes the SSWF oligarchical.
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Theorem 6.2.13 If an SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ satisfies PO and IIA, then γ is oligarchi-
cal with oligarchy the set O = {i ∈ N | {i} ∈ ∆γ}.
Proof From the proof of Lemma 6.2.12, it follows that the set O is nonempty.
Consider any profile π ∈ ΠN and distinct x, y ∈ A where γπ(x, y) > 0. Since
γ satisfies PO, the set K = {i ∈ N | πi(x, y) = 1} is nonempty. Suppose
πi(x, y) = 0 for all i ∈ O. Then K is decisive and K∩O = ∅, which contradicts
with Lemma 6.2.12. Now consider any profile π′ ∈ ΠN and distinct x, y ∈ A
where π′j(x, y) = 1 for some j ∈ O. Let S = {i ∈ N | π′i(x, y) = 1}. Since
j ∈ S, Lemma 6.2.12 implies S is decisive and hence γπ′(x, y) > 0.
According to Theorem 6.2.13, for a PO and IIA SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ, in or-
der to assign a positive weight to a pair (x, y) ∈ A × A, there must exist an
individual, who is as a singleton coalition decisive, and prefers x to y. In case
none of such individuals prefers x to y, then PO and IIA SSWF should assign
zero weight to the pair (x, y) ∈ A× A. Hence, the preferences of the oligarchy
members determine whether or not a positive weight will be assigned to a
pair of alternatives. Remark that the converse statement of Theorem 6.2.13
does not hold. Although an oligarchical SSWF is PO, it does not need to sat-
isfy IIA. To transform Theorem 6.2.13 into a full characterization, we need to
know more about IIA and oligarchical SSWFs. So we proceed by showing
that under IIA and oligarchical SSWFs, the social outcome depends only on
the preferences of the oligarchy members which is stated by the next proposi-
tion.
Proposition 6.2.14 Take any oligarchical and IIA SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ which is
expressed by the pairwise SSWF f : Πxy → Σxy. Let O ⊆ N be the oligarchy
induced by f . Given any r, s ∈ (Πxy)N, if ri(x, y) = si(x, y) holds for all i ∈ O,
then fr(x, y) = fs(x, y).
Proof Consider any r, s ∈ Πxy where ri(x, y) = si(x, y) for all i ∈ O. Without
loss of generality let O1r = {i ∈ N | ri(x, y) = 1}, O0r = {i ∈ N | ri(x, y) = 0},
K1r = {i ∈ N \ O | ri(x, y) = 1}, and K0r = {i ∈ N \ O | ri(x, y) = 0}.
Take any distinct a, b, c ∈ A and consider a profile π ∈ ΠN where πi(a, c) =
πi(c, b) = πi(a, b) = 1 for all i ∈ O1r , πi(a, b) = πi(b, c) = πi(a, c) = 1 for all
i ∈ K1r , and πi(c, b) = πi(b, a) = πi(c, a) = 1 for all i ∈ O0r ∪ K0r . Note that
πi(a, b) = πi(a, c) = ri(x, y) for all i ∈ N, which implies γπ(a, b) = γπ(a, c).
Now consider a profile π′ ∈ ΠN where π′i(a, b) = πi(a, b), π′i(b, c) = πi(b, c),
π′i(a, c) = πi(a, c) for all i ∈ O. So for π′ every oligarchy member has the
same preferences as in π. Moreover, let π′i(a, c) = πi(a, c) for all i ∈ N \O.
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Since π′i(a, c) = πi(a, c) holds for all i ∈ N, we have γπ′(a, c) = γπ(a, c).
Since π′i(c, b) = 1 for all i ∈ O, we have γπ′(c, b) = 1. By transitivity this
implies γπ′(c, a) = γπ(c, a) ≥ γπ′(b, a). Now consider another preference
profile π′′ ∈ ΠN where π′′i (a, b) = π′i(a, b), π′′i (b, c) = π′i(b, c), π′′i (a, c) =
π′i(a, c) for all i ∈ N \O. Moreover, let π′′i (b, c) = π′i(c, b), π′′i (a, b) = π′i(a, b),
and π′′i (a, c) = π
′
i(a, c) for all i ∈ O. Note that π′′i (a, c) = π′i(a, c) holds for
all i ∈ N. This implies γπ′′(a, c) = γπ′(a, c). Since π′′i (b, c) = 1 for all i ∈ O,
we have γπ′′(b, c) = 1, by transitivity this implies γπ′′(b, a) ≥ γπ′′(c, a) =
γπ′(c, a). Noting γπ′′(b, a) = γπ′(b, a), we establish γπ′(b, a) = γπ(c, a) =
γπ(b, a), which completes the proof.
A power distribution on the set of individuals is a mapping ω : 2N → [0, 1]
such that ω(K) + ω(N \ K) = 1 for all K ∈ 2N. We consider monotonic power
distributions which satisfy ω(K) ≤ ω(L) for all K, L ∈ 2N with K ⊆ L while
ω(N) = 1. A monotonic power distribution ω : 2N → [0, 1] is called oli-
garchical if and only if ω(L) = 0 implies ω(K ∪ L) = ω(K) for all K, L ∈ 2N .
Remark that when ω is oligarchical, the set {i ∈ N | ω({i}) > 0} is nonempty.
Moreover, ω(K) = 0 for all K ∈ 2N with K ∩ {i ∈ N | ω({i}) > 0} = ∅.
Lemma 6.2.15 Any oligarchical power distribution ω : 2N → [0, 1] induces a PO
and IIA SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ which is defined as γπ(x, y) = ω({i ∈ N | πi(x, y) =
1}) for all π ∈ ΠN and x, y ∈ A. Moreover γ is oligarchical where O = {i ∈ N |
ω({i}) > 0} is the oligarchy.
Proof Take any π ∈ ΠN and any x, y ∈ A. If x and y are not distinct, then
γπ(x, x) = 0 holds by the irreflexivity of individual preferences and the fact
that ω(∅) = 0. If x, y are distinct, then the definition of a power distribution
implies γπ(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] and γπ(x, y) + γπ(y, x) = 1. So γπ is a sophisticated
preference. To see the transitivity of γπ, take any distinct x, y, z ∈ A with
γπ(x, y) = 1. Let K1 = {i ∈ N | πi(x, y) = πi(y, z) = πi(x, z) = 1}, K2 = {i ∈
N | πi(x, z) = πi(z, y) = πi(x, y) = 1}, K3 = {i ∈ N | πi(z, x) = π(x, y) =
π(z, y) = 1}, L1 = {i ∈ N | πi(y, x) = πi(x, z) = πi(y, z) = 1}, L2 = {i ∈ N |
πi(y, z) = πi(z, x) = πi(y, x) = 1}, and L3 = {i ∈ N | πi(z, y) = πi(y, x) =
πi(z, x) = 1}. Note that {K1, K2, K3, L1, L2, L3} is a partition of N. Moreover,
the way ω induces γ implies γπ(x, y) = ω(K1 ∪ K2 ∪ K3) = 1, γπ(y, z) =
ω(K1 ∪ L1 ∪ L2) and γπ(x, z) = ω(K1 ∪ K2 ∪ L1). As ω(K1 ∪ K2 ∪ K3) = 1,
ω(L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3) = 0 and by the monotonicity of ω, we have ω(L) = 0 for all
L ⊆ (L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3). As ω is oligarchical, γπ(y, z) = ω(K1 ∪ L1 ∪ L2) = ω(K1)
and γπ(x, z) = ω(K1 ∪ K2 ∪ L1) = ω(K1 ∪ K2) and the monotonicity of ω
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implies γπ(x, z) ≥ γπ(y, z), showing the transitivity of γπ. Thus, γ is an
SSWF. It is trivial that γ is oligarchical and satisfies both PO and IIA.
So every oligarchical power distribution ω : 2N → [0, 1] generates a PO
and IIA SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ where at each π ∈ ΠN, the weight at which
x ∈ A is socially preferred to y ∈ A equals to the power of the coalition of the
individuals who prefer x to y at the preference profile π. We refer to γ as the
ω-oligarchical SSWF with O = {i ∈ N | ω({i}) > 0} being the corresponding
oligarchy.
Theorem 6.2.16 An SSWF γ : ΠN → Σ is PO and IIA if and only if γ is ω-
oligarchical for some oligarchical power distribution ω.
Proof The if part follows from Lemma 6.2.15. To see the only if part, recall that
by Proposition 6.2.3, γ can be expressed in terms of a single neutral pairwise
SSWF f : Πxy → Σxy. On the other hand, f can be expressed in terms of a
value function v : 2N → [0, 1] which is defined for each K ∈ 2N as v(K) =
fr(x, y) where x, y ∈ A is an arbitrarily chosen distinct pair while r ∈ Πxy is
such that ri(x, y) = 1 for all i ∈ K and ri(x, y) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ K. The fact
that fr(x, y) + fr(y, x) = 1 for any distinct x, y ∈ A and any r ∈ Πxy results in
v being a power distribution. Moreover, v is monotonic by Proposition 6.2.5
and oligarchical by Proposition 6.2.14. As v and f uniquely determine each
other, v is the oligarchical power distribution that induces γ.
According to Theorem 6.2.16, a sophisticated social welfare function is PO
and IIA if and only if it is generated by an oligarchical power distribution on
the set of individuals. This is a fairly large class ranging from dictatoriality,
where power is concentrated on a single individual, to anonymous power
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